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FOREWORD 
 
 
 
Helen Sampson  
 
 
 
This year the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) is twelve years old. For 
a UK University research centre this is a fairly healthy age. Nevertheless we are not 
planning on stopping the work we have begun just yet and I hope to be here with you 
in eight years time announcing that the centre has reached the grand old age of 
twenty!  
 
The centre was set up in 1995, in order to conduct research into seafarers’ health and 
safety. It is in essence a policy-related research centre, the success of which has been 
in working closely with the maritime sector. In terms of  the centre’s achievements I 
think it is fair to say that these have been built upon the support of key stakeholders in 
the maritime sector, who have commissioned projects, provided ‘core-funding’ for the 
centre, and importantly facilitated, and sometimes even encouraged, research access. 
Such on-going co-operation suggests a deep rooted desire within the sector to gain a 
deeper insight into some of the issues relating to the organisation and functioning of 
the shipping industry with particular attention to issues relating to safety and to 
seafarer health.  
 
As I said, SIRC is twelve years old, and with the passage of time comes change, and 
with change there are often challenges. Our challenges are primarily challenges of 
funding and in the coming years we are going to need to find more support from the 
industry in the form of research sponsorship (the funding of research posts rather than 
research projects) if we are to survive. My hope is that the centre will continue for 
another twelve years and that we will continue to contribute to policy debates in the 
sector via the production of objective reports and papers documenting our various 
research findings. That is what this symposium is all about: feeding back our findings 
to those across the sector who may find the kinds of information we have gathered of 
use to them in forming policy, in reaching decisions about strategy, and in considering 
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operational matters, whatever kind of organisation they represent. Not everyone here 
will share the same priorities, some organisations are primarily focussed upon seafarer 
welfare, some upon safety, some upon the competitive operation of ships, some on the 
representation of seafarers, but whatever your reason for taking an interest in our 
research I would like to thank you for coming to Cardiff today and for sharing with 
us, and with others, your insights and your perspectives. I hope you will find the 
papers of use, and of interest, and that you enjoy the symposium. 
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Introduction to Day One 
 
 
 
Helen Sampson  
 
 
The first three papers presented today appear on the surface to be unconnected. In 
terms of current problems being experienced by shipping companies however these 
papers have a very close relationship.  
 
Dr Kahveci is going to present the findings of a commissioned study of the provision 
of welfare services for seafarers. His paper discusses changes in the nature of 
seafarers’ requirements for port-based welfare services. These are predicated upon the 
reduced time that seafarers have available  for shore- leave, and their associated need to 
prioritise matters that can be dealt with promptly from port. In this, communication 
with families and friends features strongly. Dr Kahveci’s paper also highlights the 
limited interpretation currently being applied to seafarers’ welfare needs on board. 
Such understandings can be seen to emphasise a need for entertainment facilities such 
as DVD players, and communication facilities such as email, but give little, or no, 
consideration to the mitigation of social isolation on board or the alleviation of stress 
through group activities (games, barbecues, sports etc). The maximization of cargo 
space and the minimization of cost appear to be the paramount concerns of today’s 
ship builders and the customers of new build vessels, and seafarers’ welfare and living 
conditions (beyond the most basic provision of space for cabins and more frequently 
today than perhaps previously en-suite washing) are increasingly overlooked.  
 
Mr Gekara, is one of three SIRC-Nippon Foundation fellows1 presenting research at 
this year’s symposium. His paper presents some of the findings from his PhD study of 
                                                 
1 SIRC has been awarded a grant by the Nippon Foundation to support people with a social science or a 
maritime -related background (including former seafarers) through a programme of post-graduate level 
research which has the potential to culminate in the award of a PhD. The objective of the funding is to 
support the development of an international network of social scientists focussing on ‘human-related’ 
work in the maritime sector. There are currently thirteen SIRC-Nippon Foundation fellows based 
within the Seafarers International Research Centre. For further details of their backgrounds and 
research please visit the SIRC-Nippon Foundation Fellowships website at 
http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/Nippon%20Fellows/index.html   
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the effectiveness of the introduction of the training commitment as part of the UK 
tonnage tax regime. In considering this area Mr Gekara has explored the perspectives 
of those working for cadet training sponsors, and colleges, in order to try to gain an 
understanding of why it is that the number of junior officers has not risen dramatically 
with the introduction of the training commitment within the tonnage tax regime, 
despite the increase in the UK fleet in tonnage and numeric terms. Perhaps most 
importantly of all, Mr Gekara reports on the perspectives of UK former cadets who 
having initially committed themselves to training, have subsequently withdrawn and 
chosen to pursue other occupational pathways.  
 
 In contrast to both of these papers (Kahveci and Gekara), Mr Tang is not going to 
discuss the perspectives of seafarers themselves but of seafarers’ partners. The 
importance of the family for seafarers’ decisions to go to sea, and whether or not to 
remain at sea, has been demonstrated to a limited extent by previous research 
undertaken by SIRC. Seafarers’ partners have been shown to accept the brunt of the 
responsibility for: child care and rearing; parental care; emotional labour in relation to 
the maintenance of seafarers’ friendships and family relationships; household 
management; and so forth. Their willingness to shoulder the burdens of practical life 
is essential in enabling seafarers to continue to work at sea, and their support is often a 
central pillar for the emotional and psychological strength of seafarers when enduring 
the isolated and often stressful conditions they work in. By focusing on the young 
partners of Chinese seafarers many of whom have yet to commit to marriage Mr Tang 
gives us a unique insight into the pressures and privations which seafarers’ partners 
experience. This, in turn, offers us an understanding of the issues which seafarers 
have to deal with in relation to their emotional relationships with partners. Sometimes 
these may be impossible to satisfactorily resolve and Mr Tang’s paper offers us a very 
clear understanding of why it is that many younger seafarers may choose to leave the 
sea rather than sacrifice close emotional bonds with loved ones.   
 
So what is it that links these three, rather different, papers? Today one of the major 
preoccupations of fleet personnel managers, whether they work in ship management 
companies or for ‘owner operators’, is the recruitment and retention of suitably 
qualified and experienced officers. The crisis in the supply of such personnel can be 
attributed to a concatenation of circumstances which include: an increase in demand 
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spurred by a boom in trade and a rapid expansion of the world fleet; a fall in the 
supply of seafarers from traditional maritime nations such as the UK; increasing 
numbers of seafarers leaving the industry for shore-based jobs at a relatively early 
age; and a decline in the provision of cadet berths. When we begin to unpick the 
problem in these terms we see the connection between the three papers mentioned. Dr 
Kahveci and Mr Tang’s papers shed some light on why it is that many seafarers seek 
to leave ‘the sea’ at a relatively early stage in their career whilst Mr Gekara’s focus is 
more directly on cadets and the supply of new young officers to the sector.  
 
At the present time, in trying to deal with the problem of the limited availability of 
officers, the focus of many in the sector is wages and we have seen senior officers’ 
wages increase dramatically in the last five years. However, what these three papers 
highlight when put together and considered in the light of an officer shortage, is why 
seafaring can be seen as an increasingly unattractive occupation and why paying 
higher wages cannot offer a long term solution to the challenges of recruitment. 
Higher wages mean that in the medium to longer term seafarers will be able to leave 
‘the sea’ at an earlier and earlier stage in their careers. This will further reduce the 
numbers of available officers and put further pressure on wages, resulting in a wages 
spiral which will allow seafarers to leave the industry even faster, and so forth. 
Clearly such a situation is unsustainable and is likely to produce a major crisis in the 
sector with ships being tied up, more accidents resulting from the recruitment of lower 
quality personnel, etc.  
 
Current research at SIRC, illustrated by the findings presented in the first three papers 
of this year’s symposium, suggest that what is required is not just higher wages but a 
more systematic effort to improve the lives of seafarers at sea in order to retain them 
on board. This kind of effort was once evident in the Scandinavian and North 
European fleets when considerable consideration was given to thinking about life and 
work on board and the kinds of living and recreational facilities that seafarers would 
benefit from. Today it seems there is an assumption that seafarers from developing 
countries don’t need such provision (I have heard people ‘explain’ this to others) but I 
think that the evidence speaks for itself. People wherever they are from are all capable 
of experiencing suffering as a result of: isolation; boredom; confinement; 
institutionalisation; fear; heat; cold; noise; vibration; fatigue; and stress. Seafarers are 
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no different. The need for the provision of a decent lifestyle on board a ship knows no 
ethnic or cultural boundaries. If it is not provided, then seafarers, wherever they are 
from, will constantly weigh up economic necessity and privation. As soon as their 
economic needs can be satisfactorily met, in their judgement, they are likely to leave 
an uncomfortable life aboard ship for a less-well paid but happier life ashore with 
their families and friends. A consideration of the findings from various SIRC studies 
strongly suggests that the key to keeping seafarers at sea is to make seafaring an 
attractive occupation where adequate compensation is provided on board for the 
privations associated with such remote and monotonous work.    
 
The fourth paper of the day deals more directly with the current concerns of the 
industry via a focus on risk and risk management. Professor Walters has undertaken a 
great deal of land-based research on safety, and safety management, and in recent 
years has undertaken an extensive study of land-based chemical risk management. For 
the last six months he has drawn upon this expertise in undertaking a small-scale and  
preliminary investigation of chemical risk management at sea, with regard to both the 
transport of chemical cargoes and the use of chemicals in the course of daily work on 
board merchant vessels. In this paper he highlights the dearth of knowledge about 
practice in this area, the lessons that can be learned from land-based experiences of 
risk management, and the contribution that risk-management at sea could, potentially, 
make to the elucidation of best practice ashore.  
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Introduction to Day Two 
 
 
 
Helen Sampson  
 
 
Today sees the continuation of the theme of safety and risk management begun for us 
with the delivery of the last paper of yesterday’s session given by Professor Walters. 
Professor Walters considered the very specific application of risk management to the 
use and transport of chemicals. However, today’s papers consider risk and safety at a 
more general level.  
 
We begin with an account by Mr Ellis of some research activity which we have 
initiated under the auspices of the ‘Perceptions of Risk’ study undertaken by the 
Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU) formerly known as the 
‘Lloyds Register Research Unit’ or LRRU, here at SIRC. In the course of this 
research we have sought accident data from a variety of stakeholders. Our ambition 
was to compare data gathered on seafarers’ perceptions of risk, and the perceptions of 
those involved in the shore-side management of vessels, with the ‘reality’ of risk. We 
have been limited in realising this ambition by the inadequacy of the available data 
relating to accidents/incidents at sea. Whilst various types of information are 
collected, collated, and sometimes analysed, by stakeholders in the sector such data 
are invariably limited in their coverage. This makes it impossible to aggregate data 
and thereby establish, with any degree of confidence: how risk prone the shipping 
industry is in general terms: where risk is concentrated (types of ships, types of trades, 
types of activities and so forth) ; and/or where risk management is being successfully 
achieved. However, not to be defeated, we have set out to document what kinds of 
data are available from three sources: Maritime Administrations; P&I clubs; and 
individual companies; and have sought to describe how these might best be utilised 
and what kinds of data could valuably be collected and collated in the future, in order 
to facilitate the development of far more robust information on accidents at sea.   We 
are hoping that these preliminary efforts might be a catalyst for a concerted effort by 
key stakeholders to standardise data collection relating to accidents at sea to allow us 
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to develop, for the first time, a valid understanding of maritime accidents and 
incidents.  We would be grateful for any assistance which can be volunteered by 
stakeholders in furthering this objective. 
 
Following on from the account by Mr Ellis, Dr Bailey describes what we have been 
able to make of the available accident/incident data, in relation to the production of a 
comparison between the perceptions of risk held by seafarers/those involved in the 
shore-side management of vessels and the kinds of risks which appear to predominate 
in the industry. Here Dr Bailey draws heavily upon the outcome of a major survey of 
risk perception undertaken by LRETRU and data which we have been able to access 
from seven of the thirty largest maritime administrations in the world. This research is 
on-going and we hope to produce a full report of the findings in 2008. For the present, 
Dr Bailey offers a clear understanding of seafarers’/managers’ perceptions of risk and 
draws some conclusions about the nature of risk in the industry and the different ways 
of seeing risk found across the industry workforce. 
 
One of the very interesting findings which emerged in the course of the analysis of 
our extensive questionnaire on perceptions of risk (LRETRU), was that they are 
strongly influenced by nationality. Chinese respondents were found to see risk in the 
general domain of shipping as relatively low, whilst they ranked the risks which they 
perceived co-workers (employed by the same company as themselves) to be faced 
with as relatively high, when compared with other groups of respondents of different 
nationalities. Intrigued by these findings we developed a study within SIRC designed 
to explore with Chinese seafarers the issues which impacted upon their perceptions of 
risk. This study is still ongoing and to date Dr Wu has boarded two vessels wholly 
crewed by Chinese nationals in order to consider the issue further. His paper 
represents a preliminary analysis of his findings which currently point to structural 
factors (such as local labour market conditions, and management practices and 
policies) having a stronger influence over perceptions of risk than cultural factors. 
 
Last but not least, Mr Bhattacharya, the third of our SIRC-Nippon Foundation fellows 
to present a paper at the symposium, will discuss his research into the implementation 
of the ISM code. His paper focuses on the importance of seafarer participation in 
relation to the effective management of safety on board and considers the factors 
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which block or impede such participation. It concludes that a number of issues 
confront the industry in its quest to develop an effective safety management system 
i.e. one that successfully achieves a reduction in accidents/incidents. Not least of these 
is a lack of awareness amongst many shore-side managers of the importance of 
seafarer participation in effective shipboard safety management. Other barriers relate 
to the hierarchical structure of shipboard relationships, the nature of the labour market 
(e.g. the widespread application of temporary contracts), and a lack of trust in 
aspirations, on the part of management, to foster ‘no blame’ or ‘just’ workplace 
cultures. 
 
This collection of papers represents some of the current interests and concerns of the 
Seafarers International Research Centre. Inevitably, our research interests extend 
beyond those that we have been able to present here and incorporate work on: 
regulation; education and training; transnationality; the impact of globalisation on 
seafarers’ living and working conditions; the under-reporting of personal accidents by 
seafarers; the long-term health consequences of working at sea; seafarers’ nutrition; 
the mental health of seafarers; and a range of issues which have in common a broad 
conception of health and safety. By its nature this short symposium allows us to offer 
a flavour of just some of the work that we are undertaking, or planning, at the centre. 
Nevertheless we hope that this selection has been of interest and value and that you 
continue to take an interest in and, where possible, support the research undertaken at 
the Seafarers International Research Centre.  
 
Please note that all the views offered here are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily constitute the views of the SIRC, or Cardiff University, management nor 
those of our sponsors and funders. Please include a full citation (reference) when 
quoting any parts of any of the papers contained herein.          
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WELFARE SERVICES FOR SEAFARERS 
 
Erol Kahveci 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the adequacy of welfare provision for seafarers, in port and on 
board vessels, by analysing primary data obtained through extensive research 
undertaken with both seafarers and shipping company key informants. The research 
utilised questionnaires and semi-structured in-depth interviews. The paper identifies 
‘best practice’ and areas where improvements are needed in relation to welfare 
provision at sea. It recommends a number of wider policies and practices for the 
consideration of regulators, policy makers, shipping companies and ship management 
company personnel.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ILO 2006 Maritime Labour Convention is currently in its ratification phase. 
However, there is a general consensus in the industry that if, and when, the 
convention is ratified by sufficient administrations the conditions set by the 
Convention will establish comprehensive minimum requirements for almost all 
aspects of working conditions of seafarers. As far as welfare issues are concerned the 
convention covers access to shore-based welfare facilities and services; also onboard 
recreational facilities including reasonable access to ship-to-shore telephone 
communications and e-mail facilities. However, there are two questions here, firstly, 
what do we actually know about seafarers’ access to port based welfare services 
world-wide and second ly what do we know about the current state of recreational 
facilities and access to telecommunication facilities aboard merchant vessels? In this 
context the paper aims: 
 
· To explore current seafarer access to shore based welfare facilities and 
services; 
· To document the provision of recreational facilities and access to 
telecommunication facilities aboard merchant vessels; 
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· To critically assess the adequacy of welfare provision for seafarers from a 
seafarers’ perspective.  
 
In the following sections of this paper these main aims will be examined by the 
analysis of a recently completed SIRC research project funded by the ITF Seafarers’ 
Trust which was started in April 2006 and finalised in March 2007 (see Kahveci 2007 
for further details). 
 
 
Research methods  
 
The research was conducted in different locations combining various research 
methods (i.e. an extensive seafarers’ questionnaire, semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with seafarers and key industry informants etc.) and these included: 
· 86 questionnaires from shipowners and key ship management company 
informants.  
· 52 semi-structured interviews with ship owners and ship management 
company informants in the UK, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Norway, Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  
· 3,792 questionnaires from seafarers (stratified sampling applied to the top 20 
maritime labour supplying countries and the sample target is based on 1 per 
cent representation)  
· 112 in-depth interviews with seafarers in their home societies in the 
Philippines, India, Russia, Ukraine, PRC, Turkey and the UK 
 
Summary demographics 
 
Table 1 below summarises the number and nationalities of the seafarer respondents to 
our survey. Of those included in the survey 53 per cent were employed on deck, 40 
per cent in the engine room and seven per cent in the galley. Fifty-one per cent were 
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ratings. Of the rest 17 per cent were senior officers, 21 per cent junior officers, nine 
per cent petty officers and two per cent were cadets.  
 
Table 1: The top 20 seafarer supplying countries and the number of seafarers 
who responded to the survey questionnaire  
 
 Nationality Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Proposed 1 
per cent 
representation 
Returned 
questionnaires 
1 Philippines 132314 27.1 1323 1417 
2 Russia 40871 8.4 409 379 
3 Ukraine 40305 8.3 403 419 
4 China 30855 6.3 309 164 
5 India 23861 4.9 239 320 
6 Indonesia 17761 3.6 178 147 
7 Poland 17254 3.5 173 175 
8 Turkey 15277 3.1 153 210 
9 Greece 14216 2.9 142 101 
10 Burma/ Myanmar 10830 2.2 108 62 
11 Syria 10273 2.1 103 48 
12 Romania 10081 2.1 101 80 
13 Latvia 9552 2.0 96 49 
14 Bulgaria 9502 1.9 95 70 
15 Croatia 7893 1.6 79 21 
16 Korea, South 5946 1.2 59 18 
17 Egypt 5828 1.2 58 27 
18 Netherlands 4387 0.9 44 33 
19 Italy 4295 0.9 43 35 
20 Taiwan 4265 0.9 43 17 
 Total 415,566  4,158 3,792 
Note: for frequency and valid per cent SIRC Global Seafarer Labour Market Survey 2003, used as a 
source. 
 
Most seafarers were married (71 per cent), 28 per cent were single and only one per 
cent were divorced, separated or widowed. There were only 18 women respondents. 
The youngest seafarer was 18, the oldest 65 and the average age was 36. The years at 
sea varied from a coup le of months to 49 years with an average of 14 years. The 
average lengths of contracts were five months for senior officers, seven months for 
junior officers and nine months for petty officers and ratings. When they responded to 
our survey questionnaire they were on average into their fiftieth month of current 
contracts at sea. 
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We estimated that seafarers responded to our survey from circa 400 ships. Twenty-
eight per cent of seafarers worked aboard bulk carriers, 19 per cent on general cargo, 
18 percent on tankers (including oil, chemical and gas), 11 percent on containers, four 
per cent on Ro-Ro (including car carriers) and the remaining 20 per cent aboard 
different type of vessels (including unknown). The voyage cycle of the vessels where 
the seafarer respondents sailed showed variations. Just over 28 per cent of the vessels 
were involved in short sea trades, 20 per cent were involved in deep sea crossings 
with intense port calls, 17 per cent were involved in deep sea crossing with few port 
calls; another 15 per cent were involved in regional trades (i.e. Mediterranean, Black 
Sea, Baltic Sea etc.), 11 per cent said the trade patterns of their ships were changeable. 
The remaining nine per cent said that their ships sailed world-wide without making 
any specific reference to the nature of their ships’ voyage cycle. 
 
The majority of the eighty-six shipping company survey respondents were ex-
seafarers (n=75), having served as senior deck and engine room officers. Only 11 of 
them had no previous sea-based career. The biggest company in our survey 
owned/managed well over 200 ships and the smallest had only 3. Their position in the 
company also varied from senior managers (owner, president and vice-president, n=8) 
to managers (crewing, communication, operation etc., n=53) to lower line 
management (superintendent etc., n=25). 
 
 
Access to shore -based welfare facilities and services – shore leave 
 
It is a simple fact that in order to have access to shore-based welfare facilities and 
services seafarers need to have adequate shore- leave. Seafarers overwhelmingly 
acknowledged that having shore leave was important for their physical and mental 
well-being. They also made frequent reference to the importance of ‘seeing different 
faces and places’, having a break from the stressful shipboard environment and work 
pressure. They explained that it was time for them to contact their families as shore 
leave provided them opportunities to use cheaper telecommunication facilities.  Here 
are some first person accounts to highlight this: 
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“Shore leave is important because it is the only way for letting our stress out. 
We are like prisoners onboard. We need to interact with other people and see 
different faces and places.”  
 
“For me it is important to have shore leave, even once in a while just for a few 
hours.  This is the worry free time from all those traumas in the engine room 
and all those problems on the ship. And being relieved from home sickness or 
sea sickness.” 
 
“It is very important because when we have a shore pass; it’s the only time that 
we can forget our problems on the ship.  Then it’s also the time we can call our 
family.  It is the time that no-one will tell you to do this or do that.  No boss 
when you go out.  It is my favourite time; my favourite part of seafaring.” 
 
“When I have a shore leave I can release my boredom. It’s another environment 
and I can refresh myself.” 
 
One seafarer said that his ship had just been in dry dock in China for 17 days and he 
had gone out every evening. However, his case was atypical. When seafarers were 
asked how many times they had shore leave during the last eight weeks, as can be 
seen from Table 2, 64 percent of the respondents said they had not had any shore 
leave during the last eight weeks. However, for some the lack of shore leave went  
well beyond the previous eight weeks: 
 
“My last five contracts, including the current one have been on LNG tankers. 
Our route is only between the Middle East – Qatar and Japan – Bay of Tokyo. It 
takes fifteen days between the two ports. We stay in port 18 hours in both ends. 
In Qatar, it is impossible to have shore leave. In Japan we are always busy with 
engine work or gangway watch. So over the last 50 months at sea I’ve never had 
shore leave. Once we had this emergency dry dock, for two days in Jabel Ali 
and even then we were within the port compound, we didn’t go outside.” 
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Some other seafarers provided more typical examples of shore leave: 
 
“I have not had any shore leave during my current contract at all. We are very 
busy in ports. Only port we stay over night is in Japan which is our main 
loading port, but at night we are like prisoners onboard. They close all the port 
gates. Although you are sometimes off duty at night you cannot go out. This 
happened to me twice already during my current contract.” 
 
“Our ship trades between Korea and Europe. Ulsan is our loading port and we 
stay in port over night while loading cars.  Every time we stop in Ulsan I have 
shore leave which is every other month. So I have one shore leave every eight 
weeks.” 
 
Thirty-six per cent who had been able to take shore leave during the same period said 
that their shore leave on average lasted around two hours.  Voyage cycles of the ships 
that seafarers sailed aboard could be seen to have had an impact on their shore leave 
opportunities; as the majority of seafarers who had taken shore leave during the 
previous eight weeks worked aboard short-sea trade vessels. 
 
Table 2: Number of shore leaves during the last 8 weeks 
 
  Percentage 
None (N=2160) 64 
Once (N=270) 8 
Twice (N=371) 11 
Three times (N=169) 5 
Four times (N=201) 6 
Five Times and more (N=204) 6 
N= 3375 
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There was a further question for seafarers who had taken shore leave asking whether 
they spent it within the port area or went beyond the port gates. In response, fifty-
three per cent (N=604) of seafarers said that they spent their shore leave within the 
port area.  
 
In-depth interviews with seafarers revealed that when they ha d an opportunity for 
shore leave their main priority was to make a phone call to their families and friends 
and their shore leave did not extend beyond a phone box either in the port area or 
seafarers’ centre. Seafarers who got beyond the port gate stated that the main 
motivation for this was either to go shopping for their basic needs or again to use 
communication facilities which are not in the immediate port area.  
 
The main reasons given for not having shore leave and for lack of access to shore-
based welfare facilities were workload when ship s were in port; fast turnarounds; lack 
of information about ports where ships called; lack of transport; and restrictions, 
imposed by port authorities, related to the ISPS Code. According to the 1996 MORI 
survey, 57 per cent of seafarers were satisfied with their shore- leave. Today, on the 
contrary, 64 per cent of the seafarers were not able to have shore- leave for a 
considerable length of time.  
 
The limited access to shore based welfare facilities and services due to lack of 
adequate shore leave had an impact on the ranking of important port based welfare 
services for seafarers. In seafarers’ opinions the importance of using traditional port 
based services such as organised sightseeing, video/book exchange and reading rooms 
have declined. The next section of the paper demonstrates this change over the last 10 
years. The MORI 1996 Seafarers’ Living Conditions Survey serves as a very useful 
comparison point to document these changes.  
 
 
Important port based welfare services for seafarers and changes over 10 years  
 
Seafarers were asked to rank the importance of 15 selected port based welfare services 
(as “important”; “neither/nor”; “not important”). In order to document changes over 
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the last 10 years this question was adopted from the MORI 1996 Seafarers’ Living 
Conditions Survey. However, the 1996 Survey did not include port based welfare 
services such as transport to seafarers centres; availability of cheap phone cards which 
did not exist in 1996, and internet access which was in its infancy in 1996. These 
items were included in the 2006 Survey. 
 
Table 3: How important each port based welfare service is for seafarers  
(Percentage of seafarers who said it was important) 
 
Services MORI 1996 SIRC 2006 Change over 
10 years  
Transport to shops/town 70 85 +15 
International phone 79 81 +2 
Transport to seafarers’ centre N/A 72 N/A 
Cheap phone cards N/A 70 N/A 
Internet access N/A 68 N/A 
Personal counselling services 45 57 +12 
Place of worship 48 53 +5 
Port based medical clinic 70 44 -26 
Reading room/library 50 17 -33 
Video/book exchange 64 15 -49 
Organised sightseeing  48 13 -35 
Meeting local people 53 10 -43 
Sports facilities 51 10 -41 
Money exchange 66 9 -57 
On shore accommodation 44 9 -35 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, over the last 10 years the opinions of seafarers in 
relation to the most important port-based welfare services have changed. As in the 
1996 MORI Survey, port-based welfare services such as transport to shops and town, 
and international telephone facilities are very important for seafarers. In fact over the 
10 years the importance of these services for seafarers has increased slightly. 
 
The other port based services which were not listed in the MORI survey, such as 
transport to a seafarers’ centre; availability of cheap international phone cards; and 
internet access are also regarded by seafarers as being important. 
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Availability of services like a port based medical clinic and personal counselling 
services have been regarded as more important in comparison to the 1996 MORI 
survey. 
 
The most important changes occurred, however, in relation to the need for a reading 
room/library; video/book exchange; organised sightseeing; meeting local people; 
sport facilities; money exchange; and on shore accommodation. In comparison with 
the 1996 survey, the importance of these services for seafarers has declined 
considerably.  
 
This major shift reflects changes in the maritime industry and the basic priorities of 
seafarers faced with limited time in port. In fact, when seafarers were asked what 
would improve their lives at sea their emphasis focused on the shipboard welfare. 
They frequently mentioned a desire for people from shore based welfare agencies to 
visit their ships or for companies to expand their onboard welfare facilities and 
services. In other words in the context of seafarers having very limited opportunities 
to have access to shore based welfare facilities and services, the provision of adequate 
shipboard welfare facilities are very important for seafarers’ physical and mental well-
being. The next section of this paper focuses on the current state of the onboard 
welfare provisions for seafarers. 
 
 
Onboard welfare provisions  
 
As the respondents worked for circa 100 shipping and ship management companies 
their onboard welfare provisions such as sports and recreational facilities varied 
considerably according to the different companies the y worked for. One of the most 
frequently reported company policies for welfare provision included a monthly 
provision of approximately $100-150 contributed to the welfare fund of each ship in 
the fleet. From this budget seafarers would decide what to buy (i.e. DVD’s, sports 
equipment, musical instruments etc.). The worst cases of onboard welfare provision 
varied from very limited provision to ‘pay for it yourself’ - where seafarers 
contributed to shipboard welfare funds either from their overtime pay or extra earning 
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onboard (such as earnings from cargo handling or cleaning of cargo holds). Here are 
some first person accounts to demonstrate these alternative approaches: 
 
“Our facilities for entertainment are good.  We have  complete DVDs; it’s 
pirated but better than nothing. Our yearly budget is for entertainment, exercise 
equipment and games etc. and it is $1,200 per annum.” 
 
“We have so many facilities onboard.  We have a whole basketball court, 
swimming pool, gymnasium; we have also table tennis, darts, chess and other 
table games and complete set of musical instruments and lots of movies, CDs 
and, DVDs. … Five dollars deduction from every crew member’s salary 
monthly and the welfare committee decides how to spend it - if there is 
something to be bought or something to be paid. In addition once a year – every 
December the company allocates also $1,000 for the purchase of equipment. For 
example last December we have purchased a play station and a DVD player. 
The captain also cuts some funds from our overtime pay for the purchase of 
movies.” 
 
“When we lash containers we get paid one dollar per container, every month 10 
per cent of the lashing money goes to the ship’s welfare fund.” 
 
“My ship is a passenger luxury liner.  We have a library equipped with all the 
CDs and DVDs but it’s very hard to compare it with the passengers, because we 
rent them for one dollar a day. We can also borrow a book but need to put a $20 
deposit.” 
 
It needs to be emphasised that as far as seafarers are concerned their financial 
contribution to ‘ship welfare funds’ is involuntary. “They never ask if we want to pay 
or not” said one seafarer and “we can’t say no, this is a company rule” said another. 
The system that allows deductions from seafarers’ payments for the purchase of on 
board entertainment equipment creates suspicion and disagreement. One seafarer said 
“we pay money for the ship’s welfare fund but don’t get anything back”. A rating said 
“officers buy what they want not what we [ratings] want”. 
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Seven out of 10 seafarers said that it was important for them to have access to e-mail 
at sea. However, only 16 per cent of the seafarers reported that they had access to 
onboard e-mail facilities. There are differences when senior officers and ratings are 
compared. Their access to on board e-mail facilities for private use was 40 and three 
per cent respectively. All the vessels that seafarers worked on had e-mail facilities. 
However, it was generally stated that this was mainly for official use. Where it was 
possible to use e-mail on board seafarers expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations 
placed on the number and length of messages they could send and also the lack of 
privacy associated with email communication. Some seafarers said that they not only 
had to pay for the messages they sent from their ships, but also for in coming e-mails 
too. 
 
“We have e-mail onboard the vessel but it is at the discretion of the master. 
Some times he lets the junior officer use it but some times not. Some times he  
lets the crew use it and some times that’s also limited but there is no problem for 
senior officers.” 
 
“Our captain is quite good.  He allows us to send 4 e-mails a week.” 
 
“Our first captain said we could only send 2 emails a week.  However, the new 
captain said that we could send 3 emails a week, but only at weekends -  
Saturday or Sunday.” 
 
“We can use e-mail onboard but you have to buy a 20 dollar internet card, it is 
very expensive. I pay minimum of $1 for each mail I send or receive. The price 
goes up by bytes. Each card cost $25 and I use 3 cards a month. I can send about 
10 e-mails per card. I also receive some.” 
 
“Only communication I use is via satellite phone which is very expensive. We 
have an e-mail onboard but it is for the ship’s business only even as a Chief 
Officer I don’t have an access to it for personal use.” 
 
“We are not allowed to use the e-mail. It’s only for the business 
communication.” 
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As some of the seafarers’ accounts illustrated above suggest the shipping companies 
that they worked for had no clear policies on shipboard e-mail access for them and 
captains’ discretion played an important role. This policy has potential to create a 
further division amongst the crew members on board ships.  
 
The main means of communication for seafarers with family and friends whilst at sea 
was the satellite phone. This was followed by personal mobile phones (mainly text 
messages) when they were in range of a signal. Only one in 10 seafarers mentioned 
writing letters. Although this is the cheapest option available, many said that the 
limited time they had, and the length of time it took for letters to be sent and received, 
made letter writing less attractive. 
 
 
Company policies on seafarers’ welfare  
 
The questionnaire analysis and the in-depth interviews with ship owners and ship 
management company representatives revealed that onboard seafarers’ welfare 
provisions were heavily influenced by company preferences and practices. This 
creates a very fragmented welfare provision for seafarers at sea with a big gap 
between the ‘top’ end of the industry and the ‘bottom’.  
 
“In our fleet the onboard welfare facilities vary. Some clients are more 
concerned with crew welfare than others. We have to give them a free hand to 
some extent and we only step in when there are problems. We employ 3,000 
seafarers and have had no welfare related complaints so far this year.” 
 
“We have a vested interest in looking after seafarers’ welfare because quite 
frankly, happy seafarers are far more productive. It’s far nicer to manage happy 
people, so why not make them happy if you can and still be relatively 
competitive.” 
 
The analysis of company policies on seafarers’ welfare shows parallels with seafarers’ 
accounts of their experiences of onboard welfare provisions which were reported 
earlier. As we have also seen, some companies aim to provide welfare services for 
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seafarers which are directly or indirectly subsidised by seafarers themselves. Here are 
some examples to demonstrate this.  
 
“We have shipbased welfare funds. The money is collected in these funds 
through supernumeries onboard. For example, if a senior officer sails with his 
wife he contributes to the welfare fund US $3.50 every day that his wife stays 
onboard. We have no restrictions on ranks to sail with a family member and 
sometimes if the space permits a crew member could be joined by his wife and 
children together but they must contribute to the shipboard welfare fund. The 
money accumulated in this fund can only be used for the crew entertainment 
onboard. They could purchase sports equipment or DVD’s and so on.” 
 
“These days many crew members have their own laptops, DVD players and 
other equipment in their own cabins and they all have different taste. In some 
parts of the worlds where our ships trade our crew could buy music CDs or 
DVD movies very cheaply.” 
 
This “different taste” has also been emphasised by another manager: 
 
“Our company recruits crews from seven different countries through local 
crewing agencies. All these seafarers have different tastes. We have common 
understanding with the crewing agencies that they send DVDs in Tagalog or 
Hindi with a joining crew regularly. This is part of their service.” 
 
However, it must be emphasised that encouraging seafarers to subsidise their own 
recreational facilities on the basis of different tastes could create some problems for a 
cohesive social life on board vessels. Seafarers spending their time alone  in their 
cabins watching DVDs on their computer monitor, or different nationalities arranging 
their recreation according to their “different taste” aboard the same vessels, could 
have some serious consequences for the safe running of the ship as well as physical 
and social well being of seafarers. These sort of company policies for seafarers’ 
recreation limit social interaction between crew members and deepen the social 
isolation of seafarers.  
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As emphasised earlier, onboard recreation provision for seafarers differs enormously 
from one shipping or ship management company to another. This pattern persists 
when monthly crew welfare and recreation budget allowances are considered. As the 
table below demonstrates when company representatives were asked about their 
average monthly welfare budget per ship, over 50 per cent indicated that they do not 
have any regular monthly budget allowances. “We don’t have a particular budget but 
we supply movies and entertainment systems and all that on board” said one manager 
and “we spend some months over a thousand dollars on stereo systems or TVs but not 
much in the next. It all depends on demand” said another. Similar points were echoed 
by other managers. Some ship management company representatives emphasised that 
although they have no particular welfare budget allowance as such their ship 
operating budget covers items related to crew welfare. 
 
However, 26 per cent of company representatives said that their companies have a 
monthly on board welfare budget allowance per ship of between US$100 and $150, 
and another 18 per cent of under $100. Table 4 below, also demonstrates the extent of 
‘contributions’ made by seafarers to shipboard recreational welfare funds. Altogether 
28 per cent of our respondent group have practices in place to this end.  
 
When the best budget allowance per ship is considered the amount of money per 
capita is fairly low and in real terms it is insufficient to maintain most facilities and /or 
equipment let alone improve the current low level of onboard provision. 
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Table 4: Monthly company budget for ship-board seafarer recreational facilities 
(per ship) 
 
  Percentage 
No regular budget but facilities are provided on demand (N=16) 20 
No specific budget but provisions included in the ship operation 
budget (N=13) 
16 
No regular budget but company provisions coexist with 
(involuntary) contribution from seafarers (N=12) 
15 
Regular budget over $100 and provision on demand (N=12) 15 
Regular budget between $100 and $150 and further 
(involuntary) contribution from seafarers (N=9) 
11 
Regular budget under $100 and further (involuntary) 
contribution from seafarers (N=7) 
9 
Regular budget under $100 (N=7) 9 
Other (i.e. supernumeries contributing to onboard welfare fund) 
(N=3) 
4 
N= 79 
 
One of the striking outcomes of the survey and interviews is that in general companies 
have a narrow sense of seafarers’ welfare which mainly focuses on the provision of 
limited leisure and entertainment facilities, such as TV monitors, DVD players and 
DVDs, music systems and so on. During interviews and focus group discussions with 
seafarers, they emphasised that sometimes ships they sail on have recreation facilities 
such as gymnasium rooms, swimming pools, saunas, bars, reading rooms and 
libraries. However, increasing numbers of vessels are built without such facilities as 
emphasis is increasingly placed upon cost and cargo space, as opposed to crew 
welfare. 
 
Where they do remain it was reported that these spaces are often not utilised for the 
purposes they were built for. It emerged during interviews with seafarers that the 
spaces may be left empty, turned into store rooms or locked up permanently. One 
manager making reference to one of his multi purpose ships which was built in the 
early 1990s in Finland said “that ship has so much empty, unused spaces. Life 
onboard changed a lot since that ship was built”. He implied that the ship was built 
originally by a Scandinavian company employing Scandinavian crew and his 
company employs seafarers from the Philippines, India and Indonesia and that crews 
from these countries do not ‘need’ a reading room, sauna or a gym. It was evident 
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from the findings of the research that assumptions are being made about what crew 
require on board and what they do not based upon stereotypes and seeming prejudice. 
Crews themselves are likely to feel unable to resist practices such as never filling up 
the swimming pool or turning over gymnasia for storage space given the precarious 
nature of their employment, and in any case a gymnasium full of obsolete un-
maintained equipment may eventually fall into ‘voluntary’ disuse. If companies are 
not prepared to equip and properly maintain reading rooms, gyms, saunas, swimming 
pools and so forth, as a matter of priority, then inevitably seafarers will end up not 
making use of them. 
 
In fact, newly built vessels are often based on the optimisation of available space for 
cargo and sometimes for daily work which results in smaller crew quarters. In general 
it seems that the provision of onboard welfare facilities for seafarers is going in the 
wrong direction. Given the shortage of qualified seafarers and problems with seafarer 
retention in the industry, this is not a good impression to give future recruits, and the 
industry needs to address the provision and maintenance of shipboard welfare 
facilities for seafarers. In fact, at a time where concerns are being expressed about 
seafarers’ health onboard, recreational facilities such as swimming pools, gyms, 
separate recreation and mess rooms could improve social interaction on board 
contributing to an improvement in both physical and mental wellbeing. Similar views 
in relation to the importance of recreational facilities on board are also expressed 
elsewhere (Du Rietz and Ljunggren 2001; Sampson 2000: 2006).  
 
To finalise the paper on a positive note, some companies have managed effectively to 
secure shore-leave for their crews despite their vessels having fast turnarounds and 
busy schedules and some others provide unlimited e-mail access to their seafarers: 
 
“With a very few exceptions we have free shuttle services for our seafarers in 
every port that our ships operate, even if there is only one seafarer who could 
have shore leave in that particular port. The service operates on demand and 
makes a couple of rounds if necessary to accommodate crew members who are 
on duty. Of course this costs money but we see this as an investment and we 
have very good return in our investment. We can see the outcome of this service 
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although it is difficult to measure it. We have a very high retention rate, our 
crew is loyal to us, they are happy and healthy.” 
 
“In our fleet every crew member onboard has a private e-mail account and 
unlimited access to send and receive e-mails.” 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
It is widely accepted in the shipping industry that due to changes in relation to 
globalisation and competition and also in relation to fast turnarounds, reduced crew 
sizes, restriction of shore leave, and new port development s away from easy access to 
shore-based facilities, the welfare needs of seafarers are greater than they used to be. 
Prolonged isolation from families and friends and limited opportunities to 
communicate with them make this need even greater.  
 
The comparison between the results of the ITF/MORI 1996 and the current survey 
shows that over the last 10 years, seafarers’ lives have become increasingly confined 
to their vessels. As we have seen, port-based welfare services, access to which 
requires a longer period of time ashore (reading room/library; organised sightseeing; 
meeting local people; sport facilities and on shore accommodation) are not seen as 
important as they were 10 years ago. These changes reflect the basic priorities of 
seafarers with a limited time in port and are not because seafarers do not desire or 
require these services anymore. They simply do not have time to use them and 
prioritise their most pressing needs in the face of limited time. 
 
As we have seen, some shipping and ship management companies provide better 
welfare services for their seafarers than others and there is a polarisation in the 
industry as far as company policies on welfare provisions for their seafarers are 
concerned. However, amongst our company respondents only a few could be 
considered as implementing  ‘best practice’ in relation to crew welfare provision.  
 
The ILO Maritime Labour Convention has the capacity to improve seafarers’ welfare 
ashore and at sea. There is also optimism in the industry that by 2011  ratification by 
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30 countries will be achieved representing a total share of at least 33 per cent of world 
gross tonnage - the requirement in order to bring the convention into force.  
 
Meanwhile a number of policies and practices could be successfully introduced or 
developed by international and national maritime employment regulators, policy 
makers and shipping and ship management companies. The following proposals could 
be adopted to improve the existing welfare services and facilities for seafarers.  
 
Shipping and ship management companies should consider: 
 
• Having policies in place making sure that their seafarers have shore leave on a 
regular basis. 
• Exploring the provision of free shuttle bus facilities provided by the 
companies for their seafarers when their ships are in port. 
• Instructing their agents to provide necessary information about welfare and 
other facilities (including communication and transport) for their crews in 
ports. 
• Having clear policies in place which permit seafarers aboard their ships access 
to telecommunication facilities (not at the discretion of captains). 
• Developing a holistic approach to seafarers’ welfare beyond just addressing 
Limited entertainment facilities aboard their vessels. 
• Allocating a sufficient budget for wide ranging onboard welfare provision. 
• Exploring the availability of cheaper onboard telecommunication facilities for 
seafarers. 
 
It needs to be emphasised that, as documented in this paper, some of these 
recommendations are already in practice; however it would be beneficial if they were 
more widespread across the industry. 
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`INCREASING SHIPPING SKILLS IN THE UK: ‘BURSTING’ THE 
INDUSTRY ‘MYTH’ OF ‘DIMINISHING INTEREST’ 
Victor Gekara 
 
Abstract 
In recent decades, the UK has experienced a significant decline in the numbers of 
qualified officers which poses a threat to the British shipping industry and the wider 
maritime sector. Efforts by the state to change this situation, primarily through the 
introduction of a tonnage tax regime incorporating a training commitment, have brought 
little success as cadet intake levels remain low and drop-out rates increase. This paper 
examines the apparent failure of state intervention in relation to stated objectives to 
increase officer numbers. It considers the perspectives of employers/ training sponsors, 
staff working at training colleges, and cadets themselves, in an effort to understand why 
the training commitment associated with the tonnage tax has failed to significantly 
increase the pool of UK officers.   
 
Introduction 
Over the past thr ee years I have been writing a thesis on some of the issues related to 
globalisation and state strategy in shipping. My big question in this thesis is how the 
state responds to some of the negative aspects of economic globalisation. I have been 
particularly looking at the loss of fleet and merchant navy officers, especially junior 
officers, in the UK and considering what the state has done to mitigate the negative 
impact of globalisation on the industry and the wider maritime sector.  
In recent decades, there has been a drastic decline in shipping skills in the UK due to 
reduced training levels and increased officer ‘wastage’ rates. This has left a shrunken 
and ageing pool of British officers working at sea (BIMCO/ISF, 2005). The impact of 
this decline has been extensively analysed and discussed by many people (Pettit et al, 
2004; Selkou and Roe, 2002; Leggate, 2004; Brownrigg et al, 2001), who have argued 
that the reduction in the available pool of officers poses a threat to the future of the 
British maritime sector as a whole, because seafarers supply essential skills to the shore-
side maritime ‘cluster’ of firms (Gardner and Pettit, 1996, 1999). 
In response to these concerns the UK government introduced a range of measures 
associated with a ‘tonnage tax’ regime aimed at increasing the pool of UK seafarer 
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officers. The strategies introduced by the government in 2000 for the recovery of UK 
shipping have not been as successful as originally projected however, particularly with 
regard to increasing the  training and output of qualified UK junior officers. It was 
projected that within five years of the introduction of the tonnage tax, intake levels 
would have increased to 1200 cadets per year (Gardner and Pettit, 1996), but by 2005 
the annual intake stood at about 600 with a cadet cohort wastage rate of between eight 
and ten percent (UK Seafarers Analysis, 2005).  
In this paper, I mainly want to focus on questions relating to the diagnosis of the 
problem and the adequacy of the tonnage tax as the main strategy for the recovery of 
shipping skills in the UK. There is a sharp difference in opinion between shipping 
companies on one hand, and the training establishment on the other, regarding the 
reason for the failure to increase the number of qualified British junior officers. I will 
assess the various claims on both sides with the aim of determining the actual cause of 
the problem of low training and output levels in British cadet training colleges.   
 
Methods  
Over a period of twelve months, between January and October of 2006, I collected a 
large amount of data through semi-structured interviews, policy document analysis, and 
secondary data analysis as part of my PhD project. I Interviewed the Human Resources 
and Operations Managers of UK based Shipping companies; training agency managers 
and administrators; cadet college administrators and training staff; and ex-cadets. I also 
interviewed industry commercial and policy representatives as well as policy officials in 
relevant government departments and seafarers’ union officials. I gathered important 
information through an extensive analysis of relevant government policy documents and 
analysed existing statistical data from various sources including the Department for 
Transport, World Fleet Statistics, and the Seafarers International Research Centre.  
The data I am using in this paper is mainly interview data collected as follows: 
· 25 Human Resources or Operations Managers from 25 UK-based shipping 
Companies 
· Training administrators from 2 cadet colleges 
· 4 training company managers 
· 15 ex-cadets  
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The UK Tonnage Tax 
 
The shipping industry in the UK declined steadily between the 1970s and the late 1990s. 
The UK registered fleet fell from 33 million GT (3,822) in 1975 to 3.4 million GT 
(1,391 ships) in 1999 (World Fleet Statistics). The number of officers dropped from 
28,000 in 1980 to 7,000 in 1998 as estimated by the UK Chamber of Shipping (CoS) 
and reproduced in Charting a new course (see also Brownrigg et al, 2001). Cadet intake 
levels also fell from around 4,500 in 1970 to less than 1000 in the late 90s.  
 
By the mid 90s it was clear that this decline was threatening the entire maritime sector. 
The decline in the UK fleet combined with the decline in the number of qualified British 
officers threatened the shore-side maritime cluster of firms which rely on the flow of 
essential technical skills from the sea to the shore. Certain technical shore-side 
operations like ports and harbours, ship surveying and insurance, ship management and 
maritime law require people with seafaring skills and experience (Gardner and Pettit, 
1996; 1999). The possibility that some of these firms would close down, and others shift 
their operations overseas, as a result of a skills shortage, was high hence urgent 
measures were needed.  
The introduction of the UK tonnage tax was, therefore, a response to this general 
decline and was meant to represent a long-term recovery strategy for both UK registered 
tonnage  and the seafarer skills base. It was designed to achieve three main objectives: 
To encourage the growth of the UK registered fleet; to encourage cadet training with the 
aim of increasing maritime skills; and to promote the growth of the shore-side cluster of 
maritime related industries.  
In order to encourage the growth of the UK fleet the tonnage tax was offered as an 
alternative and more attractive  method of calculating corporation tax based on a 
company’s actual operating tonnage per day rather than the company’s total profits and 
chargeable gains. In this way it was meant to attract ship-owners because they would 
end up paying much less tax, it would be more user- friendly; it would create an 
investment friendly atmosphere for ship-owners, and offered more predictability than 
the normal corporation tax. 
SIRC Symposium 2007     32 
 
To encourage cadet training and boost the maritime skills base, a unique minimum 
training commitment was included in the UK tonnage tax system whereby all 
participating companies are required to undertake to train at least one UK cadet for 
every fifteen officer positions on board each of their tonnage tax vessels every year. An 
‘opt-out’ window was provided which allows companies to make a payment of £550 per 
un-provided cadet position per month instead of undertaking the actual training.  This 
money goes into funding career promotional activities jointly sponsored by the 
government  and industry. As a result of this commitment , it was projected that within 
the first five years of the introduction of the tonnage tax, annual cadet intake levels 
would have increased to 1200 which represents the minimum level required to maintain 
the maritime skills base (British Shipping: Charting a New Course, 1998). 
A third element built into the tonnage tax and meant to boost growth in the shore-side 
maritime cluster was the requirement that all participating vessels be ‘strategically and 
commercially’ managed in the United Kingdom. This would mean that, with every 
company entering the regime, there would be some growth in the UK’s shore-side 
maritime cluster of maritime related firms. 
Performance evaluation of the strategy, by the Department of Transport and the Inland 
Revenue four years after its introduction, showed positive scores on all but one of the 
three main targets. With regard to increasing the fleet and the shore-side maritime 
cluster the strategy was shown to be successful. According to the Department of 
Transport (DfT) data, the number of vessels participating in the tonnage tax steadily 
increased from 134 in 2000 to 816 in 2005 and, because of the ‘strategic and 
commercial management location’ requirement, many British and foreign companies 
participating in the tonnage tax regime had relocated a significant amount of their ship 
management operations to the UK. It must however be remembered that until  the 1st of 
April 2006, this increase in tonnage tax vessels did not necessarily mean an increase in 
UK flagged tonnage  since the regime allowed companies the option of retaining vessels 
on foreign registers while operating under the tonnage tax. With the enactment of a law 
requiring that all new tonnage entering the scheme must be EU registered (EC, 2004; 
Leggate and McCoville, 2005), it is expected that the UK national register will grow 
quickly. Already, by June 2004, there had been a big positive response in this direction 
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with the UK registered fleet increasing from 5,531GT in 2000 to 11,122 GT in 2004 
(World Fleet Statistics). 
Unfortunately, with regard to increasing the number of qualified British junior officers, 
the strategy has not been as successful as initially expected. This is in spite of the fact 
that, according to my research data, all the tonnage tax participating companies are 
either directly recruiting and training UK cadets or making the required payment in lieu 
of training under the minimum training commitment. Cadet training levels are still far 
less that initially projected and the number of qualified British officers has continued to 
decline. According to the UK Seafarers Analysis (2005), the number of all UK officers 
rose from 15,190 in 2002 to 16,850 in 2003 but then declined to 16,150 by 2005 while 
future projections show that, at the current rate, by 2021, the number of officers will 
have dropped to 6,190. Furthermore, although annual cadet intake rose by about twenty 
percent, from 450 in 1997 to 540 in 2005, the general output for qualified junior officers 
remains low. 
 
Low Officer Output Levels  
One of the main objectives of my thesis is to determine why the government strategies 
have failed to increase the output of qualified British junior officers and, during my 
research, I came across a number of views from different interest groups including the 
corporate industry, largely made up of shipping companies and training agencies, the 
training establishment comprising mainly of training colleges and the cadet view. 
(i) The Corporate View 
Many of the managers in the corporate shipping industry presented the view that 
declining interest in seafaring careers among British youth was the reason for the low 
training output and the failure to increase the number of officers in the UK. The 
majority of shipping company Human Resource Managers and training agency 
personnel I interviewed strongly argued that British people no longer wanted to go to 
sea because seafaring no longer had anything to offer them, as a career, as the following 
interview extract reveals: 
I can’t see very much to attract British people to go to sea; the wages are not 
that good, and that is not going to get any better any time in future because 
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shipping companies can’t afford it. I see nowadays that there are many, 
much better career options for British youth ashore…. What we want them 
to do is a very difficult job under difficult conditions… [Company Interview 
6]  
Some supported this argument with accounts of difficulties in attracting young people to 
their training programmes and argued that young British people preferred careers ashore. 
This, according to many was greatly frustrating their efforts to fulfil their training 
obligations under the tonnage tax system. One Manager explained: 
It is difficult, I tell you, and it is frustrating. Getting people who want to join 
the merchant navy is proving to be very difficult. It seems that most of our 
youth would prefer careers ashore rather than go to sea and maybe one can 
understand but it is hurting our effo rts to recruit British cadets [Company 
Interview 17] 
In addition to this problem of attracting the youth to cadetships, the shipping companies 
and training agencies explained that they were facing problems arising from, what they 
described as, a lack of physical and academic capacity in cadets. Many of the managers 
participating in the study said  that “the people who apply for cadet training nowadays 
are both too young and lack the academic aptitude necessary to successfully complete 
officer training” [Company Interview 10]. This, they argued, presented two problems: 
first, it made the selection process difficult because, as one training agency manager 
explained, “there are not enough good quality applicants to pick and choose from” 
[Agency Interview 13] and, second, they lack both the physical and academic capacity 
to withstand the strenuous and demanding training. One training agency manager 
explained: 
The people we are taking now are very young and because there has been a 
gradual lowering of university entry points, we are forced to lower ours so 
that many of the candidates are hardly equipped physically and/or 
academically to manage the strain of the course [Agency Interview 9]. 
The general argument from the corporate industry, therefore, seems to be that the 
number of people interested in sea careers has decreased drastically so that it is not easy 
to recruit enough cadets to meet companies’ minimum training obligations and, 
moreover, the few that are available are not of the right quality and are therefore likely 
to drop out of training before completion. 
Not all shipping companies and training agencies, however, supported this argument. 
Some explained that they were able to get enough cadets through active advertisement 
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and promotion of the ir training schemes to the youth. One company manager, for 
example, dismissed the ‘lack of interest’ argument  and explained that: 
Everything needs hard work, a lot of hard work. So, you can not sit and 
expect good cadets to come to you. We go out, work hard and get the cadets 
and we don’t complain [Company Interview 5] 
Also disagreeing with the argument, the Managing Director of one of UK’s major 
training agencies pointed out that: 
There is no evidence to suggest that young people are not interested in these 
cadetships, I must say that each year we are inundated with applications; we 
are receiving an average of 3000 enquiries each year, I don’t see that as a 
sign that young people are not interested [Training company manager]  
This divergent corporate view seemed to support that of the training establishment 
described below. 
(ii) The training establishment view 
According to staff in training colleges, the problem is not in attracting people. My 
training college staff interviewees explained that, judging from intake levels in recent 
years, many people in the UK are still interested in sea careers: One college staff 
explained: 
There are many people in Britain still interested in seafaring careers….the 
traditional seafaring areas like Liverpool, Glasgow and Southampton still 
continue to generate a lot of interest in the profession….Numbers wise, in 
the last three to four years, we have had no problems, we have done very 
well [College Interview 28].  
Another college administrator explained: 
We have not failed to bring people in, I don’t think that is where the 
problem is; I think that there needs to be measures to ensure greater 
retention; to ensure that most of the cadets actually complete their training 
[College Interview 15].  
Some of the other problems identified by college staff and administrators included 
declining awareness of seafaring careers, declining academic quality of applicants, and 
the age of most cadets, which they thought was too young. According to these 
interviewees, such issues have a considerable impact on overall cadet output because 
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they contribute to high rates of cadet wastage. With regard to academic aptitude one 
training administrator said: 
This is a big problem; many of the cadets simply do not have the academic 
capability for the course and it is something that has to be considered 
seriously because it inevitably affects output and the general quality of 
officers that come out of the system [College Interview 15] 
Concerning age, the main problem as identified by employees of training colleges, 
seemed to be one of difficulty adjusting to the training environment on the part of cadets, 
but also difficulty with some of the training content, especially practical training at sea. 
In contrast to the corporate view where these issues were presented as indicative of a 
characteristic of society which makes it difficult to recruit and train cadets, training 
college staff viewed them as issues which could be easily overcome with the right 
amount of support from sponsoring companies and their training agents. One college 
cadet officer explained: 
Age becomes a problem when there is no proper support for the cadets. 
Some are clearly too young and it shows from their physical build and their 
behaviour… In college we can handle the discipline part but out there at sea 
some senior officers do not have the patience… These are the ones who 
cannot complete the course, it [age] is not such a big problem, I don’t think 
[College Interview 15]   
Declining awareness of shipping and seafaring among many people in Britain was one 
of the main issues raised by training staff and administrators in colleges. They argued 
that because of the many years of decline in shipping and cadet training in the UK, 
knowledge about seafaring had diminished so that the new generation was unaware of 
shipping or the careers it offers: 
Not many of our young people know anything about shipping of seafaring, 
we occasionally run quizzes on line and in schools to try and find out how 
much young people know and to increase their awareness, but it is amazing 
how little of what goes on in shipping that even adults know nowadays 
[College Interview 28] 
With regard to whether young people did not want seafaring careers the college 
administrator wondered “how do you become uninterested in what you do not know?” 
[College Interview 28] 
What I found was, therefore, a situation whereby shipping companies, who are both the 
training sponsors and potential employers of British junior officers, and some of the 
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training agencies argued strongly that British youth are no longer interested in sea 
careers and presented this argument as the explanation for the fact that the tonnage tax 
has not been successful in increasing the output of qualified British junior officers. The 
training colleges on the other hand identified high cadet wastage rates as the main 
problem rather than recruitment. Evidence from the data overwhelmingly supports the 
latter argument. Statistics show that there has been a significantly positive response with 
regard to intake levels since the introduction of the tonnage tax, but there is also 
overwhelming evidence from other studies, like BIMCO/ISF Manpower survey and the 
UK Seafarers Analysis, to support the claim by college staff that cadet dropout rates 
have been on the increase. The important question, therefore, is why dropout rates are 
high? 
Data from industry managers suggest that because most of the people being admitted 
into cadet programmes in recent years are both too young and lack essential capacity, 
they are unable to withstand the strain of training and therefore end up dropping out. 
The college training administrators and staff, on the other hand, argue that cadets 
withdraw from the programme prematurely because their sponsoring companies fail to 
give them the necessary support; both material and emotional. 
Cadet data becomes important here because the cadets are in the unique position of 
being able to explain why they may choose to terminate their training prematurely. In 
order to shed further light on my findings, I therefore specifically sought out, and  
interviewed, ex-cadets.  
(iii) The Cadet View 
In my interviews with cadets I explored the various factors influencing their decision to 
withdraw from training. In their accounts many highlighted poor support, (financial and 
emotional) when confronted with difficulties with course content and the tough life at 
sea, a lack of adequate facilities in colleges, inadequate on-board training, abusive and 
insensitive senior officers during sea-time, and inappropriate deployment of cadets 
while training at sea.  
Experiences on board were described as particularly influential in decisions to drop out 
of training. Many of the cadet accounts indicated an unsupportive and insensitive 
atmosphere on-board their training ships. They described cases where their training 
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officers and other senior personnel on-board treated them with impatience and lacked 
tolerance in their approach. One such account came from a cadet who was experiencing 
difficulties with some of the tasks he was required to do by his training officer: 
I did not enjoy the training, especially at sea… it was hard work and I did 
my best but the chief officer kept threatening to send me away…that I was 
lazy. When I complained to the training company they just did nothing, not 
even respond [Cadet Interview 3] 
Some of the interviewees suggested that their companies took advantage of the ir 
presence on-board to cut down crewing costs because they treated them as a supply of 
extra free labour. About the nature of work on-board, one cadet explained: 
I expected that I would be assigned to various officers in different sections 
at different times to work with, practice skills and be assessed accordingly, 
but no. … I realised that I was there just as part of the crew; cleaning and 
scraping most of the time. When I approached the training officer about it 
he got very cross saying that I was arrogant [Cadet Interview 6]. 
There are similarities between these two accounts but, perhaps, the most important 
common element is the lack of support and concern which, would, probably,  have left 
the cadets feeling ‘cornered’ and helpless. In both cases the cadets tried to seek support 
within the training structure but received none.  
Accounts of lack of support and subsequent frustratio n, on the part of the cadet, were 
not only offered in relation to the nature of the work. Many cadets narrated incidents 
whereby they had personal or family related problems but received no emotional 
support from the training management structure. In the following extract such a 
situation culminated in a decision to quit training: 
I had many problems after I started the training but it was clear to me that 
no one cared; my father died while I was away at sea the first time…the 
captain complained that I had overstayed when I rejoined the ship… I was 
really unfortunate because during the next sea phase I was told that my 
girlfriend had miscarried. This time I was told I could not go…when I 
complained to the training company they said if I left I should not come 
back… [Cadet Interview 9] 
Another problem highlighted in the cadet interviews was the nature of the training ship 
on which the cadets are placed. In some of the interviews the cadets gave accounts of 
their experiences on-board what one described as “old run-down” vessels with neither 
decent nor adequate living facilities. Cadets who were placed on such ships found it 
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hard to adjust and cope with life at sea, especially if it was their first experience at sea. 
The following interview extract shows this: 
My first sea-phase was on-board an old, run-down, ship with the worst 
conditions, honestly, the accommodation cabins were few and horrible and 
we had to share; there were basically no decent facilities of any sort on 
board that ship, no entertainment, no communication, nothing!..... It was 
very hard for me [Cadet Interview 1] 
Unfortunately it seems as if it is not always the case that a choice of training berths are 
available for cadets. One training agency manager explained that, in cases where 
sponsoring companies do not have any training berths available in their fleet, training 
agencies have to allocate cadets to any ships available and not all are always suitable. 
However, not all the cadets who were interviewed found their training experience at sea 
unbearable; a few cadets described their sponsors as being very supportive and 
encouraging with the result that their training experiences were pleasant. One such cadet 
explained: 
My sponsoring company was good to me; I received a lot of support. It was 
three of us with the same company and we had direct telephone contact with 
a personnel person in the company itself and we were treated very well….I 
had to quit for personal reasons…. the other guys are still in training, going 
to the third year now. I might go back later; who knows... the company said 
they would consider continuing the sponsorship [Cadet Interview 6] 
Once again a training agency staff provided an explanation for this. He said tha t some 
shipping companies had an established training structure which included an elaborate 
support mechanism for their cadets whereby the cadets could contact a training liaison 
officer with their problems. He also explained that such companies normally designated 
specific and suitable training berths on-board their ships and had an elaborate training 
structure on-board those ships.    
Apart from factors directly related to the training arrangement and life at sea, the cadet 
interview data reveal yet another problem; one of career anxiety and uncertainty. The 
data reveal that many cadets are anxious about the ir future career prospects because 
they are aware of the diminished employment opportunities for British junior officers. 
Although this is not a problem that was cited as a major reason for quitting by many 
cadets, some of them said that it was something that they seriously thought about. A few 
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went so far as to say that it was one of the major reasons for their decision to quit as 
shown in the following extracts: 
I started hearing stories from other crews that the company was really bad 
and one senior officer….they said the company only employed foreigners, 
said I was wasting time if I expected a job with them, he said. I could not 
take the risk (Cadet Interview 10).  
People are talking about lack of jobs and, of course, it is discouraging…. I 
did not want to sit around and take chances [Cadet Interview 11] 
They say that there are no jobs for British officers, not anymore; everybody 
is talking about it and it is discouraging….. Companies are employing 
foreigners…..they claim that the British want too much money…. Too 
expensive….it is very discouraging….better to find something more 
promising [Cadet Interview 3] 
In any case, it appears that, a decision to quit was influenced by a combination of 
factors and, from the data, it seems that all the cadets, apart from those who were given 
job guarantees by their sponsors, did consider their career opportunities with anxiety.  
It seems, from the analysis of the various views above that the major issue behind high 
drop-out rates seems to be a lack of commitment by sponsoring companies and their 
training agents in relation to the active support and encourage ment of cadets. In the 
words of one college administrator; “the companies simply don’t care, as long as they 
have met their recruitment quota, they just don’ t care what happens to the cadets” 
[College Interview 15]. But the next question would be why companies are not 
providing the necessary support to cadets when they are committed, under the tonnage 
tax, to recruit and train cadets?  
 
A Question of Demand  
There is overwhelming evidence, in this study, that many UK-based shipping 
companies are not genuinely committed to train UK cadets and that this is linked to a 
lack of genuine interest in the employment of British officers; particularly junior 
officers. This lack of genuine commitment to train emerged in my interviews with many 
industry Managers. The general view was that British junior officers are much more 
costly than other available nationalities and that shipping companies were unable to 
afford their services. The following interview extract from one such manager sums-up 
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this argument and reveals the predominant company attitude towards cadet training 
among UK based shipping companies: 
We train alright but that does not mean very much… With or without 
British officers, ships will still sail and cargo will still move …I don’t want 
you to get me wrong, I have nothing against training British officers but 
who is going to employ them? If we train then we should employ but we 
can’t…it is just too expensive… I don’t want to give young people false 
hopes… It is a sad situation, I agree, but that is the way of open 
markets…we must live with it [Company interview] 
Another manager explained: 
The other nationalities are so much cheaper than the British and do the same 
job. We employ the Eastern Europeans  because they are cheaper and can do 
the job. It is the only way we can make a profit and remain in business 
(Company Interview). 
These extracts suggest that because companies consider British junior officers too 
expensive, they are not willing to employ them and, by extension, they see no great 
benefit associated with  training British cadets. Employment is a key missing element in 
the design of the tonnage tax which, seemingly, triggers a ‘chain reaction’ which, 
ultimately, results in a discouraging training atmosphere for cadets and, consequently, 
high cadet wastage.  
Many of the company managers I interviewed made it clear that they are in no position 
to guarantee employment to cadets in the face of constantly changing fortunes and 
growing costs and competition. The following extracts from an interview with a 
company manager echoed this wide-spread view. On the commitment to employ British 
junior officers he explained: 
That is a promise we cannot guarantee to keep and so we do not make the 
mistake of giving one. I honestly don’t know of any industry in which 
companies promise and guarantee employment to trainees in …. The British 
are just too expensive to employ. (Company manager) 
Perhaps the best illustration of the general company approach towards training and the 
underlying economic argument for this approach is given by this next extract from an 
interview with yet another company manager: 
I don’t need to tell you that we are in business for profit and the competition 
is high… We cannot employ British officers, or any others for that matter, if 
it is not profitable for us…. If we begin with this position then, you see, 
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there is really no need for the training because, what good is it…? 
[Company interview] 
It therefore seems as if the shipping skills problem in the UK is primarily driven by 
forces of demand and supply. Because UK-based employers prefer employing foreign 
officers who are relatively cheap, the demand for British junior officers is low which 
also affects training since the employers are also training sponsors. Unfortunately, the 
tonnage tax strategy has only focused on the supply side, i.e. increasing cadet 
recruitment and training, without addressing the problem of demand. Unless UK 
seafarer employers begin to rely on British junior officers they will have no motivation 
to train and therefore will continue to show little commitment to support the training 
programme. The tonnage tax will therefore remain inadequate as a strategy for the 
increase in the pool of UK seafarers. 
 
Conclusions  
The discussion in this paper has shown that the idea that British youth do not want to 
work at sea is a ‘myth’ which serves to legitimise an unwillingness to train and employ 
British junior officers. There is overwhelming evidence in the data, especially the cadet 
interview accounts, to suggest that the problem facing cadets in training and resulting in 
poor officer output, is due to a general lack of support and attention for cadets from 
their sponsoring companies during training. This makes the training experience for 
many cadets unpleasant and leads to high dropout rates. 
There is no evidence to indicate that people are not interested in the seafaring career 
instead, training college and agency staff interview data indicates growing interest in 
cadetships over the past five years and provide figures which dispute the mantra of 
‘diminished interest’.  
The interview accounts of industry managers have, on the other hand, clearly shown 
that because operators are concerned with the cost of UK junior officers and have access 
to cheaper alternatives elsewhere, they are not taking the training commitment, 
associated with the tonnage tax, seriously. They, as the main training sponsors, are not 
actively and positively underwriting cadet training and have often failed to provide the 
necessary support and encouragement that cadets need during the programme.  
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The general conclusion therefore is that for the government to effectively address the 
problem of declining officers and increase training and output levels, they need to find 
ways of boosting demand for British junior officers on-board UK ships. This will not 
only restore society’s confidence in the profession but also, and most importantly, give 
companies the commercial motivation to train UK cadets. 
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THE ‘PRESENCE’ OF ABSENT SEAFARERS: PREDICAMENTS 
OF CHINESE SEAFARER-PARTNERS 
 
Lijun Tang 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the difficulties experienced by a group of relatively young 
seafarer-partners. Drawing upon online observation and interview data, it suggests 
that these seafarer-partners suffer emotional loneliness, stigmatization and social 
isolation associated with the relatively long-term absences of seafarers. These 
experiences may have implications for seafarers’ morale at work and the retention of 
seafarers.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Seafaring is a special career. It often causes predicaments for seafaring families, such 
as loneliness, isolation and role displacement (Thomas, 2003; Thomas and Bailey, 
2006; Thomas, Sampson and Zhao, 2003), although it can also positively impact upon 
seafarer partners in terms of income and independence (Sampson, 2005; Thomas, 
2003). Families, however, play an important role for male seafarers, since when at 
home they depend heavily on their wives for social networks and emotional warmth 
(Thomas, 2003; Thomas and Bailey, 2006). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
family stability has an influence on seafarers’ morale at work. Additionally, the desire 
for a happy family may play a significant part in determining whether a seafarer 
remains at sea or not. Given that the shortage of officers has become a priority at the 
top of many companies’ agendas in the shipping industry (BIMCO/ISF, 2005), the 
retention of qualified seafarers is arguably more important, today, than ever before.  
 
This paper is based upon the experiences of young Chinese seafarer-partners, who are 
computer literate and participating in online discussions on a website called the Home 
of Chinese Seafarers. While the informants of past studies were seafarers’ wives 
across the whole age range, most of the seafarer-partners in this study have not been 
married yet and can be considered to represent more closely the partners of future 
seafarers. With the largest population and relatively adequate Maritime Education and 
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Training facilities, China is regarded as an important seafarer supply country that has 
the potential to help bridge the officer shortage gap in the near future. In this context, 
young Chinese seafarer-partners’ experiences are worthy of particular attention. 
 
 
Methods 
 
This research focuses on the Home of Chinese Seafarers, which was established on 
May 1st in 2003 by a fairly new seafarer. It is a Bulletin Board System (BBS) website 
containing a number of forums and covering the following discussion areas: 
· Information exchange for seafarers and future seafarers 
· Careers advice for future seafarers 
· Job information for seafarers 
· Experiences of seafarers and seafarer-partners  
Besides postings, the Home of Chinese Seafarers also provides a diary space for its 
participants to record, and to open up to others, their everyday experiences. By 
October 15th 2005, some 19 months or so after its start, the website had 11,532 
registered members, including Chinese seafarers, students of Chinese Maritime 
Education and Training institutes, partners of seafarers and seafaring students, 
Chinese shipping companies, crewing agencies, and others in the seafaring 
community. In the autumn of 2005, it was estimated that the number of participants 
online simultaneously was on average around fifty over any given 24-hour period.  
Besides registered members, non-members are allowed to visit this website and read 
postings  as guests. As in many of other BBS websites, the number of registered 
members does not represent the participating population. It seems that only a few 
hundred members (including seafarer-partners, seafarers and others from the seafaring 
community) are active at a given time. The others remain inactive for long time 
periods or disappear completely after a few ‘visits’.  
 
One research method employed in this study was online observation. From August 
2005, I started ‘observing’ seafarer-partners’ activities online in the Home of Chinese 
Seafarers regularly. My attention was paid mainly to the open diary space and one 
forum called ‘Communication between Seafarers and Seafarer-Partners’ where 
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seafarer-partners were likely to make postings. Occasionally, I also browsed other 
forums. During the two-year observation period, the following kinds of writings were 
gathered: 
· Revealing problems that seafarer-partners face due to the absence of seafarers 
· Indicating relationships between seafarer-partner participants in this website 
· Disclosing seafarer-partners’ feelings towards participating in the website 
· Reflecting how the website is managed 
· Showing the reasons for coming to and leaving the website 
This paper focuses on the first point.  
 
Unlike interview transcripts, data from online observation is not obtained via the 
gathering of responses to the researchers’ questions. Rather, in the case of this 
research, postings and open diaries in the Home of Chinese Seafarers were produced 
for their own sake. In this sense, these fieldnotes are more natural and spontaneous 
than interview data. If the range and scope of interview questions pose restrictions on 
what informants can answer, observation allows flexibility. The observed, of course, 
write what they want to reveal, and they have no intention to note down what the 
researcher needs. Some postings and diaries, however, are related to seafarer-partners’ 
everyday lives and thus reveal some of their dilemmas caused by separation. A long 
period of observation (over one and half years for this project) of many seafarer-
partner participants’ writings arguably allows the researcher to draw a relatively 
detailed picture of their day to day concerns.  
 
One may wonder whether the postings or diary entries in the website are authentic. 
The 30 interviewees also included in the study, however, believed that those postings 
reflected real experiences. Moreover, some informants stated that the anonymity in 
‘online space’ encouraged them to reveal their innermost feelings and thoughts which 
they would not do in their ‘offline’ daily lives.  
 
The other research method was interviewing. Between February and April 2006, I 
interviewed fifteen seafarer-partner participants of the Home of Chinese Seafarers in 
three places of China: Shanghai, Nanjing and Shandong province. Thirteen interviews 
were undertaken face-to-face, while the other two were by telephone. In addition to 
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these, another fifteen interviews were undertaken using email during 2005. Altogether 
thirty seafarer-partners from various parts of China took part in interviews. As 
mentioned earlier, the informants were relatively young, well educated, lived in cities, 
and had access to the internet. Twenty-nine of them had received, or were receiving, 
higher education; twenty five were below thirty in age; and only eleven were married 
at the time of interviewing.  
 
 
Emotional loneliness 
 
The painful experience that seafarer-partners are most likely to suffer certainly is 
emotional loneliness. The latter, according to Weiss (1973), is the subjective response 
to a long-term separation from, or loss of, the person to whom one is emotionally 
attached. Seafaring entails seafarers being away from home for long periods. For 
Chinese seafarers absence may be for around one year, since they are likely to sign 
one-year contracts. This inevitably involves the long-term separation of seafaring 
couples, which may cause, among others things, emotional isolation for seafarer-
partners. The latter can present itself in several forms: longing, feeling of emptiness, 
complaining of seafarers’ inability to provide emotional support, and worrying.   
 
Longing was the most visible theme in the postings and diary entries on the website. 
‘It is not lonely to be one person alone; it is lonely to be longing for a person.’ This 
poignant remark was one seafarer-partner’s signature in the Home of Chinese 
Seafarers website. It reveals the major cause of loneliness – longing, which seafarer-
partners have to face when seafarers are absent. Due to the nature of seafaring careers, 
seafarer-partners are alone most of the time. Thus though they are in relationships 
they are also rendered effectively single by their partners’ absences. A seafarer-
partner described this ambivalent situation as such:  
A single person can live as others and lead a beautiful life. But I am in a 
predicament: behind the appearance of being single, you [the partner away at sea] 
are in my mind. Therefore, I cannot live as a single person. But the reality is that 
nor can I enjoy the shared life of a couple. I fall in between. [Fieldnote, 18/12/05] 
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When seafarers leave home for ships, seafarer-partners lose their intimate companions. 
This loss makes seafarer-partners feel that their lives suddenly become empty. For 
some new seafarer-partners this emptiness seems to be felt strongly. Two interviewees 
who were ‘new’ seafarer-partners reported: 
[M]y boyfriend had been with me for a while and then he suddenly went 
onboard. I suddenly felt that my life had become empty. [Tulip] 
My husband went onboard the ship shortly after we established our relationship. 
I suddenly felt empty. [Rebecca] 
 
Many seafarer-partners also complained on the website of seafarers’ inability to 
provide emotional support. Modern heterosexual relationships have been regarded to 
be the most important source for emotional intimacy (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1992). 
Seafarers’ long-term intermittent absence, however, renders this problematic. Two 
seafarer-partners complained: 
When I feel bad and want to talk to you, your mobile has no signal; when I 
know from news that accidents happened at sea, it is an ordeal to hear nothing 
from you; when something happens home and needs your opinions, you are not 
here…[Fieldnote, 30/11/2005] 
I feel so bad these days that I hope that you can give me some consolation. But 
what I face is always silence … [Fieldnote, 10/01/2006] 
 
Being attached to seafarers, seafarer-partners are concerned about their safety. 
Working and living on ships, seafarers are at the mercy of the sea. The sea, however, 
is perceived as mysterious, volatile and dangerous. Thus, seafaring careers are 
regarded as inherently risky. No matter whether this perception is correct or not, it can 
fill seafarer-partners with concerns for their partners’ safety. One seafarer-partner 
wrote: 
It is true that modern technology and safety standards enable ships to outride 
storms at sea. However, out on the vast ocean and being left high and dry, who 
can guarantee 100% safety of ships? [I am] worrying and fearing for his safety 
everyday. [I am] checking the situation of his ship everyday. Without 
exaggeration, this is an unbearable ordeal! [Fieldnote, 26/11/2005] 
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For the partners of new seafarers, worrying manifested itself even more strongly, 
because they had not previously experienced separations and were thus ill-prepared 
for their fears. Further, seafaring is a ‘secluded’ career in the sense that it takes place 
on the oceans  and in enclosed ports, which are invisible to the wider population. 
Inexperienced seafarer-partners thus may know very little about seafaring. The sudden 
‘disappearance’ of seafarers for the first time into an unknown and unreachable world 
makes their young partners worried. Two seafarer-partners recounted their 
experiences: 
[H]e went to the sea for the first time. I could not get any of his information and 
was worried. [Dianna] 
After he left, I did not get any of his information for two months. I was very 
anxious. [Snow] 
 
The feeling of loneliness makes seafarer-partners treasure every trace of information 
they receive about their beloved seafarers. In the diary space, some seafarer-partners 
expressed their excitement after receiving a long-distance phone-call or a letter or an 
email. For example, one wrote after she had received a phone-call from her boyfriend : 
He phoned me a moment ago, really! … …Oh, I cannot believe it. It was him. 
It’s really beyond my dream. How excited I was. [Fieldnote, 11-08-2005] 
It has been noted, however, that there is no convenient and cheap communication 
means between ships and home (Thomas, et al., 2003). More often than not, therefore, 
seafarer-partners were complaining that they had not received any phone-calls for a 
long time. The following example illustrates the worries of seafarer-partners when 
they fail to make contact with seafarers: 
One seafarer-partner: Why has my partner not made a phone-call? … Having 
waited for dozens of days, I am worried. 
Another seafarer-partner: Me too! I have not received a call for more than forty 
days. [Fieldnote, 12/12/2005] 
As a result, a phone-call from the seafarers is important and being looked forward to; 
and seafarer-partners take every possible measure to make sure that they do not miss 
any contact from their partners. Many seafarer-partners disclosed that they dared not 
switch off their mobiles or to forget to take mobiles with them. One wrote:  
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Actually I know that the radiation from the mobile is not good for health. But 
when he is away, I am afraid of missing his phone-calls and therefore I keep it 
close to me around the clock. [Fieldnote, 19/03/2006] 
 
 
Stigmatized by others  
 
Of course, seafarer-partners do not live in a one- or two-person world. In every day 
lives, they interact with people around them. Sometimes, such interactions make 
seafarer-partners feel stigmatized.  
 
The most common occasion when seafarer-partners fe lt victimized was when others 
gossiped about seafarers’ infidelity. Most people know that seafarers leave home for a 
long time for the job; and that during this time, seafarers have no sexual contact with 
their partners and that they may go to foreign ports. This knowledge leads to a 
common perception about seafarers – seafarers are promiscuous and they have girls in 
every port. The presence of a seafarer-partner may invoke other people’s discussion of 
or even joking about this. One seafarer-partner complained in one of her diary entries: 
At lunch time, my colleagues talked about relationships. They said that the 
relationship would meet problems if two persons are separated for a long time. I 
knew that they were insinuating me and my seafarer boyfriend… They said that 
seafarers were not reliable. I have not seen him [her boyfriend] for eleven 
months and have been feeling bad for that. Their words made me feel worse… 
[Fieldnote, 06/01/2006] 
It seemed that another seafarer-partner had encountered similar problems quite often. 
She was furious about this and wrote:  
There are lots of curious people around. [They keep asking:] what is your 
husband job? I told them: a seafarer. Then they would look at me in a strange 
way. I do not mind how they think of me since they do not know much of 
seafaring …But one thing makes me angry. I have been working in this 
company for three years … and said good-bye to many colleagues. But the fact 
that my partner is a seafarer has never failed to evoke their curiosity and 
discussions about seafarers’ infidelity… [Fieldnote 28/04/2006]   
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Though people do not know much about seafarers, they tend to associate seafarers 
with high incomes. When seafarer-partners told others that their partners were 
seafarers, the common response from others was said to be that seafarers earn lots of 
money. For example, one interviewee said: 
For many people, once they know that we are married to seafarers, their first 
response would be saying that seafarers earn lots of money. [Forever] 
From this common response, some seafarer-partners perceived a connotation: marry 
for money. One seafarer-partner complained: 
When others ask me about my partner’s career, I say that he is a seafarer. They 
would immediately respond that you are rich … If our aim were really their 
money, why would we suffer the agony of separation, after all there are lot of 
rich men ashore. [Fieldnote, 19/05/2006] 
This seafarer-partner clearly felt very bad at others’ responses. The latter, in her view, 
insulted her and her sacrifice for love. She accepted that she could not, however, 
change others’ perceptions. 
 
Further, some seafarer-partners fe lt that others pitied them. Being alone most of the 
time, seafarer-partners had to cope with many tasks single-handedly, while other 
women had their husbands’ or boyfriends’ help. This sometimes attracted others’ 
sympathetic eyes and such sympathy was not always welcome.. One seafarer-partner 
explained: 
It is the end of the year. Our company provides each of us lots of things to 
celebrate the New Year1. My colleagues rang their husbands to come to give 
them a hand, while I could not. They looked at me with pity when I was loading 
and lashing these things on my bike alone and with great difficulties… This was 
hard to bear. I do not want others to pity me! [Fieldnote, 25/01/2006] 
 
Finally, people around were said to occasionally misinterpret seafarer-partners’ 
motivations when communicating with the opposite sex. One seafarer’s wife 
complained:  
I am a seafarer’s wife. Because my husband is not home most of the time, many 
people think that I cannot bear the loneliness. This brings me lots of pressure in 
                                                 
1 It is a common practice in China for companies to buy for and distribute to their employees some 
goods, such as food and drinks, to celebrate New Year. 
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the work. As a leader, I have to talk to and discuss with colleagues quite often. 
This makes others suspicious of my motivation, which is awkward for me... 
[Fieldnote, 01/10/2006] 
These words suggest that this seafarer-partner felt humiliated by others’ inaccurate 
perceptions of her motivation when talking with colleagues. Thomas’ (2003) study 
shows that the temporarily ‘single status’ of British seafarer-partners had double 
effects on them. On the one hand, they might fear unwanted attention from men who 
perceived them as single; on the other, they felt they were being regarded as a ‘sexual 
predator’ by coupled women. Similarly, it appears that the above seafarer-partner’s 
discussions with colleagues were interpreted by others to be out of loneliness. Lotus, 
who had been married for twelve years, gave another account:  
There are more things that I need to pay attention to, especially interactions with 
the other sex. Once they know that you are a seafarer’s wife, they would … they 
would be more likely to think in that way. In order to maintain a seafarer’s 
partner’s reputation, I have to be more careful. [Lotus] 
Again, it seems that seafarer-partners’ behaviours towards the opposite sex can easily 
be misinterpreted by others. For this, seafarer-partners felt stigmatized but helpless. 
 
The four elements discussed so far can combine together. Separation, loneliness, 
money and promiscuous partners, may stir up people’s imagination and curiosity 
when there is a seafarer-partner around. Others may not enquire or discuss seafarer-
partners’ lifestyle directly in front of a seafarer-partner. They can, however, do it 
indirectly. Another married seafarer-partner seems to have experienced various kinds 
of attention from others: 
As a special group, we always live a different life-style. Around us, people are 
observing and guessing our lives with various eyes and attitudes: envy, 
sympathy, suspicion, and even pity! [Breeze] 
The seafarer-partner identity thus seems likely to attract others’ intrusive attention. 
Some envy seafarer-partners’ having money; some sympathize and feel sorry for 
seafarer-partners’ sufferings; and some suspect seafarer-partners’ motivation for 
entering relationships with seafarers.  
 
The above seafarer-partner’s words also suggest that some of them become sensitive 
towards their surroundings. On the one hand, seafarer-partners may be aware that they 
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are different; and that as a result their different private lives are likely to attract others’ 
attentions and speculations. On the other hand, knowing this makes seafarer-partners 
sensitive towards others’ attitudes and behaviours towards them. The sensitivity leads 
some seafarer-partners to feel that the ‘small talk’ of familiar people about seafarers is  
intrusive. For example, one seafarer-partner wrote:  
I used to be a very social person and liked to join in group activities. Now, I do 
not like going out after my husband left. No matter where I go, there are always 
people asking: how long has your husband been away and when will he come 
back? If I say that he has just left, others would show sympathy: your husband is 
good in all other respects but too far away from you… Some familiar colleagues 
and neighbours have never been tired of making such inquiries… [Fieldnote, 
08/01/2006] 
It appears that others’ common questions and ‘concerns’ made this seafarer-partner 
feel stigmatized. To avoid the awkwardness, she chose self-seclusion. Similarly, 
another seafarer-partner wished to go to a new place in order to avoid others’ intrusive 
talk: 
The women in my office are the kind of people who gloat over others’ 
misfortunes. They make jokes about me, as if my loneliness can remind them of 
their happiness… I want to go to a new place where people pay attention to their 
job instead of others’ private lives. [Fieldnote, 31/12/2005] 
 
 
Social loneliness 
 
Apart from emotional loneliness, Weiss (1973) identifies another kind of loneliness – 
social isolation, which is due to an inadequacy of social networks. Though not 
uprooted from their everyday social grounds, some seafarer-partners may withdraw 
from the wider social network into a self-confined world to avoid others’ intrusive 
prying, as I have shown in the last section.  
 
Further, the longing for their absent partners causes seafarer-partners to become 
sensitive to other couples’ togetherness. Seeing others being together or even hearing 
talk about husbands can easily remind seafarer-partners of their lonely situation. For 
example, one seafarer-partner wrote: 
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One day, it was snowing, some couples were sharing an umbrella, clinging 
together and talking to each other intimately. The feeling of loneliness suddenly 
rose from deep in my heart. [Fieldnote, 18/01/2006] 
This sensitivity equally forces some seafarer-partners to withdraw from social 
activities. Two seafarer-partners complained in the Home of Chinese Seafarers: 
In those days when you are away, I do not even want to go out. I fear of going to 
busy places, where the hurly-burly makes my loneliness and sadness 
prominent… [Fieldnote, 31/12/2005] 
When I go out with other women, their talk always revolves around their 
husbands … … I don’t have a husband at home. Being with them makes me feel 
the pain of my loneliness more sharply. So, normally, I do not go out. Instead, I 
stay home cooking and surfing the Internet… [Fieldnote, 08/01/2006] 
.  
Being in an ‘in-between’ situation, many seafarer-partners tend to set themselves 
apart from others who are together with their husbands or boyfriends. One seafarer-
partner wrote in her diary: 
A colleague just invited me to her house for dinner, but I declined. All others are 
in pairs … I do not want to join them. [Since] my boyfriend is not around, I do 
not want to go anywhere but stay home to watch telly. [Fieldnote, 15.01/06] 
These words indicate that when alone she did not want to be involved in situations for 
couples. Besides being reminded of the lonely state, seafarer-partners may feel 
awkward to have to mix with seemingly happy couples.  
 
While some seafarer-partners have bosom friends, with whom they can share their ups 
and downs, many seafarer-partners reported feeling that their non-seafaring friends 
could not empathise with their feelings and situations. Seafarers’ long absences 
created different experiences for seafarer partners compared with those whose 
partners worked ashore. Many informants in this study reported that conversations 
with non-seafaring friends could not ‘go deep’ and ‘get close to the heart’. As one 
seafarer-partner explained: 
[T]hey [non-seafarer-partner friends] have little idea about seafarers; they 
cannot empathize with seafarer-wives’ feelings! Even though we talk, the 
conversations can never go as deep as I wish. Moreover, there are many things 
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that they do not understand. I have to explain to them over and over again. It is 
tiresome. I cannot find resonance. [Rose] 
Another interviewee, who was a student, was afraid that revealing too much grievance 
might be regarded as ‘making a fuss over an imaginary illness’ by her friends and 
therefore make them impatient. She therefore ‘edited’ her expressions and showing of 
feelings: 
My boyfriend is a seafarer and I may feel lonely everyday. But I cannot 
complain everyday about this. Otherwise, I feel that my friends would feel 
impatient…Too much grievance gives people the feeling that I am making a fuss 
over an imaginary illness. [Lily] 
 
In a similar vein, British seafarers’ wives in Thomas’ (2003) research and Australian 
seafarers’ wives in Foster and Cacioppe’s (1986) study believed that only people with 
similar experiences could understand their feelings and therefore expressed their 
desire to meet and socialize with other seafarer-partners. They were, however, 
geographically separated and could hardly have any contact with each other (Thomas, 
2003). In China, there are seafaring families living in ‘Seafaring Villages’ constructed 
in major port cities by shipping companies. There are also ‘seafarer wife committees’ 
and ‘seafarer wife stations’ to organize mutual support for China Ocean Shipping 
Company’s (COSCO) seafaring families (Thomas et al., 2003). These services are 
diminishing however. The privatization of housing at the end of last century replaced 
the companies’ house providing function;  ‘stations’ and ‘committees’, which are 
relics of planned economy, are being eroded because a more market orientated 
economy is prevailing (Thomas et al., 2003). Moreover, these services only target 
married seafarer-partners and are not for the new generation of Chinese seafarer-
partners. It is not surprising then, that among the thirty interviewees only one (who 
has been married for sixteen years) lives in a ‘Seafaring Village’. It is a tradition for 
Chinese seafarer-partners to visit ships while they are in Chinese ports. On these 
occasions, seafarer-partners from different places were able to meet and establish 
contact with each other, for example, Lotus said: 
Normally, I would meet them [other seafarer-partners] on the way visiting the 
same ship. Then I know that she is the wife of Captain and she is the wife of the 
Chief. After several times, we would be familiar with each other. Then we 
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would chat what happened to them on the ship and what she takes with her. 
[Lotus] 
Geographical separation, nevertheless, constituted a barrier for developing close 
relationships. Lotus continued: 
[But], we do not have time to develop relationship. We only meet on the way to 
visit the ship and have a little chat. [Lotus] 
Another informant who also had opportunities to visit ships and to meet other 
seafarer-partners expressed the same view. Thus, it seems difficult for the young 
generation of Chinese seafarer-partners to communicate with each other and to share 
their experiences.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have examined the dilemmas that Chinese seafarer-partners have to face in their 
everyday lives. Seafarers are absent; yet in their absence their presence is strongly felt 
as a strong shadow cast over a relationship. In the shadow of each seafarer-partner’s 
dilemma, there is the presence of seafarers. Arguably, it is seafarers’ absence that 
makes their presence even more prominent  in seafarer-partners’ consciousness. Only 
in the seafarers’ long absence, do seafarer-partners experience longing, worrying, and 
feelings of emptiness. The longer the absence and the longer there is no 
communication, the more seafarer-partners long for their beloved and become worried. 
It is the seafarers’ absence that makes other people ‘concerned’ about seafarer-
partners, which in turn leads seafarer-partners to feel stigmatized. Moreover, seafarer-
partners may become sensitive to others’ attention and conscious of their lonely 
situation. Even others’ togetherness and seemingly happy companionship remind 
seafarer-partners of their absent seafarers. The social interactions and even non-
interaction encounters, then, bring to the fore for seafarer-partners the presence of 
absent seafarers. For this reason, some of them tend to withdraw into the ir own world, 
which inevitably causes social isolation. Even worse, seafarer-partners’ close non-
seafaring friends may not be able to share their ups and downs. On the other hand, 
although they may wish to communicate with other seafarer-partners, geographic 
separation nevertheless constitutes a huge barrier.   
 
SIRC Symposium 2007     57 
 
 
These experiences are certainly painful. During the interview, several seafarer-
partners complained that one year at sea is too long to be humane. Behind the 
complaint, the practical implications loom. One wrote in the website: 
If he does not move ashore, we will not marry. If [the fact that he is a seafarer] 
cannot be changed, we will have to break up. Before we started the relationship, 
I have said explicitly that I had no intention to marry a seafarer. That kind of life 
is not complete. Moreover, it will be sneered and laughed at by others. 
[Fieldnote, 14/08/2006] 
Such a view may not be popular among participants on the website, for many 
seafarer-partners expressed that they would respect their boyfriends/husbands’ 
choices and decisions. Nevertheless, they kept an eye on information about leaving 
sea and moving to other careers. Communication is another problem. While some 
seafarer-partners complained in their diary entries in the Home of Chinese Seafarers 
that they had not received phone-calls from their boyfriends/husbands for a long time, 
many others wrote postings asking for cheap and reliable means to keep contact with 
seafarers at sea. 
 
Separation is certainly unavoidable for seafaring couples. This does not mean, 
however, that nothing can be done to alleviate seafarer-partners’ problems. If the 
duration of separation becomes shorter and if there is more frequent communication, 
they may experience less emotional loneliness. In line with unavoidable separations, 
seafarer-partners have to live a different lifestyle and thus attract extra attention. 
However, if seafarer-partners are able to reunite with their partners more often, they 
may become less sensitive and more able to ignore others’ talk. There are also 
possibilities for seafarer-partners to communicate with similar others. The Home of 
Chinese Seafarers is a good example. Through it, seafarer-partners are able to 
overcome geographical barriers and ‘meet’ others online. In a sense, the Home of 
Chinese Seafarers networks seafarer-partners, and the latter are able to share their 
experiences with each other and become less socially isolated.  
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CHEMICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
David Walters 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Chemicals are both transported in large quantities by sea and also used in the 
everyday operation of ships. This paper is an exploratory discussion of the extent of 
the risks involved in such transport, and use, and its implications for approaches to 
health and safety management on board vessels. It asks whether sufficient is known 
concerning the reality of chemical exposures and their control at sea, what the 
implications of this are, and whether further research is warranted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of risk management at sea.  It presents some consideration of the broad 
strategies to manage and reduce chemical risks that have been the subject of previous 
work across a range of economic sectors.  Based on recent literature and interviews 
with key informants representing interests in the supply, transport and use of 
chemicals in the maritime sector, the paper makes a preliminary attempt to establish 
what might be some of the issues for managing chemical risks to seafarers, while at 
the same time considering the extent of common ground between them and those 
addressed in land-based situations.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
During the 20th century the global production of chemicals increased from 1 million 
tonnes in 1930, to 400 million tonnes by the beginning of the 21st century. Much of 
this material requires transportation from producer to user. When raw materials such 
as the mineral ores and hydrocarbons involved in chemical production are included, 
the scale of global transportation of chemical substances and products is enormous. A 
substantial proportion of this transportation takes place at sea. In addition, on ships as 
in many other workplaces, chemical substances are used routinely in operational and 
maintenance work and may also be present in the shipboard environment as bi-
products of other ship operations. In all these cases there is a degree of risk of harmful 
exposure. This presentation is an exploratory discussion of the extent of this risk and 
its implications for strategic approaches to health and safety management on board 
vessels. It asks whether sufficient is known concerning the reality of chemical 
exposures and their control at sea, what are the implications of this and whether 
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further research is warranted to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management and its 
supports at sea.  
 
The paper begins with a review of recent literature on the toxic risks involved in 
working with chemical substances in maritime transport. It notes the presence of 
many ‘known unknowns’. This, it suggests, is in common with the findings of land-
based research on working with chemical substances and demonstrated need for a 
wider search for understandings of the nature and extent of chemical risks and how 
they can be most effectively addressed, embracing both land-based and maritime 
experience. At the same time it recognises that the maritime industry presents a 
unique working environment, which needs to be taken into account in discussing 
approaches to control risks of working with chemicals at sea.  
 
This leads to some consideration of the broad strategies to manage and reduce 
chemical risks that have been the subject of previous work across a range of economic 
sectors.  Based on recent literature and interviews with key informants representing 
interests in the supply, transport and use of chemicals in the maritime sector, the paper 
makes a preliminary attempt to establish what might be some of the issues for 
managing chemical risks to seafa rers, while at the same time considering the extent of 
common ground between them and those addressed in land-based situations. It 
discusses factors that support or constrain sustainability and transferability of good 
practices. It identifies some challenges and asks what it would be useful to know in 
order to address them.  
 
 
Chemicals and the nature of the risks they pose to seafarers  
 
Accidents with hazardous chemicals at work may cause injury, acute ill-health or even 
death. The extent to which this is documented largely depends upon the coverage and 
accuracy of reporting systems for work-related incidents, which for a host of reasons 
are known to under-report such events. There are predictable variations by sector in 
the importance of chemicals as a cause of injury, and while they are not the main 
cause, they feature prominently across most sectors, especially associated with burns, 
being overcome by fumes, poisonings as well as commonly involved in major 
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incidents such as fires and explosions. Lack of standardisation of reporting systems in 
the shipping industry make quantitative assessment difficult but the qualitative details 
of incidents involving chemical substances suggest similar patterns, with accidental 
spillages, leaks, entry into confined spaces, fumes and handling chemical products in 
routine maintenance and cleaning, frequently occurring in shipboard incident reports.    
 
However, such reporting only tells a small part of the story, because most of the 
consequences of working with chemical substances are chronic health effects, for 
many of which there is also a long latency between exposure and subsequent ill-
health. In employment generally, by far the most prevalent health effects associated 
with exposure to chemical substances are diseases of the respiratory system and the 
skin, of which, asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) in the case 
of the respiratory system and contact dermatitis in the case of the skin, are the most 
common. Diseases of the central nervous system are linked to such exposures, as are 
allergies and reproductive, developmental and endocrine disorders. Cancer is also 
associated with exposure to chemicals at work.  
 
In all cases, there are no reliable data concerning the full extent of occurrence. In 
Europe for example it has been estimated that nearly one third of all occupational 
diseases recognised annually in the EU are related to exposure to chemical substances.  
Occupational cancer is estimated to account for between 4 to 16 per cent of all cancer 
mortality and most occupational cancer is related to exposure to chemical substances 
of one sort or another. But it is also acknowledged that these are only partial measures 
and probably serious underestimations. Two major problems confound measurement 
of the extent of the health effects of working with chemicals. One occurs because 
neither the hazards of many chemical substances nor the extent of exposure to them 
are adequately researched, therefore understandings of risks to health and their 
quantification are based on limited data. The second occurs because the long latency 
between exposure and disease for many conditions associated with hazardous 
substances means it is often difficult to establish a causal relationship.  
 
There is no reason to suppose that the pattern of chemically related ill-health or the 
problems in documenting its extent in seafaring are likely to be any different from 
those found elsewhere. Seafarers are potentially exposed to a range of hazardous 
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chemicals in their routine work and, as already noted, in addition, a substantial 
proportion of global chemical production is transported by sea, from producers to 
users, including many substances that are known to be hazardous to health. Seafarers 
regularly employed in such transport may be particularly at risk as a result of 
exposures during loading and unloading operations, as well as in routine maintenance 
and as a result of leakage. There is some evidence of this in the mortality data for 
seafarers generally (Bloor et al 2000) and for particular seafaring occupations. For 
example elevated cancer incidence has been demonstrated amongst merchant seamen 
(Greenberg, 1991), in Danish engine room crew (Brandt et al 1994); for mates on 
Norwegian tankers (Moen et al 1994) as well as for Danish seafarers employed on 
tankers generally (Kaerlev et al 2005). For Finnish seafarers, it has been noted that 
occupational exposure of both deck and engine room crews on tankers add to their 
risk of various forms of cancer (Pukkala and Saarni, 1996; Saarni et al 2002). 
Elevated risks of lung and bladder cancer have also been found amongst Icelandic 
seamen (Rafnsson and Gunnarstoditter, 1995).  As well as historical exposure to 
asbestos in engine rooms, exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) and 
to benzene are commonly reported in studies of seafarers. Exposures to carcinogenic 
agents in tanker operations and in engine rooms has been noted (for example, Verma 
et al 2001, Nilsson et al 2004, Moen et al 1995a and 1995b) and in relation to the 
inspection of commercial tank barges (Davenport et al 2000). Other than carcinogens, 
chemical substances such as organic solvents for example, have been associated with 
neurotoxic effects amongst seafarers (Riise and Moen 1990; Nilsson et al 1997). 
There is also some limited evidence that subgroups of seafarers with a higher risk of 
hospitalisation as a consequence of lifestyle related conditions also have increased 
risk of hospitalisation due to injury and poisonings, the latter caused by chemical 
substances (Hansen et al 2005).  
 
However, overall, the extent to which the health effects of working with chemicals at 
sea are reported and analysed in the international scientific literature on the subject, is 
comparatively limited in comparison with studies on the effects of occupational 
exposures in land-based industry. There are good reasons for this. Problems of 
monitoring such ill-health are particularly challenging in seafaring, where many 
individuals are employed on short-tem contracts across a range of employers and 
agencies, and where the large part of the labour supply is from countries in which 
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disease reporting systems are poorly developed.1 As Thebaud-Mony (2007) has 
shown in relation to the incidence of work-related cancers amongst contract workers 
in the nuclear and chemical industries in France, such employment arrangements are 
major factors promoting the low visibility of ill-health in routine reporting systems 
even in Western countries with robust reporting systems. Combined with poor public 
health data reporting systems in most major maritime labour supply countries, this 
means that complete information on the long term health consequences of seafarers’ 
exposures to chemicals is unlikely to be available. As a result, there are no reliable 
data on the proportion of the morbidity and mortality that can be attributed to work 
involving the transportation of chemical substances by sea.  
 
Nor is exposure to chemical substances that occurs during sea transportation 
systematically documented. While some ships are fitted with automatic devices that 
are designed to warn workers about toxic chemical contamination and are equipped 
with hand-held simple detection devices for checking for contamination in confined 
spaces, such devices cannot be used to monitor workers’ exposure during work. Some 
chemical tanker companies also require more frequent than average routine medical 
examinations for seafarers employed on their tankers, however, here again, such 
medical monitoring is unlikely to detect effects of more than a very limited number of 
the range of hazardous substances to which seafarers may be exposed in their work. 
Moreover, such examples represent exceptional cases in which the dangers of the 
chemical substances involved are to a large extent known and precautionary measures 
are implemented. In many other cases, arguably the majority, the hazards and the 
exposures concerned as well as their consequences for seafarers are simply unknown.  
 
In land-based workplaces there is also little systematic information on exposures. 
Exposure data-bases exist in some industries in a few countries — for example, the 
DOK-MEGA database in Germany — but they are exceptional. In the UK, the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) has maintained measurements of exposure to hazardous 
substances on the National Exposure Database since 1986. But research carried out by 
the Institute of Occupational Medicine (Cherrie, et al 1999) noted tha t its coverage is 
only partial and that it has proved difficult to persuade industry and others to 
                                                 
1 All the epidemiological studies cited, are concerned with Western European or North American subjects, 
reflecting the relative availability of data from such sources.  
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contribute towards this database. In Europe more widely, self-assessment based 
surveys conducted for example by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions found that 22 per cent of respondents throughout the 
EU considered themselves to be exposed to dangerous substances for at least a quarter 
of their working time, while 16 percent thought they handled dangerous substances 
daily (European Foundation 2001). It has been estimated that some 22-24 million 
workers in EU countries are exposed to occupational carcinogens (Kauppinen et al 
2000). National surveys support this thesis, for example, analysis of the French 2003 
SUMER survey indicated that 14 per cent of the French workforce were exposed to 
one or more of 28 carcinogenic substances at their place of work (DARES 2005). No 
such information on the exposure of seafarers has ever been gathered systematically. 
But snapshot small scale surveys suggest substantial exposures, for example Jensen et 
al (2005) indicate that 55 per cent of a sample of over 6000 seafarers thought 
themselves to be exposed to chemicals with the highest exposures experienced, not 
surprisingly, on tankers.  
 
All this suggests that the current level of knowledge of the full extent of the health 
effects of transporting and working with chemical substances at sea, does not provide 
a reliable basis on which to implement or evaluate control strategies.  Although 
seafaring may represent a cause for concern in this respect, it is clear that it is not 
unique. In recent years there has been a growing recognition of the extent of ‘known 
unknowns’ in relation to workplace chemical exposures and their effects across a 
wide range of work situations and a variety of sectors. This prompts the question of 
what is to be done to minimise exposure and manage risks.  
 
 
The development of current occupational chemical risk management strategies  
 
Conventional approaches towards health and safety at work involve imposing 
regulatory duties on those that create risks, requiring them to take reasonable steps to 
protect those that may be exposed to them. This is also true as far as the risks of using 
and working with chemical substances are concerned. In addition, in the case of 
chemicals there are a host of further requirements imposing duties on manufacturers 
and suppliers of chemical products to provide information on their hazards and how 
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they may be transported, used and disposed safely and without risks to health or the 
environment. This makes for a complex regulatory framework for managing the risks 
of hazardous substances. Nowhere is this more evident than in the shipping industry, 
where sections of international regulations, codes and conventions such as MARPOL, 
SOLAS, STCW and so on, as well as a host of national measures and industry 
requirements, provide for an exceedingly complex regulatory framework addressed to 
the supply, transport, use and disposal of chemical products at sea, providing general 
standards and detailed requirements specific to particular trade sectors and ships.  
 
Despite this complexity there are some relatively simple conceptualisations about risk 
management that can be distilled from both land-based and maritime requirements. To 
appreciate their significance requires first understanding a little of their background.  
 
The 1970s and 1980s were decades when the modern approach to regulating the 
management of health and safety took hold.2 Regulatory approaches to achieving 
systematic risk management were increasingly advocated, both in relation to health 
and safety generally and for specific hazards such as chemical exposures. While it 
could be argued that the maritime industry was somewhat slow to follow suit, with its 
adoption of the ISM Code in the 1990s, it too implemented a more systematic 
approach to general safety management on board ships. On land, requirements began 
to emerge at EU and national levels in which good occupational hygiene practices 
were emphasised in the regulation of systematic chemical risk management. Where 
safer substances or processes could not be introduced, concepts of controlling 
exposure at source were advocated, standards were required against which exposures 
could be monitored and the risks to workers controlled. Today as result, although 
there are some differences of detail, most countries in the EU have broadly similar 
regulatory requirements for general chemical risk management, derived from, or 
harmonised by, EU provisions. They are outlined in Table1. In addition there are 
special requirements that apply to sites and substances that are deemed to be 
especially hazardous. 
                                                 
2 Regulating health and safety management (process regulation), as opposed to setting prescriptive regulatory 
standards with which duty holders are required to comply (prescriptive regulation) was a feature of national 
legislation such as the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSW) Act in the UK, the various Work Environment Acts 
of Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, all of which date from this period. They influenced the content of 
the EU framework Directive 89/391, which extended such process-based regulation to all member states from the 
early 1990s onwards. They also influenced similar developments in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
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Table 1:  Requirements on chemical risk management 
 
Substitution, obligatory for some substances in some countries but also in most 
countries there is an obligation on duty holders to consider whether there may be safer 
products available  
Risk assessment — this requires appropriate suppliers’ information, i.e. on labels and 
in material safety data sheets (SDS), but also the capacity to understand it and to 
consider the tasks for which chemical products are required. It also requires 
inventories of substances used. More technically, it requires exposure assessment. 
Information and training for workers about risks to health and safety and risk 
prevention/control measures, often interpreted as written working instructions 
Implementing control measures according to the established hierarchy of good 
practice for control  
Health surveillance where necessary  
 
 
Similar requirements can be found amongst the regulatory details that cover the 
shipping industry, applying generally to chemical risk management in the industry as 
well as more specific requirements on ship design, substance and plant safety that 
apply to situations such as chemical and oil tanker transport, and are analogous to 
those on land addressed to hazardous installations and very toxic chemicals. 
  
Despite the plethora of regulatory and other measures aimed at the control of the risks 
to health of working with chemicals, as the preceding section suggests, both on land 
and at sea there is reason to be concerned that reduction or control of these risks to 
acceptable levels remains to be achieved. On land such concern is not new  — indeed 
the measures outlined above were a response to earlier worries in this respect. In the 
past decade however attention has shifted from the systematisation of process 
regulation of chemical risk, to the practicability of the achievement of control in 
workplaces in which resources to operationalise such ends are limited.  
 
It became increasingly apparent, for example, that the effective implementation of 
systematic approaches to chemical risks management was dependent on several 
preconditions. They included, not least, good quality information concerning the 
hazards of substances, clear criteria on which exposure standards could be set, good 
systems for communicating this information to duty holders, sufficient technical 
capacity to monitor, evaluate and control risks and monitor workers’ health in 
workplace scenarios, sufficient grasp of what was required and how it should be 
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achieved by duty-holders, as well as adequate inspection and control. Yet the reality 
was that information on the hazards of the vast majority of substances used in 
European workplaces was far from complete, exposure standards were set for 
comparatively few substances and the criteria used subject to variation and debate. 
The quality of communication on hazard information to duty holders as well as that 
between duty-holders and their employees was poor. Technical capacity was limited 
to large enterprises or external services and there was growing evidence that a 
substantial proportion of duty–holders neither understood what was required of them, 
nor possessed the capacity to deliver the systematic approaches framed by regulation 
(Walters and Grodzki 2006).  
 
Numerous studies across the range of northern European countries demonstrated that 
owners/managers especially in small enterprises did not understand suppliers’ 
information or use it appropriately, they frequently did not understand the application 
exposure assessment/control, nor were they willing or able to employ expertise to do 
so (see for example Research International 1997). At the same time, many studies 
pointed to the inadequacies of information, both with regard to labelling and SDS – 
considerably more so in the case of the latter — identifying severe limitations in the 
quality of information and of its accessibility for small enterprises. (See for example, 
Samways 1988, Geyer et al 1999 and more recently CLEEN, 2004).  It was also 
becoming evident that regulatory inspectorates lacked the capacity to check 
compliance adequately across the range of duty-holders subject to the regulation and 
it was, in short, a situation in which there was mounting evidence of regulatory 
failure. 
 
It would seem to be important to ask to what extent this land-based experience is 
repeated at sea. Unlike the situation on land, there has been little independent 
evaluation of the effectiveness of arrangements to manage chemical risks to seafarers. 
However, there are several points of comparison. For example there would appear to 
be some degree of parallel between land-based experiences in the chemical and oil 
industries, and that on board chemical and oil tankers, where industry experience, 
regulatory scrutiny and the presence of large and well resourced companies, combine 
to influence good practice in controlling chemical risks both in terms of the safety 
technology of plant/ship design, and in the systematic management of operations to 
SIRC Symposium 2007 
 
 
68 
ensure delivery of best occupational hygiene and safety practices. As well as 
requirements on design and operation in relation to the carriage of hazardous cargo, in 
the oil and chemical tanker sectors of shipping there are especially pronounced 
requirements on the training of seafarers that are also in place.  
 
Turning to the other sectors of the shipping industry, practices in the carriage of 
hazardous substances are considerably more varied, most probably reflecting the 
diversity of ships, companies and clients involved. This is therefore a further parallel 
with land-based situations in which it is well established that outside of large 
companies, the chemicals industry and high-risk hazardous installations, there is 
similar variety of practice in terms of chemical risk management across a wide range 
of workplaces and sectors. What is also known to be the case on land however is that 
it is in these situations that previous regulatory strategies to control chemical risks 
failed because they did not address the conditions of risk communication and control 
commonly experienced in these workplaces. 
 
 
Tackling the challenge 
 
Acknowledgement of this failure led to recent strategies to improve chemical risk 
management by addressing them towards the limitations of risk communication 
(Russell et al 1998, Topping 2001. For example in the UK, the production of COSHH 
Essentials, the recasting of requirements on exposure limits, and the recent 
reorientation of the COSHH Regulations have all occurred within a policy debate at 
national level in which the weaknesses referred to above have been aired. Similar 
debates have taken place more recently in Germany, explicitly addressing the need to 
make the legal framework for regulating chemical risk management ‘more small 
enterprise friendly’ and have influenced Hazardous Substances Ordinance 2005. 
Within the recently re-established Committee on Hazardous Substances, (Ausschuss 
für Gefahrstoffe – AGS) for example, there is a working group to develop proposals to 
improve the accessibility of support tools directed at SMEs. In Sweden, the 
KemiGuiden (Chemical Guide) is a complete tool that allows employers to identify 
regulatory requirements on chemical risk management and implement appropriate 
responses. It was developed with support and financing from trade unions’ and 
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employers’ organisations and is delivered with their active institutional support as 
well as that of the Work Environment Authority.  
 
Other countries have adopted comparable approaches, embedding them in wider 
strategic initiatives to engage employers and their workers. For example, in the 
Netherlands the VASt programme, requires employers to engage with preparation of 
sectoral level action plans for chemical risk management that identify specific 
improvement activities in high-risk sectors. Alongside another major Dutch strategy 
that promotes the adoption of covenants (Arboconvenanten) between employers and 
trade unions at sectoral level, setting achievable targets for improvement of health and 
safety issues, this provides a framework for institutional support in which tools for 
chemical risk management can be deployed.  
 
In Austria, the AUVASafe system (AUVAsicher) provided by the AUVA (the major 
insurance organisation for occupational risks) is a free preventive support service for 
smaller worksites. Employers can call upon the services of health and safety expertise 
from prevention centres run by the AUVA. Chemical risk management is not the only 
part of its programme, but it is nevertheless a central one (Friedl 2000; Pfoser and 
Peer 2004).  
 
Such approaches are increasingly international. At the level of the European Union, 
for example, the rhetoric behind the recently introduced Regulation on Registration, 
Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH) places considerable emphasis 
on risk communication in the supply chain and its requirements are intended to 
promote two way exchange between suppliers and users concerning exposure 
scenarios at the workplace.  
 
None of this seems to be taking place at sea where there has been no parallel 
acknowledgement of limitations in the application and operation of requirements for 
safety in the transport and use of chemicals, as was the case on land. Of course it is 
possible that this is because, unlike in the majority of land-based scenarios, 
requirements for managing chemical risks on board ships work effectively. If so, it 
would seem important to know what are the supports for effectiveness in this respect 
on board ships and the extent to which lessons learned here can be transferred to land-
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based situations.  Alternatively, it may be that similar failings to those perceived to 
occur on land are in fact commonplace in chemical risk management on board ships, 
but neither they nor their consequences have been properly investigated or 
documented. If this were the case, again it would seem important to learn more about 
the reasons for such failings in order to better understand ways in which they may be 
overcome.  
 
 
A focus for further study?  
 
A great deal is already known about the technology of preventing harmful exposures 
to chemical substances. Yet, if the indications of the evidence of exposure and its 
consequences referred to previously are to be believed, harmful exposure to chemical 
risks continues to be a commonplace experience at work and a cause of substantial 
work-related mortality and morbidity. Furthermore, although we cannot document it 
in detail, it seems likely that such exposure will be no less an issue in the shipping 
industry than it is in other sectors of the economy.  
 
While it is relatively straightforward to show that the technical means exist to prevent 
harmful exposures, to use chemical substances safely and to monitor workers’ 
exposure and health, as preceding sections illustrate, it is equally easy to demonstrate 
that they are seldom applied across all the situations in which chemicals are used and 
it is far from simple to find practicable and economically feasible solutions to this 
problem.  
 
From a social science research perspective, an interesting set of questions arise 
concerning the socio-economic factors that act as supports or barriers to desired 
improvement in chemical risk management of which the following are some 
examples.   
 
Communicating risk: Figure 1 illustrates the flow of information from supplier to user 
in chemical risk communication and how it drives the operation of risk management 
at the workplace. Many of the known weaknesses in present practice take place at 
points in this diagram. For example, as we have seen, land-based study suggests that 
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the content of SDSs are frequently inadequate. Preliminary interviews in the present 
study suggest that there are similar concerns about chemicals both in use and carried 
as cargo on ships. Further study of the extent and nature of such inadequacy would 
seem to be warranted since good suppliers’ information is both fundamental to 
downstream safe use of chemical products as well as being one of the cornerstones of 
regulatory strategies. This does not only concern requirements on the generic design 
of SDS but also monitoring the extent to which they are observed in practice. 
 
Figure 1: Aspects of chemical risk management 
 
(after Walters 2007)  
 
Several other aspects of the role of suppliers are important. In land-based studies, they 
are shown often to be the major source of specialist and trusted advice on chemical 
safety, especially for many users in smaller establishments who do not have the 
resources or knowledge to use alternative sources of advice. It is largely based upon 
this understanding that modern European regulation such as REACH advocates a 
greater role for the chemical supply chain and for risk communication between 
suppliers and users. In shipping the role of economic relations between shipping 
companies and their clients in the transport of goods can sometimes be major factors 
that influence the management of safety on board ships, including that of chemical 
safety. Equally, some of the chemical products used on board ships are often sourced 
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from relatively few suppliers for whom shipping companies are a major source of 
business. In these situations the supply chain may be an important influence on safety 
and the leverage for improvements that may be possible in such relationships. Yet, it 
is equally clear that there is much variation in the quality of help available from 
suppliers and that supply chains are not simple relationships (Walters 2007; James et 
al 2007).  Their role in improving chemical risk management at sea would therefore 
benefit from further detailed study to identify both their supporting and constraining 
features.  
 
Purchasing and registering: Figure 1 also shows the importance of purchasing 
strategies in chemical risk management. Here too there are several aspects of land-
based experience that may be worthy of further study. Fundamental to the control of 
chemicals hazardous to health is the notion of the substitution of dangerous products 
with those less dangerous. As researchers have pointed out, such substitution extends 
beyond substances and can also include plant or processes (Ahrens et al 2006). 
Substitution certainly occurs in the purchase of chemical substances in shipping, but 
its extent of significance is not clear and a better understanding of these matters and 
their effects would be useful. 
 
Of course purchasing decisions also take account of a variety of other factors. For 
example, there is some evidence to suggest that in land-based scenarios as well as 
maritime ones, some organisational strategies have quite explicitly taken into account 
environmental issues in the purchase of chemicals and with beneficial effects (Gorton 
2001). It would seem to be important to explore how widespread this practice is in 
shipping companies and how far it is possible to create links between the purchase of 
substances for use on board ships and already present environment policies in many 
shipping companies.    
 
A consequence of purchasing that is often a legal requirement is the creation of an 
inventory of substances used at the workplace. Some firms use this requirement as an 
opportunity to keep purchasing policies under review to ensure only necessary 
substances are acquired and in necessary amounts. An example of a similar approach 
used at sea is found on Wallenius Lines (Gorton 2001). Again, it would be useful to 
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know how widespread such approaches are and what are their effects in relation to the 
use of chemicals across the industry as whole.  
 
Risk assessment and control: Reasons for a register of chemicals, and good quality 
suppliers’ information are in a large part to enable adequate assessment of the risks 
involved in the handling and storage of substances at the workplace. Risk assessment 
on board ships is required not only by specialised rules and regulations on chemical 
safety but also more generally as part of the shipboard safety management systems 
called for under the ISM Code. Elsewhere, risk assessment has been fundamental to 
regulatory strategies on chemical risk management at the workplace for several 
decades, and has been seen as an important stage in the development of appropriate 
control strategies in the professional practice of occupational hygiene for a lot longer. 
Despite this history, it is a process that is much misunderstood, and often 
inappropriately and incompletely applied. Research on the practice of managing 
chemical risks suggests that employers in workplaces other than those that are large 
and well resourced are poorly equipped to undertake risk assessment and even when 
they are supplied with appropriate information there remain major problems with their 
understanding and capacity to carry out the task adequately (Walters 2007).  Since the 
primary purpose of assessing risks is to ensure that adequate and appropriate measures 
are taken to control them, it follows that failure to discharge this task properly will 
lead to further problems in implementing appropriate controls.  
 
It was the acknowledgement of this failure that has led the development of the latest 
national strategies, to improve chemical risk management in land-based industries, 
some examples of which were outlined previously, and in which generic control 
solutions and greater engagement with support infrastructures and suppliers are 
advocated. Properly conducted study of the effectiveness of these approaches has 
been shown to be limited. However, some indications of supports and constraints to 
these approaches are evident.  
 
It seems clear for example that simplified and generic control solutions are not a 
complete answer. Their application requires engagement and support from actors in 
the economic infrastructures of the sectors and trades in which they are applied. These 
may include trade unions and employers organisations, trade bodies such as economic 
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chambers, insurance organisations, inspectorates and occupational health and safety 
services as well as the suppliers of substances and  equipment themselves, and client 
companies and other intermediaries that are in positions of leverage (Walters 2006 
and 2007). The exact nature of such constellations of influence is shown to vary 
according to firm size, economic position, country, and sector. What is possible by 
way of support for chemical risk management is very different in, for example, the 
German printing industry, where there is active, insurance-based, technical support for 
health and safety, well established co-operation between small firm users of 
chemicals, the insurance organisation, the trade bodies, the suppliers of chemicals and 
the regional health and safety inspectorates and say, the British construction industry 
where many substances are in unsupervised use on a daily basis by non-union 
employees of small subcontractors with no direct link to suppliers, often at temporary 
building sites for short periods and with no more than the remotest of connections 
with the health and safety management arrangements of principal contractors on such 
sites (Walters 2007). 
 
In contrast to the situation on land, the extent of the success or failure of traditional 
approaches to risk assessment and control of chemical substances has not really been 
tested in the shipping industry. Based on the available literature and the preliminary 
findings from interviews in the present study however, the picture that emerges 
suggests at least some commonality with land-based experience. For example, most of 
the work that has been done on exposures to hazardous substances at sea has been 
undertaken in the chemical and oil tanker trade, paralleling the similar situation in the 
chemical and oil industries on land. It is in these sectors that the most developed 
strategies for managing chemical risks exist and aga in this is the case on land. 
However, the extent of the research evaluating the effectiveness of these strategies at 
sea is limited in comparison with that in the same sectors on land. Importantly, there 
appears to be no documentation of the range and extent of demonstrable good practice 
on chemical risk management in these trades or of the extent to which such practice 
might be transferable to other parts of the shipping industry, or of the likely barriers or 
supports for such transfer. Nor does there appear to be any sign of an emerging 
research literature paralleling that on land that considers the role of leverage in the 
economic and social relations of the supply of chemical products, or, in the case of 
their transportation, of these relations between suppliers, shippers, ship- operators and 
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users. Yet anecdotal accounts suggest that such relations provide opportunities for 
leverage in the supply chain and in the relations between shipping companies and 
their clients that may be important influences on practice.  
 
If all of this could be explored further in the tanker trade, it certainly would warrant 
investigation in other sectors of shipping where the transport and use of chemicals are 
commonplace but where the situations and contexts of control are considerably more 
varied. Here too anecdotal accounts in interviews for the present study suggest that 
supply chain leverage could be an important support for the introduction of more 
accessible approaches to risk assessment and control and for sustainable good practice 
in their operation. Such activities as the storage and use of paints, engine room 
materials and substances used in general cleaning and maintenance are to some extent 
comparable with those in land-based activities where the role of suppliers in 
improving and sustaining good practice have been described further. For example in 
the motor vehicle trade in Germany large manufacturers are able to influence the 
management of chemical products both in relation to their contracted dealers and 
repairers, as well as in some cases, the suppliers of components and there are many 
other examples in the same vein in other trades (Walters 2007).  
 
 
Conclusions: Learning from experience 
 
Working with chemical substances is a widespread feature of modern life at sea as 
well as on land. Some chemical substances are hazardous and exposure to them at 
work may cause serious ill-health and may even prove fatal. The problem is a 
significant one but its dimensions are not known, especially not in seafaring, where 
both exposure and its consequences are difficult to monitor. Nevertheless, sufficient is 
understood of the means to prevent harm in working with chemical substances to 
suggest that applying a precautionary principle would be good management practice. 
Unfortunately, research shows that regulatory approaches to achieving such good 
practice across anything like the full range of workplaces in which chemicals are used 
in land-based situations has until now met with only limited success.  There are 
several reasons underlying this limited achievement but research further suggests that 
important amongst them is the failure of risk communication and support for the 
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implementation of chemical risk management in enterprises that lack the resources to 
gain specialist knowledge in this field. The absence of similar study of the situation at 
sea means that it is unclear to what extent approaches have been successful here, but it 
would appear that there is sufficient similarity with many land-based situations to 
warrant caution in assuming such success.  
 
In land-based situations, acknowledgement of regulatory failure in chemical risk 
management has meant that the orientation of current research and policy has 
increasingly focused on discovering ways of supporting and sustaining the 
effectiveness of interventions by exploring the socio-economic contexts in which they 
occur. It is suggested that there would be something to be gained from the exploration 
of these contexts in shipping too. 
 
At the same time on land, a general crisis in the resourcing of regulatory inspectorates 
combined with neo- liberal economic policies has promoted a desire for more self-
regulatory approaches towards health and safety management generally on the part of 
industry. As a result there has been a growing interest in the role of economic drivers, 
in leverage in the relations of supply, and in the role of actors in social and economic 
infrastructures that support business relations in achieving improved and largely self-
regulatory approaches to health and safety management. These approaches are already 
the norm in shipping, where in a globalised industry self- regulation has been a well-
developed feature for a considerable time.  It is therefore quite possible that by 
investigating the role of economic drivers in determining best practice in chemical 
risk management at sea, by documenting what works and why it works in these 
situations, significant lessons may be learned that could have a wider application in 
other economic sectors.  
 
While it is important to understand and utilise the possibilities for support and 
leverage to improve chemical risk management in the shipping industry, it also needs 
to be acknowledged that there are likely to be some limits to the extent to which 
economic relations can be utilised to drive self-regulated approaches, since there are 
always those companies that fail to see the commercial advantages of improved 
quality and are unresponsive to economic pressures to achieve it, opting instead to 
compete for business by cutting costs. Here again there would seem to be some room 
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for further study, this time concerning  ‘best fit’ in the relationship between economic 
drivers and international regulation and its enforcement in achieving improved 
working practices on board ships.  
Particularly interesting at the macro- level for example, would be some consideration 
of what might be the extent of the possible increased supply chain focus of 
international regulatory intervention, and to what extent it might be possible to 
explore linkage between improving workplace health and safety in the use and 
transport of chemicals at sea, with that of measures aimed at environmental and 
consumer protection. Such has been the character of the new European approach to 
chemical regulation typified by REACH. Here, a refocusing of the chemical suppliers’ 
duty of care has occurred so that it is industry rather than the state that is responsible 
for ensuring the safety of chemical products, and the extent of this responsibility 
extends beyond use at work to embrace consumer and environmental protection also. 
In so doing, the role of risk communication in the supply chain has become a 
prominent issue for regulatory attention.  
 
It is far too early to see what the effect of these measures will be, but for our purposes, 
it is important to note the already existing parallels in some of the requirements of 
MARPOL, in the voluntary practices of larger oil and chemical suppliers, shippers 
and shipping companies and to suggest that their effects could be the subject of 
fruitful future inquiry.   
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ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT DATA  
 
Neil Ellis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Although it is often suggested that accidents at sea have reduced over the last decade, 
there is no doubt that they still occur, both to vessels and those that work on them. 
One potential contribution to the reduction of such accidents is the collection of 
accurate data on accident and incidents as this may be used to suggest improvements 
to safety systems, and to inform changes in practice and policy. Although there are a 
number of sources from which such data may be obtained, when these are examined 
they are generally found to be localised, poor in coverage, and/or to contain only very 
basic data. Therefore, this paper outlines an attempt to collect and combine available 
sources of accident and incident data, both for vessels and personnel, discusses the 
format, nature and limitations of this data, and considers whether there is any common 
core of available information in the public domain.  Information from a number of 
sources will be examined, including maritime administrations, P&I clubs, and 
shipping companies.  Finally, recommendations are made to consider what 
information could valuably be recorded, and how it could helpfully be classified, so 
that these sources are more comparable and compatible for research purposes. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the number of shipping accidents occurring at sea has been said to have 
reduced over the last decade (Transport Safety Board of Canada, 2001) accidents and 
incidents still occur, both to vessels and those who work on them. The impact of these 
accidents can be far reaching. Not only can they entail physical damage to, or loss of, 
a vessel with considerable financial losses, all too frequently they also involve loss of 
life or disabling injury. For shipping in general, such accidents cause a loss of 
confidence about the safety of the industry (Iarossi, 2003), and may produce strong 
demands for tougher regulation and control over the sector. 
  
One way to try and reduce accidents and suggest ways in which safety may be 
improved, is to collect accurate information about the accidents and incidents that 
occur (McCafferty and Baker, 2006; Nielsen, 2001; European Transport Safety 
Council, 2001).  The benefits of such information are well recognised. The European 
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Transport Safety Council (2001) in a report on road, air, rail, and water transport 
suggested that ‘accident and casualty databases are an indispensable tool to allow for 
objective assessment of transport safety problems, the identification of priority areas 
for action and for monitoring the effectiveness of countermeasures’ (p1).  
 
There are also a number of benefits of such information which are specific to the 
maritime industry. For example, classification societies could use such information to 
guide and support their planning of rule making (Baker and McCafferty, 2005). 
Shipping companies may also use this data to develop better informed and targeted 
policies for their safety management systems, whereas Port State Control could use it 
to identify ship types that are more at risk of incidents in order to better target vessels 
for inspection. More generally such data may help to facilitate research into health 
and safety within the industry (Baker and McCafferty, 2005), which at present is very 
limited. 
 
Ashore, information about accidents and incidents in most transport sectors is well 
recorded and is readily available. For example, a European wide database of road 
transport accident s was set up in 1993, and all member states provide data to feed into 
this on a yearly basis. Similar schemes have also been set up in the aviation industry 
(European Transport Safety Council, 2001).  However, in the maritime industry, 
although administrations are legally required to collect data on accidents and incidents 
occurring to their flagged vessels, or to vessels in their waters under SOLAS 
regulation I/21 and MARPOL 73/78, articles 8 and 12 (see MSC/Circ.953-
MEPC/Circ.372 for more detail), this data is sometimes poorly kept, and often not 
always publicly available. This makes it of limited use. 
 
In an attempt to try and examine the types of accidents and incidents that are 
occurring at sea, some researchers have simply looked at single datasets (Philips and 
Daltry, 2006, Roberts, 2006). However, due to their nature such studies are generally 
very limited, as the data even when collected from several sources is often related to a 
single geographical location (e.g. Hansen et al., 2007), or focuses on specific vessel 
types. Thus, robust generalised statements about the type of accidents and incidents 
that are occurring worldwide cannot confidently be made from such studies.  
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Other researchers have attempted to collect data from multiple sources and aggregate 
this data (Baker and McCafferty, 2005). However, in practice these have only used 
data from a small number of sources which the researcher has access to, and thus 
cannot be seen as global in their coverage, suffering from many of the limitations 
similar to those of the single source studies.  A similar conclusion is drawn by the 
European Transport Safety Council (2001) report on accidents and casualties 
occurring in waterborne transport.   
 
A major recognised source of accident and incident information is maritime 
administrations. Administrations are not only obliged to conduct accident 
investigations and record their outcomes, but they must also supply the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) with information regarding their findings1. However, 
they are only legally required to provide these when ‘it [the maritime administration 
concerned] judges that such an investigation may assist in determining what changes 
in the present regulations may be desirable’ (Graveson, 2006), and thus a large 
majority of the accidents and incidents that occur are not reported. This is supported 
by our own analysis of the IMO database and corresponding data from a sample of 
maritime administrations which indicated that only a very few of the incidents 
recorded on national databases are reported to the IMO 2. A similar conclusion is 
drawn by Graveson (2006). 
 
Many other sources of accident and incident data are also available. For example, the 
World Casualty Statistics is published yearly by Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, and lists 
losses and disposals of sea-going merchant ships. Confidential reporting schemes such 
as the Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS), and the Confidential Hazardous 
Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) collect and publish accident information 
reported confidentially by seafarers. However, these sources generally provide limited 
data with very partial coverage, and cannot be used to determine robust calculations  
of numbers of accidents and incidents globally. 
 
                                                 
1 Under the SOLAS regulation I/21 and MARPOL 73/78, articles 8 and 12 legislation (see 
MSC/Circ.953-MEPC/Circ.372 for more detail). 
2 It should be noted that administrations are only legally required to report ship casualties which are 
considered to be ‘serious’ and ‘very serious’. 
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Thus, whilst there are a number of available sources of information about maritime 
accidents and incidents internationally, these are either very localised, or those which 
are more global contain very limited data.  The European Transport Safety Council 
(2001) suggested that where such situations arise ‘a co-ordinated approach offers the 
best means to gain maximum value out of each separate system‘ (p7). However, to 
date in the maritime industry such a combined approach has not been undertaken on a 
large scale. 
 
This paper describes the progress made to date with a project dedicated to the 
identification and collation of accident and incident data kept by different sources 
worldwide, such as maritime administrations, Protection & Indemnity (P&I) clubs, 
and shipping companies, as well as other available sources of information. The format 
and nature of these data will be documented, as well as whether there is a common 
core of information that is collected across sources.  The public availability of 
relevant data will be also discussed. 
 
Within the study we have looked at two levels of accident and incident data: vessel 
level incidents and personal injuries/fatalities and in describing these have approached 
and collated data from maritime administrations, P&I clubs, and shipping companies. 
 
 
Vessel Level Incidents 
 
In order to collect vessel level incident data, maritime administrations were contacted 
and asked for their co-operation. Maritime administrations are legally obliged to 
collect accident and incident data, so between them they should be in a position to 
supply comprehens ive data on numbers of accidents/incidents worldwide, all things 
being equal. 
 
However, shipping is a major global industry, and worldwide there are over 180 
maritime administrations. Contacting all of these would be very time consuming. 
Therefore using the Lloyd’s Register Fairplay World Fleet Statistics 2005 report, we 
identified the top 30 countries of registration by gross tonnage and contacted them for 
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further information and details.  This was seen as acceptable as the top 30 represented 
87.5% of the world gross tonnage.   
 
Contact details for these maritime administrations were obtained from three sources.  
Firstly, the Marine Accident Investigators International Forum (MAIIF) 
(http://www.maiif.net/Contacts.htm)  which is an organisation that aims to provide a 
forum to promote and improve marine accident investigation, and to foster co- 
operation and communication between marine accident investigators. Secondly, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) website 
(http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D17408/6-circ.2Annex1NationalcontactpointsJan07.pdf ), 
and thirdly, if no contact details were listed for a particular maritime administration, 
internet search engines or personal contacts were used to try and identify relevant 
personnel3. 
 
Using these contact details a combination of faxes and emails were sent to the listed 
contact persons/organisations explaining the aims of the project, and asking them to 
identify the most appropriate person to contact in their administration about accident 
and incident records and their potential access. To make it easier and quicker to 
respond a pre-designed pro-forma was provided (see Appendix 1) asking for the 
following information: organisation, name, the person’s position within the 
organisation, their address, email, telephone number, and fax number.  The sheet 
could be either sent back by email or by fax.  If no response was received to this after 
approximately 2-3 weeks, a follow up fax or email was sent, again asking for the same 
information.  If no responses were received after the two attempts, the maritime 
administrations were contacted by telephone (where listed), and the contact details of 
the appropriate person were asked for. 
 
Although for many of the contacts the same organisation and individuals were listed 
on both the IMO and MAIIF list, in some instances different people/organisations 
were provided.  In these cases, if no response was received from the initial and follow 
                                                 
3 In some cases no contacts details  could be found for some maritime administrations either on the lists 
or the internet, and thus, where possible personal contacts of staff in SIRC were used to either directly 
contact the maritime administration, or to identify contacts. 
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up requests, an alternative contact person was identified from the list, and was 
contacted. 
 
Following this lengthy process we managed to get a response from 80.0% (24 of the 
30) of the maritime administrations initially contacted. Of the 6 maritime 
administrations we could not contact at all despite numerous efforts, two put the 
phone down on the researcher, which was mainly attributed to language difficulties, 
and the phone number listed in two other cases did not work. For one maritime 
administration, the contact details were for an inappropriate person in the 
administration, and despite being passed from department to department, the 
appropriate person was never found, and in one further case the follow-up process 
remains incomplete. 
 
Figure 1: Pie chart showing contact made, and reasons for contact not being 
made 
 
Phone number 
did not work, 
n=2, 7%
Follow up 
on-going, 
n=1, 3%
Appropriate 
person not 
found, 
n=1, 3%
Hung up on 
researcher, 
n=2, 7%
Contact made, 
n=24, 80%
 
 
Once we had established the appropriate individuals with whom to further liaise, we 
sent a short questionnaire (see Appendix 2) to them by fax or email. The questionnaire 
asked about the sort of information that was maintained by the maritime 
administration (e.g. written accident reports, statistics on accidents, tabulated data, 
etc), the format (i.e. electronic or paper), whether it was publicly available, whether it 
could be accessed online, and importantly if they would be willing to share this data 
for academic research purposes. 
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If no response was obtained a second follow up fax/email was sent after a period of 2-
3 weeks. After a further 2-3 weeks, if we still hadn’t received a response, the 
identified person was contacted by phone, and asked if they would be willing to 
complete and return the questionnaire. 
 
As a result of this concerted effort, 18 completed questionnaires (75.0%) were 
returned from the 24 administrations for which we had contact details.  In four of the 
six cases where questionnaires were not returned, this was despite discussions with 
individuals on the phone and agreement with regard to the re-sending and return of 
the questionnaire.  Two contacts, simply did not respond to any fax or emails sent to 
them.  
 
Figure 2: Pie chart showing the number and frequency accident database 
questions returned, and reasons for no- responses 
 
Questionnaire 
returned, 
n=18, 75%
Spoke to on 
phone, but 
questionnaire 
not returned, 
n=4, 17%
Did not respond 
to faxs or 
emails, 
n=2, 8%
 
 
Looking at the 18 questionnaires that were completed and returned, 94.4% (n=17) of 
the maritime administrations indicated that they kept basic records of accidents and 
incidents that occurred on their national flagged vessels and in their national waters, 
with only one maritime administration indicating that it did not keep any records at 
all. However, when asked more specifically about the types of records kept, all 18 
maritime administrations indicated keeping records of accidents/incident reports, with 
88.8% (n=16) keeping paper records, and 72.2% (n=13) keeping electronic records. 
Similarly, all 18 maritime administrations  kept records of accidents/incident 
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investigations, with 94.4% (n=17) keeping paper records, and 66.7% (n=12) keeping 
electronic records. However, not all maritime administrations kept statistics on 
accidents, with one indicating that it did not keep records in either a paper and 
electronic format. Of the remaining 17 that did, 76.6% (n=13) kept paper records, and 
70.6% (n=12) kept electronic records. Four (22.2%) of the maritime administrations  
indicated that they kept other sorts of records, including website data, faxes and the 
International Maritime Organization Global Integrated Shipping Information System 
(IMO GISIS).  The frequency and type of records kept can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The frequency and percentage of record types kept 
Records kept Type of record 
 Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Paper 16 88.8% Accident/incident reports 18 100.0% 
Electronic 13 72.2% 
Paper 17 94.4% Accident/incident 
investigations  18 100.0% Electronic 12 66.7% 
Paper 13 76.6% Statistics on accidents  17 94.4% 
Electronic 12 70.6% 
Other 4 22.2% n/a 
 
 
For the accident and incident records that were kept, just under half the maritime 
administrations (44.4%, n=8) indicated that these were publicly available, and in 
87.5% of cases (n=7) these were available online. In 6 of the 7 cases (85.7%) web 
addresses were listed.  However, for one of these the website was maintained in the 
national language, and thus the researcher could do no further analysis of its content. 
Of the remaining 5 websites, two gave access to accident reports only, one offered 
tables of accident statistics, and the remaining two websites maintained both sources 
of data.  
 
When asked if they investigated all accidents that occur on their national flagged 
vessels or in their national waters 66.6% (n=12) of the maritime administrations  
indicated that they investigated all accidents. The majority of these investigations 
were done by the maritime administration itself with only 33.3% (n=6) suggesting 
that the investigations were done by another agency. 
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Twelve maritime administrations (66.7% of those who returned the questionnaire) 
indicated that they might be willing to share the information that they maintained on 
accidents and incidents for academic purposes. These maritime administrations were 
contacted by email and asked if they could provide us with access to/or copies of the 
accident and incident databases/records (ideally in an electronic format) for the period 
of 2000-2005. The email emphasised that the information would only be used for 
research, and that we were interested in general trends, and not individual cases. It 
was also made clear that all data would be treated as strictly confidential and that any 
reporting of it would not identify any sources of data, vessels or seafarers. 
 
If no response was obtained, a follow-up email was sent after a period of 2-3 weeks. If 
there was still no response after an additional 2-3 weeks, the maritime administrations  
were contacted by phone, and asked if they would be willing to let SIRC have access 
to the data for academic research purposes. In a number of cases the person contacted 
had to seek further permission to share the data which took additional time. 
 
In addition to those that agreed to share data when they completed a questionnaire, a 
further maritime administration subsequently agreed, via email correspondence, to 
share accident and incident data with us for the study, making a total of 13 maritime 
administrations that agreed to share their data with us. 
 
However, after extensive follow-up, of these 13 maritime administrations only 7 
(53.8%) actually provided data.  Even though they indicated that they were willing to 
share data, two of the maritime administrations simply did not respond to requests to 
provide this. A further two despite repeated emails and phone conversations have yet 
to actually provide the data, although they still seem willing to do so. Reasons for not 
providing data ranged from difficulties with extraction, to needing to seek permission 
from a higher authority. In one case, although the maritime administration had data, it 
could not provide it as it had only recently been computerised, and said it needed to 
check the system before it could extract such data, saying this would take around 12 
months. In another case, a database was actually sent, although this was blank. 
Despite follow-ups about this no complete database was received.  In three cases, data 
was obtained (in some cases additional data to that sent) from the maritime 
administrations’ websites, as this was publicly available online. 
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Table 2 summaries the data that was sent to us by maritime administrations. The 
actual source of the data has been excluded to protect confidentiality and the 
alphabetical letters labelling datasets were assigned randomly. In most cases the 
datasets cover a period from 2000-2005, although in one case, only a single year of 
data (2004) is given, and in two other cases, data is available from 1984 and 1982, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: Content of the datasets provided by the maritime administrations  
% keeping 
Country Information 
Datasets Offline 
Information Kept A B C D E F G A D H Datasets Offline 
VESSEL LEVEL                         
Reference number   ü ü ü         42.9% ------- 
Occurrence date/date 
incident occurred ü ü ü ü ü ü ü       100.0% ------- 
Location   ü  ü ü ü         57.1% ------- 
Incident type ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 100.0% 100.0% 
Vessel name 
  ü ü  ü ü       57.1% ------- 
Flag  ü  ü  ü ü       57.1% ------- 
Ship type ü ü ü ü  ü ü       85.7% ------- 
Damage to vessel 
    ü ü          28.6% ------- 
Gross tonnage 
 ü  ü  ü ü       57.1% ------- 
Age of vessel when 
accident occurred    ü   ü       28.6% ------- 
Was there any pollution      ü ü       28.6% ------- 
Remark ü ü ü   ü          57.1% ------- 
Cause   ü  ü             28.6% ------- 
CREW LEVEL                         
Total crew number       ü       14.3% ------- 
Number of seafarers 
dead ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü    100.0% ------- 
Number of seafarers 
rescued       ü       14.3% ------- 
Number of seafarers 
injured ü ü ü ü4  ü ü ü ü    100.0% ------- 
Number of seafarers 
missing ü ü  ü   ü ü    57.1% ------- 
Crew injury level 
      ü          14.3% ------- 
Details of  crew injury ü     ü          28.6% ------- 
                                                 
4 Injuries are actually broken down into serious and minor injuries. 
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From Table 2 it can be seen that there is considerable variation in what information is 
recorded about accidents and incidents.  Some countries, such as country ‘D’, store 
detailed information, whereas others store much less, for example countries ‘A’ and 
‘C’.  All keep information on the type of incident, the dates of incidents, and the 
number of seafarer deaths or injur ies. The majority (85.7%) also keep information on 
ship type. However, important information about the vessels and the incident seem 
not to be recorded in many cases, with less than half (28.6%) of maritime 
administrations recording information about the age of the vessel, damage occurring, 
and surprisingly the cause of the incident.  Information about the nature of injuries to 
personnel is also often not recorded, with only one of the current datasets including 
such data. 
 
Although Table 2 includes information about what accident and incident data and 
statistics are available online, it is difficult to draw conclusions about such data, as 
they often only represent a small amount of the information held by the maritime 
administrations, i.e. what they chose to publish. Therefore these online data sources 
will not be discussed any further. However, it should be noted that only 3 maritime 
administrations actually published such data. 
 
Looking at the format of the data, a number of problems can be seen when making 
comparisons between the different sources. Firstly, as discussed above, different 
information is recorded by each of the maritime administrations.  Although there is a 
basic core of information, in reality only a very limited number of variables can be 
compared, such as incident type, ship type, and the number of seafarers deaths or 
injuries. Thus only a very basic picture of the type and nature of accidents and 
incidents occurring worldwide can be obtained. 
 
How the data is recorded is also an issue.  For example, some maritime 
administrations code fire and explosion as separate events, whereas others group them 
together. In fact, even within maritime administrations classification may change year 
by year as databases grow and develop.  Such inconsistencies, make it very difficult to 
compare datasets, and often result in the loss of detailed data as incidents have to be 
grouped together in order to compare them meaningfully.  This standardisation not 
only applies to factors such as accident types, but also to others such as recording of 
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personal accidents. For example some maritime administrations simply record 
numbers of seafarers injured, whereas others record more detailed information such as 
whether these injuries were minor, serious, or fatal.  
 
There is also large variation in respect to the years for which data is available. Some 
maritime administrations keep data as far back as 1982, whereas others have only 
recently begun to collect data. For example, country ‘E’ only has accident and 
incident data from 2000. It is important to note that it is not only tabulated data that is 
not kept in some cases prior to these dates, but that accident and incident data per se is 
not available at all before this.  However, it must be noted that in some cases we were 
only provided with data for a certain range of years (usually 2000-2005), even if 
accident and incident information was available for years prior to this. 
 
In this paper we have only discussed tabulated data, and this ignores the vast number 
of accident reports that the maritime administrations maintain, which take the form of 
narrative reports, many of which are published online. In fact all maritime 
administrations indicated they kept such records. However, this type of data is very 
problematic from an analytic point of view as data needs to be extracted, classified, 
and standardised which, as a process, is very open to error, such as variability in 
coding and difference in interpretation of the data, even if it is done by one researcher. 
Therefore, although narrative accounts may be a rich source of information about 
what happened during accidents and inc idents, they present a number of challenges in 
terms of the extraction of reliable statistical data. 
 
Despite these difficulties, we were able to create a limited accident and incident 
database using combined data from the maritime administrations, containing the 
following factors: ship type, incident type, flag, the number of fatalities and injuries.  
It is these data that will be presented by Dr Bailey in the next paper in a comparison 
of perceptions of risk and ‘reality’ as far as we can ascertain it.5 . Table 3 gives a 
flavour of the sort of information which is contained in the database, showing the 
percentage of incident types occurring. 
                                                 
5  See Bailey, N., Ellis, N., Sampson, H., 2006 'Perceptions of Risk in the Maritime Industry: Ship 
Casualty ', SIRC: Cardiff University for more information about the perceptions data which this 
comparison is based on. 
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Table 3: The percentage of incidents that occurred - all maritime administration 
databases 
Incident type Percent 
Collision with Another Ship 34.9% 
Damage to Vessel 12.8% 
Personal Injury/Death 9.4% 
Grounding 8.5% 
Sinking 8.3% 
Fire 5.4% 
Natural Death 4.4% 
Damage to Equipment/mechanical failure 2.8% 
Regulation Infringement 2.2% 
Missing Data 1.8% 
Contact with a fixed structure 1.8% 
Fire/explosion 1.5% 
Explosion 0.2% 
Other 6.1% 
 
 
Personal Injuries 
 
Although maritime administrations keep fairly detailed information about accidents 
and incidents that occur to their vessels, records of accidents and incidents occurring 
to crew are much less detailed, especially if these did not involve the vessel at all in 
terms of damage (see Table 2). 
 
Looking at the data which is kept, in all cases maritime administrations retained 
information about the number of seafarers who were injured and fatalities that 
occurred in any recorded incident. In one case these injuries were further broken 
down into ‘serious’ or ‘minor’ injuries. Nearly two thirds (57.1%) kept information 
about the number of seafarers missing. However, only a small number kept more 
detailed information about injuries, with just 2 (28.6%) recording the activity that was 
being undertaken when the incident occurred. 
 
This lack of detailed information has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it does not allow 
a reliable picture of the most frequent accidents occurring to be obtained, and thus 
little can be said about the risk of certain accidents and incidents occurring.  This lack 
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of information, such as the task being undertaken, means that no conclusions about 
casual factors can be drawn from aggregated data, or recommendations as to how 
procedures can be improved in order to try and reduce the risk of accidents. 
 
Even when information is available about the type of accidents occurring, as with the 
vessel level data, there is often little consistency across sources as to how this is 
classified, again reflecting the differing nature of what is recorded by the maritime 
administrations. Thus it is difficult to make robust comparisons across the datasets. 
 
There may also be under-reporting of injuries that occur to personnel, as these often 
only seem to be recorded when they are linked to accident s associated with the vessel.  
The severity of an injury may also influence whether it is reported, and Philips and 
Daltry (2006) suggest that only a fraction of the incidents that occur are reported if 
they do not involve a fatality or serious injury. Thus the level of accidents and 
incidents occurring to personnel is likely to be dramatically under-represented as a 
result of considerable under-reporting. 
 
Given these limitations, we decided to see if more robust information could be 
collected from other sources.  Two possible alternative sources of data relating to 
personal injuries were identified: P&I club claims data, and company ‘in-house’ data.  
 
 
P& I Club Claims Databases 
 
Given the sensitive nature of this data, the previous approach - obtaining access 
through ‘cold calling’ - was seen as inappropriate, and therefore a face to face method 
of negotiating access was employed. Using established personal contacts within 
SIRC, we approached a number of P&I clubs within the UK, one within Scandinavia  
and in addition a claims handler based in a major labour supply country with whom 
we had worked in the past6. 
 
                                                 
6 We are very grateful to all these individuals for their kind assistance and time consuming efforts to 
help us. 
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We managed to obtain the cooperation of 3 P&I clubs and one claims handler, who 
agreed to provide us with data. To date information has been provided by 2 of the P&I 
clubs, and the overseas claims handler. With respect to the final P&I club, researchers 
have visited the office and looked at the data maintained, and it is hoped that in the 
near future they will return with a strategy for collation and collection.  
 
The type of data obtained from the P&I clubs was for the most part in the form of 
aggregate statistics presented as frequencies and percentages in relation to the 
different types of claims received (most of the clubs did not feel they could allow us 
to have full access to the raw claim reports due to the ir sensitive nature and potential 
legal repercussions).  Having examined the data, we concluded that there is little 
congruence in claims classification across clubs. Indeed it was only in relation to 
burns that incidents appeared to be classified in the same way.  This makes it difficult 
to compare data from one club with data from another, as there is no standard format 
to the stored information. Table 4 shows the injury claims for two of the P&I clubs, 
and illustrates the different nature and format of the data kept by the two clubs, with 
only ‘burn’ being similar across the sources. 
 
Table 4: The types of injury claims received by each P&I club 
Club A Club B 
Injury type Percentage Injury type Percentage 
Burn 2.7% Burn 8.4% 
Strain 7.4% Dental 0.6% 
Suffocation 0.8% Fracture 46.0% 
Drowning 0.8% Wound 26.6% 
Cause of injury 47.3% --------- --------- 
Under investigation 34.2% --------- --------- 
Other 6.8% Other 18.4% 
Total 100.0% Total 100.0% 
 
 
Another limitation on the use of P&I claims data in establishing levels of 
incidents/accidents to vessels and to seafarers is that they may only be collected when 
claims are sufficiently large to justify recording/documentation. For example, some 
clubs only collate data relating to claims over 100,000 US dollars, which means that 
many accidents and incidents where costs have been relatively minor are not included. 
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For larger claims, records are generally kept, but this is often only in a very basic 
form.  It seems that only in the cases of very large claims, amounting to several 
hundreds of thousands of US dollars, are detailed records kept. 
  
The format of the records maintained by the P&I clubs is also problematic from a 
research perspective. Claims generally take the form of a file (or files) of information 
about the claim, which include accident and investigation reports, port state control 
reports, witness testimonials, solicitors’ letters, invoices, emails and other 
correspondence. Within these files there may be little organisation and order, and 
what is included often varies greatly from claim to claim, depending on the nature of 
the individual case.  From a researcher’s point of view this is very difficult to analyse, 
as it may be necessary to trawl through hundreds of documents in order to arrive at 
standardised data which can be aggregated into accident/incident statistics. This 
process has its own problems as, during such coding of cases, researchers are 
necessarily required to exercise a degree of judgement as to what injuries to record, 
how to classify accidents (for example, where multiple injuries may be present) and 
so forth.  However, notwithstanding this difficulty, it is simply the case that in many 
claims files the residing documents simply do not include enough detail about the 
incident to allow for such classification into usable standardised data7.  
 
Even when P&I clubs do aggregate their data, due to the changing nature of how 
claims are classified, groupings are often inconsistent from year to year making 
comparisons over time highly problematic.  It is also the case that many claims 
records have also only been recently computerised, and thus the analysis and 
classification of earlier, paper-based records requires considerable effort and time. 
 
Some clubs publicly report some of their findings from their claims databases. 
However, caution must be taken when examining these, as they may reflect the 
particular club priorities - for example, which claims are the most costly, rather than 
which incidents are the most frequent. When looking at such reports, it is therefore 
                                                 
7 Through examining the records at the P&I club it is estimated that only 1 in 10 of the claims have 
sufficient information to be aggregated effectively into an accident and incident database format. 
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crucial to remember that these represent claims, and not accidents and incidents, 
which are very different in nature. 
 
Due to the many limitations of the claims data, and the vastly differing nature of the 
information kept by different clubs, it was not possible to attempt to combine them 
together into one dataset, and thus only very limited conclusions can be drawn from 
each comparison made. No meaningful aggregated statistics for the P&I clubs can be 
presented. 
 
 
Company Injury Data 
 
The introduction of the International Safety Management Code in 2002 made it a legal 
requirement for shipping companies to set in place and follow documented Safety 
Management Systems (SMS). As part of this process, companies are also required to 
record and maintain accident and incident data for their fleet, and this information is 
usually very detailed.  However, it is generally not publicly available and kept within 
the company due to its sensitive nature. 
 
Therefore, in order to try and address the limitations of the data kept by the P&I clubs 
we decided to approach a number of shipping companies which had helped us with 
the Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU)8 Safety and 
Perceptions of Risk study, and asked if we could have access to their injury records. 
Five companies were approached and of these three provided accident and incident 
information and two are still in discussion with us.  Of the three that did provide data, 
one simply provided their raw accident and incident data, one provided a internal 
report which consisted of brief summaries of each incident that had occurred within 
the company between 1999-2005, and the final company provided its ‘in house’ 
software package which was used to produce accident/incident reports, as well as 
examining more detailed information about specific incidents and reporting new 
incidents. Each of these sources of information will now be examined in order to see 
                                                 
8 Formerly known as the Lloyd's Register Research Unit (LRRU) 
SIRC Symposium 2007     98 
 
 
the format of the data, what it can be used for, and its compatibility to other sources of 
data. 
 
Company A 
 
Company A provided its accident and incident data in a raw electronic format for a 
period of 2003-2005, which included just over 1,600 reports. These datasets included 
information such as the date of the incident, reference number, a description, 
information about the cause, and classification of the incident type. 
 
When comparing this data to that of the maritime administration and P&I clubs a 
number of differences can be seen, relating to the classification of accidents and 
incidents. For example, Company A classifies accidents in terms of major and minor 
injurious, near misses, pollution incidents, and mechanical incidents, where as 
maritime administrations classifications included fire, explosions and collisions, etc. 
Therefore this makes comparisons between the different sources very difficult. 
 
However, the description field in the data does give fairly detailed information (in the 
form of a narrative) about what happened, and this was available for approximately 
two thirds of the accidents and incidents that occurred. Analysis of this showed 
however that many of the incidents refer to mechanical and electrical failures, dealing 
with functionality problems of machinery and equipment rather than the types of 
occurrences traditionally termed as accidents and incidents.  
 
However an important factor listed on company A’s data is cause. This was listed at 
multiple levels, and is classified in terms of the main cause, and then broken down 
into three subsequent causes. No other data sources provide such important 
information, and this may be very useful in the development of subsequent 
interventions or attempts to develop safety measures. 
 
Company B 
 
Access to Company B’s accident data took the form of access to a software package 
which could be used to produce customisable accident/incident reports, as well as to 
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examine more detailed information about specific incidents. Data could be 
manipulated and queries run according, for example, to particular years, incident 
types, locations of work, etc. Outputs could take a variety of forms such as tabulated 
data, bar graphs and pie charts.   
 
However, there were a number of difficulties with the software package. For example, 
although the software package could produce varied outputs, many of which use 
similar categorisation to those used by the maritime administrations, data could not be 
re-coded or re-classified and therefore it was not possible to produce a single output to 
match the maritime administrations data.  Raw data was not available and this 
considerably reduced the capacity for the data to be used comparatively. 
 
As a single data source, Company B’s data provided a good model for the collation of 
personal injury data, providing breakdowns of the types of injury, the area of the body 
where injury occurred, the severity of injury, treatment received, and the location of 
the incident which resulted in the injury. However these details are provided as 
separate outputs, and information cannot be matched across individual cases limiting 
the conclusions which can be drawn from the study of the information. For example, 
conclusions about the most frequent types of accidents in certain locations onboard 
vessels cannot be made. 
 
The personal injury data is however detailed enough and similar enough to that 
maintained by other companies, such as Company C, to compare for example the 
types of injury and the location of injury on the body, with some standardisation of 
coding between the two. This analysis is ongoing. 
 
Company C 
 
Company C’s accident and incident data takes the form of a report which includes 
brief summaries of each incident, which are further grouped into basic incident types, 
as well as graphs summarising these data, for example, bar graphs and pie charts 
showing the number of incidents by month. The reports cover accidents and incidents 
over the period 1999 to 2005.  
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The data is fairly comprehensive giving a brief overview of the accidents and 
incidents that occurred, and containing more detail than in many of the maritime 
administrations accident and incident reports referring to personnel. The nature of this 
data is different from that contained in maritime administrations datasets, including 
more detail about the incident, not just the number of seafarers injured or fatalities. Its 
more detailed nature would make it easily adaptable to be comparable to other 
available data. 
 
Although this report was printed it was fairly easy to transfer the brief summaries to a 
database in order to aggregate them, using categories of injury causes similar to those 
used on the LRETRU’s ‘Study of Safety and Perceptions of risk’ Questionnaire 
Survey. This allowed us not only to examine the frequencies of injury types occurring, 
but also to compare these to the perceptions of risk for each (as defined by the 
questionnaire survey results). This analysis is currently ongoing. 
 
 
Other Data Sources 
 
Although we have looked at three sources of data within this paper, there are many 
other sources of accident and incident data that are publicly available, such as reports, 
papers, and annual publications. These stem from a range of institutions and 
organisations within the maritime industry, as well as governments and academia. 
Therefore this section will consider a select few of these data sources, looking at the 
format of these, as well as their compatibility to other sources of data. 
 
Lloyd’s Register Fairplay - World Casualty Statistics 
 
The World Casualty Statistics are published yearly by Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, and 
list frequencies of total losses9 and disposals10 of sea-going merchant ships. These 
figures are additionally further broken down by nationality of registration, nationality 
                                                 
9 The term total ‘losses’ refers to ‘propelled merchant ships of not less than 100 GT which, as a result 
of being a marine causality, have ceased to exist, either by the virtue of the fact the ships are 
irrecoverable, or have been subsequently broken up’. Ships that have been declared as total losses, but 
which have, or are in the process of being repaired are not included. 
10 The term ‘disposals’ refers to ships which are broken up for reasons other than casualty. These will 
not be considered within this paper.   
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of owner, incident type, ship type, GT and DW ranges, as well as many combinations 
of these.  The most up to date report is for 2005, although data is available back to 
1994.  The World Casualty Statistics mainly deals with losses and disposals for cargo 
carrying ships, although data for other types of vessels are included, but generally 
only for serious incidents. The data does however exclude pleasure crafts, naval 
vessels, and ships restricted to harbour services, or river/canal services.  This 
information is compiled from a variety of sources, including data from insurance 
claims handlers, classification societies, registration authorities, reports form the web, 
owners, and government departments. This is usually collected in a raw format, and 
then coded, with new sources constantly being added. 
 
The information which is presented by the World Causality Statistics is very similar 
in many instances to the format of the data recorded by maritime administrations and 
some of the companies. This makes it easy to compare basic information, such as, 
accident types, and vessel types to other sources.  More in depth analysis is also 
possible, for example, such as the number of losses by flag and ship type, due to the 
extensive breakdown table provided, although this would take in some cases extensive 
manual manipulation. 
 
However, there are a number of problems, from the point of view of this type of 
research, with the use of the World Casualty Statistics.  Crucially data is limited to 
cases involving total loss of vessels excluding the many cases where vessels are 
repaired or relatively undamaged after accidents and incidents. The data also focuses 
on cargo vessels over 100 GT excluding many other smaller vessels, for example 
those that work within harbours. Therefore although the World Casualty Statistics 
may be based upon information received from a wide range of sources, its scope in 
terms of the provision of a comprehensive dataset relating to marine accidents and 
incidents is very limited. 
 
To illustrate the under-reporting inherent in the database a comparison was made 
between the frequency of incident types as listed in the World Casualty Statistics 
publication for a period of 2005-2000 to data provided to LRETRU by five maritime 
administrations for the same period (Table 5). 
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Table 5: The frequency of different type of incidents for the period of 2000-2005 
reported in the World Casualty Statistics, and from 5 maritime administrations  
 
Incident Type  
World Casualty 
Statistics 
Maritime 
administrations  
combined datasets 
Percentage 
differences 
Collision 112 2631 2249.1% 
Contact 20 135 575.0% 
Fire/Explosion 126 539 327.8% 
Foundering 423 623 47.3% 
Hull/Machinery 9 Not included in  dataset n/a 
Missing 4 Not included in dataset n/a 
Other 20 Not included in dataset n/a 
Wrecked/Stranded 208 638 206.7% 
Total 922 4566 395.2% 
 
 
From this comparison it can be seen that even when accident types from the World 
Casualty Statistics are compared to those from only five maritime administrations, 
there is a massive difference between the numbers of incidents recorded. In general, 
despite only coming from five maritime administrations, there is much more data 
recorded in this combined database. For example, in the case of collision the maritime 
administrations show a 2249.1% increase in the number of cases recorded. For other 
incident types the difference is less extreme, for example, foundering (taken as 
sinking) only showed a 47.3% increase. For our purposes such under-reporting makes 
the dataset unsuitable for use in analysis. 
 
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) - Online Database 
 
Although this source is in essence the Australian Maritime Administration’s accident 
and incident database, Australia was not included in the top 30 maritime 
administrations, and thus given the accessibility of its data it will be discussed briefly 
here.  
 
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is an operationally independent body 
within the Australian Government Department of Transport and Regional Services 
and is Australia’s prime agency for transport safety investigations. Its aim is to 
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maintain and improve transport safety and public confidence through independent 
accident investigation, safety data analysis recording and research, and through 
raising awareness and knowledge. The ATSB investigates accidents in the aviation, 
marine, rail and road sectors and keeps records on all of these. 
 
In reference to marine accidents, it investigates all accidents and serious incidents 
involving Australian registered ships anywhere in the world, as well as foreign flag 
ships within Australian waters. These reports are then published in a tabulated format 
on the ATSB website which is publicly available  
(http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/index.aspx?mode=mar). 
 
The data includes information relating to occurrence date, location, basic 
categorisation, and brief descriptive accounts. Some personal injury data is also 
presented, although this is very limited being classified and presented as either ‘none’, 
‘minor’, ‘serious’, or ‘fatal’. With some recoding this could be compared to the 
information stored by other maritime administrations. 
 
Confidential Reporting Schemes 
 
Confidential Reporting Schemes, unlike many schemes linked to maritime 
organisations and shipping companies are voluntary and confidential, and allow 
seafarers to report accidents or near misses without fear of reprisal or blame.  The aim 
of these schemes is to ‘create an environment where human element incident 
reporting is facilitated, resolution promoted and information disseminated without risk 
of negative personal consequences’ (Powell, 2006).  There is strong support for such 
schemes, as many suggest that they encourage seafarers to submit reports where they 
would not necessarily do so in other ways (Beedle, 2006). 
 
One such scheme is the Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS) run by the 
Nautical Institute, which was started in 1992. Accident reports are received from 
seafarers worldwide who can report accidents (and near misses) without fear or 
prosecution. The sole purpose of MARS is to pass on lessons learned to other 
seafarers through making public these anonymous reports.  To date over 700 reports 
have been received and published by MARS (Beedle, 2006).  Other schemes also 
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exist, such as the Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP), 
originally introduced in 1982 within the aviation industry, but extended to the 
maritime industry in July 2003 to allow seafarers to report potentially hazardous 
incidents confidentially. Both of these schemes are based online, and have searchable 
databases of reports, in which specific years can be examined or keywords searched 
for. The reports take the form of a narrative about the incident written by the seafarer.  
 
However such confidential reporting schemes cannot be used to provide statistical 
data on seafarers’ accidents and injuries as their coverage is so limited and partial. 
Few seafarers report to such schemes lacking either the requisite interest, motivation, 
means, or information to do so. 
 
 
Some Ways Forward 
 
In this paper a number of sources of data have been examined relating to vessel 
accidents and personal accidents and injuries in the merchant shipping sector. At the 
current time none of these sources of data can be easily combined to allow for the 
production of a robust analysis of accidents and injuries across the sector which is a 
major deficiency giving rise to problems in relation to planning and policy making for 
ship operators, regulators, insurers, classification societies and so forth. The sector is 
in urgent need of robust data relating to marine accidents and injuries and it would be 
possible for such data to be produced given greater consistency in recording practices.  
 
Maritime Administrations 
 
Although the majority of maritime administrations store accident and incident data, 
the nature of this varies widely from administration to administration. Therefore there 
is a need to standardise the data collected so that a ‘core’ of comparable information 
can be recorded by all. This should include information on incident type, ship name, 
location of vessel, flag, vessel age, reference number, ship type, ship size.  Core 
information about personal injury/mortality also needs to be recorded, for example, 
the number of fatalities and injuries, location of incident (e.g. whole ship/engine 
room, bridge, etc) type of injuries, area of injury, level of injury, age of those injured, 
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nationality of those injured, rank of those injured. Standardising this information 
would allow it to be compared and compiled much more easily.  However this is not 
to say that maritime administrations  should not be encouraged to collect additional 
data, as they may wish to record information specific to their administration. 
 
Not only does the type of information that is collected need to be standardised, so too 
does the method of accident/incident classification. For example, as discussed 
previously, it is not uncommon, even within single maritime administrations, for fire 
and explosion to be grouped together in some cases, but not in others. Therefore 
standard classification systems for the data that is collected need to be outlined so that 
all maritime administrations may use this to guide their classification. 
 
Although the majority of maritime administrations maintain computerised records, 
this research has shown that there are still some that do not. Therefore it is 
recommended that all should be encouraged to record accidents and incidents 
electronically, as this has a number of benefits. For example, the format of what and 
how this is recorded could be easily standardised, especially if a universal software 
package was developed for use by all maritime administrations and an electronic 
format would also make it much easier to analyse and compare the data. 
  
However, in order for such data to be of any wider use, it is of course necessary for 
maritime administrations to be willing to make data available for research purposes. 
At present it remains rather difficult to secure access and this hampers efforts to 
effectively assess accident and injury data in meaningful ways to the benefit of the 
sector. 
 
P&I Clubs 
 
P&I clubs could play an important role in the collation and analysis of injury and 
accident data and indeed some already provide partial data which is of benefit to the 
industry. To take such efforts forward and allow for more robust conclusions to be 
arrived at, there is a need for the standardisation of information that is collated by P&I 
clubs for statistical purposes. The recording of ‘core’ data about claims, similar to the 
core information outlined in relation to maritime administrations would be beneficial.  
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This would allow for comparative analyses which would provide the basis for more 
robust conclusions. 
 
One way to facilitate the standardisation of data collected by the P&I clubs is through 
the design and use of pro formas (either electronic or paper), which could be used by 
all clubs, for all types of claims, regardless of their financial value. This may go some 
way to addressing the current situation in which lower value claims are not being 
recorded. 
 
Companies 
 
Although companies are generally good at keeping accident and incident data within 
their fleet, this information is usually kept solely within the company, and is recorded 
using their own methods of classification, making it very difficult to compare to that 
of other companies.  Therefore it is suggested that, as with the maritime 
administrations and the P&I clubs there is a need to standardise how data is recorded 
and its format, perhaps through the development of a universal scheme which 
companies could voluntarily adhere to. 
 
It would also be a benefit if companies encouraged seafarers to report accidents and 
incidents, as at present practices such as including targets for the reduction of lost 
time incidents (LTIs) in Key Performance Indicators (which may be linked to 
bonuses) serve to encourage non-reporting of more minor incidents. This masks the 
real levels of accidents and injuries that may be occurring and casts considerable 
doubt on available data. It may also give the impression to seafarers that companies 
are not genuinely interested in their safety, only in the appearance of safety, which 
may cause not only low morale, but also produce poor adherence by seafarers to 
company policies and practices reflecting a two-way lack of commitment. 
 
As with the maritime administrations  and the P&I Clubs, it would also be helpful if 
companies could be persuaded to make their data available on a confidential basis to 
researchers. Sharing this information could promote the development of more 
effective safety procedures as a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of 
accidents and injuries is achieved. 
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Conclusion 
 
Within the maritime industry there are many different agencies that keep information 
about accidents and incidents, such as maritime administrations, shipping companies, 
P&I clubs, and regulatory organisations. However, when the type and nature of these 
data are compared, it can be seen that what is recorded varies greatly, even within the 
same types of organisation. For example, the levels of detail recorded about the 
incidents and the definitions used for accident type classifications. Such findings are 
not new nor are they industry specific; The European Transport Safety Council drew a 
similar conclusion in its review of road traffic accident databases in 2001.  However, 
they do suggest that although the problem is recognised within industries, currently 
little has been done to address it. 
 
The consequence of this is that it is currently impossible to present comprehensive 
and robust globalised accident and incident data, making it very hard to identify 
trends in accidents and incidents and suggest measures in order to address these. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need to standardise what is recorded, and how data is 
stored, in order to facilitate research, analysis, and subsequent decision making, across 
the sector.  
 
It is our intention in the future to attempt to develop a recommended pro forma for the 
categorisation, recording, and storage of data for use across the industry. We will be 
looking to key stakeholders within the sector for assistance and support in this 
endeavour. We thank them in advance for their assistance. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
Organisation:  ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Name: ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Position within the organisation: ______________________________________________________ 
 
Address: 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Email: ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Telephone number: _________________________________________________________________ 
 
Fax number: _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation.  Please return this completed page by email to EllisN@cf.ac.uk or by 
fax to +44(0)29 2087 4619. 
 
All contact details will be held in the strictest confidence and in compliance with the Data Protection 
Act. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Do you maintain records of accidents/ incidents that occur on/ to your national 
flagged vessels, or in your national waters? 
 
 Yes  o No  o  
 
 
2. What sort of accident/ incident records are kept? (please tick as many boxes as 
necessary) 
 Records of accident/ incident/ reports    
  Paper  …………………………………………………………. o 
  Electronic (if so please state software utilised e.g. Excel) …… 
                   ________________________________________________ 
o 
 
 
 Records of accident incident investigations  
  Paper  …………………………………………………………. o 
  Electronic (if so please state software utilised e.g. Excel) …… 
                   ________________________________________________ 
o 
 
 
 Records of statistics on accidents (i.e. the number/ type of  incidents)   
  Paper  …………………………………………………………. o 
  Electronic (if so please state software utilised e.g. Excel) …… 
                   ________________________________________________ 
o 
 
 
 Other (please specify below)  ……………………………………. 
                  ________________________________________________                                     
  ________________________________________________                   
  ________________________________________________ 
o 
 
 
3. Are these record’s publicly available? (If no, please go to question 5) 
 
Yes  o No  o  
 
 
4. Can these records be accessed on line? (If yes, please go to question 6) 
 
Yes  o No  o  
 
  If so. please give the web address:    
 _http://_____________________________________________ 
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5. Would you be willing to make your data available for academic research 
purposes (subject to normal protocols about confidentiality etc)? 
 
Yes  o No  o  
 
 
6. Do you investigate all accidents that occur on/ to your national flagged vessels 
or in your national waters? 
 
Yes  o No  o  
 
 
7. Is this done by yourself?, or by some other agency? (if this is done by another 
agency, please give contact details) 
 
Name _______________________________________________________________ 
 Address _____________________________________________________________ 
    _____________________________________________________________ 
    _____________________________________________________________ 
 Telephone number _____________________________________________________ 
 Fax number __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation.  Please return this completed page by email to 
EllisN@cf.ac.uk or by fax to +44(0)29 2087 4619. 
 
All contact details will be held in the strictest confidence and in compliance with the 
Data Protection Act. 
 
 
112 
MARITIME INCIDENTS: WAYS OF SEEING 
 
Nicholas Bailey 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to relate the perceptions of workers across the maritime industry 
to the available data on actual ship level incidents. In so doing, reference is made to 
the findings  of a Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) and Lloyd’s Register 
Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU) questionnaire survey into perceptions of 
risk, and of an investigation into available datasets.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Shipping is widely perceived as a dangerous industry. Ships sink, run aground, collide 
and catch fire, and consequently individuals are frequently injured or killed and 
coastlines, livelihoods and marine life damaged or destroyed. A fact brought home by 
high profile shipping incidents such as the capsizing of the ferry ‘Herald of Free 
Enterprise’, the sinking of the tanker ‘Prestige’, and the more recent grounding of the 
containership ‘MSC Napoli’.   
 
Media response to such events informs the opinion of the general public and 
consequently how the industry is perceived (Furedi, 2002). Other industries have 
experienced significant consequences due to the coverage of such incidents (Garland, 
2001; Kasperson, 2000). For example, current debates in the United Kingdom (UK) 
and other countries as to whether to build nuclear power plants tend to centre on 
public concerns about the risk of incidents like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island.  In 
the same way, a few years ago the perceived risk associated with eating British beef 
led to a loss of consumer confidence and the boycotting of British beef by several 
European countries.  
 
We may ask, however, whether these perceptions are a reliable indication of actual 
levels of risk. In general individuals are fairly good at perceiving risk and acting 
appropriately (Waring & Glendon, 1998). For instance, every day thousands of people 
safely assess the risk of getting running down by a moving car and manage to safely 
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cross busy roads, or drive their car to work and back without incident.   However 
amongst those thousands of crossings some may get it wrong. Moreover it has been 
shown that while individuals are generally good at perceiving the risk in these specific 
contexts they are poor at estimating risk at a more general level, i.e. estimating the 
overall likelihood that they will be run down while crossing the road, or the extent to 
which eating beef poses a genuine risk to their health (Adams, 1995; Lupton 1999). 
By investigating large numbers of actual incidents, it is possible to detect patterns or 
trends in the data which may indicate which groups tend to suffer incidents and how 
often, and thereby to provide a numerical value for the level of risk they face. In the 
case of crossing the road, a current UK government campaign suggests that it is, 
perhaps surprisingly, teenagers who are most at risk due to their lack of awareness 
while listening to personal music systems.  For those concerned with the management 
of health and safety such information can make a substantial contribution to 
understanding  the extent of the risk faced by individuals, be they members of a 
society, organisation or workplace.  
 
The collection and analysis of incident data is widely accepted and common practice 
in many sectors. Governments, in particular, tend to be concerned to keep records and 
to statistically analyse the impact of particular activities. Road traffic accidents 
represent one area that is closely monitored. Such information is then used to inform 
safety interventions, such as introducing road calming measures. On this basis, 
legislation was introduced requiring car drivers to wear seat-belts, for example. While 
this legislation initially met resistance from drivers who did not perceive the risk, 
today drivers are much more conscious of the need to belt-up and indeed are more 
inclined to  feel ‘exposed’ to unnecessary risk if they are not able to do so (Adams, 
1995). Likewise there are high profile road safety campaigns presently being aired on 
UK television and radio presenting various road safety messages relating to: the use of 
mobile phones when driving, the effect of speeding, and of drinking and driving. Each 
of these campaigns relies on the presentation of statistics highlighting the likelihood 
of experiencing an incident, accompanied by images which graphically portray the  
possible consequences. The aim of such campaigns is thus to modify perceptions and 
consequently behaviour.  
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To an extent Protection & Indemnity (P&I) clubs and some companies make use of 
these sorts of statistics to inform their policy and practice.  However, as Mr Ellis has 
already illustrated, such information in the maritime sector tends to be hard to come 
by, despite its potential value in the management of occupational health and safety at 
sea. Awareness of trends in shipping incidents either at the ship level or in terms of 
personal injury would allow for a greater appreciation of the situation in relation to 
occupational health and safety (OHS) and thereby a better informed and more focused 
response. Although the introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) 
Code in 2002 placed the onus for managing occupational health and safety on the 
operating companies, many safety interventions still originate at the international level 
(e.g. the requirement for tankers to be double-hulled).  In a global industry some 
interventions need to be enacted industry wide and thus require a global perspective  
based on a global dataset. As previously noted the data available is at best limited and 
fragmentary. There is no global dataset capable of providing insight into the state of 
OHS on an industry wide basis.  
 
Workers in the industry, whether in shore-based management positions or actually at 
the frontline working onboard ship, similarly form perceptions of the risk associated 
with the occurrence of ship and shipboard incidents. Likewise their perceptions are 
shaped by factors such as: media coverage, personal experience, training courses, 
statistical data or anecdotal stories.  This diversity of inputs may however present 
conflicting pictures. Where individuals are working with partial information and a 
lack of informed guidance there is clearly scope for differing understandings and risk 
behaviours.  
 
Lack of appropriate information is not the only factor that may affect individuals’ 
perceptions. Differences may also result from the way they make sense of such 
information, which may be influenced by considerations such as: the relevance an 
issue has for them, their education, experience and even gender (Slovic, 1999).  The 
fact is that different individuals, groups or even organisations may have their own 
unique concerns, objectives and ways of seeing things (Clarke, 1999; Hofstede, 1991; 
Harvey, et al. 2002).  This may include their perception of what is important in 
relation to safety. A failure to appreciate such differences when introducing a safety 
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initiative can potentially lead to problems of miscommunication, poor co-operation, 
and even antipathy (Clarke, 1999; Harvey et al., 2002; Rundmo, 2000).   
 
For example, during recent fieldwork aboard two ships of the same company it was 
observed that the policy on whether to wear or carry one’s inflatable lifejacket when 
boarding the free-fall lifeboat was different on both ships. When queried, it was 
reported that this was due to the senior officers on each of the two ships having 
different perceptions of the associated risk, combined with lack of clear information 
giving advice one way or the other. Eventually the company concerned simply 
stipulated that lifejackets should be worn. On the ship where this was not the normal 
practice, this decision was seen as a failure by the company to appropriately 
understand the risk and so the instruction was ignored. 
 
Access to appropriate information is essential to rational decision-making and to 
allow resources to be focused on the appropriate issues, be it at the international, 
national, organisational or even individual level. Similarly an awareness of 
differences between group perceptions is necessary for safety initiatives to be 
introduced in ways that are sensitive to the perspectives of those groups, thereby 
producing better safety management (Clarke, 1999; Harvey et al., 2000).  
 
There has, however, been little research of this type within the maritime industry. The 
Lloyd’s Register Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU) has attempted to 
address this deficit by undertaking two pieces of research to discern how risk is 
perceived in the industry and to determine the actual extent of maritime incidents.  
 
In the following pages we draw on the findings of these investigations to determine 
what lessons can be gleaned from the data and how they may inform health and safety 
policy and practice. Specifically we attempt to address the following questions:   
 
1. How do those in the industry perceive the likelihood of a ship level 
incident? 
 
2. Are there differences between different groups of respondents as to how 
they perceive the likelihood of a ship level incident? 
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3. What do the numbers of actual incidents per year tell us about safety levels 
in the industry? 
 
4. What can we learn from comparing perceived levels of risk with the actual 
levels of incidents?  
 
In so doing, we further draw attention to certain methodological issues that need to be 
addressed by the industry before full benefit can be made of such data.   
 
The discussion is based on data derived from two sources. The first draws on a wide 
ranging questionnaire survey conducted by the LRETRU into perceptions of risk 
within the industry in relation to the likelihood of experiencing a ship level incident, 
e.g. fire, sinking, grounding, collision with another ship, contact with a  fixed 
structure, or explosion. Investigation of this dataset provides insight into how those in 
the industry perceive risk. The second data source provides insight into the actual 
situation with relation to ship incidents and consists of collated incident data from 
maritime authorities, as previously reported by Mr Ellis. While there are other data 
sources available that may similarly serve this function they are in general 
fragmentary or limited as pointed out in the previous paper. For example, the Lloyd’s 
Register Casualty Statistics, while useful, only report total losses and so consist of 
around 150 cases per year. By contrast, the LRETRU dataset comprises around 1,000 
cases per annum and includes a far wider range of cases. Ideally we would piece 
together each of these various datasets to produce an overall, if kaleidoscopic, picture 
of what is actually going on in the industry, against which to compare perceived risk. 
However within the limited scope of a paper, it is clearly an advantage to have as 
large and systematic dataset as possible in order to make meaningful claims. Thus for 
the present discussion we shall confine our attention to the LRETRU collated datasets. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Incident Databases. This has been fully discussed in the preceding paper, however, to 
briefly recap: a systematic survey was undertaken of the available data relating to ship 
level incidents and included contacting thirty maritime authorities, of which eight  
supplied data in various forms. In the following discussion we utilise the data from 
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seven1 different maritime administrations, these will be referred to by the following 
codes [2], [3], [4], [10], [15], [22] and [24].  The seven datasets used represent a range 
of flag types and include both national flags and those operating open registers. 
Together these registers constitute 18.7% of the world’s fleet by gross tonnage and 
16.3% by number2. While not claiming to be representative of the global fleet; we can 
for the purposes of argument take these databases to be indicative.   
 
Perceptions Survey. 3 A worldwide questionnaire  survey was conducted during 2006 
and included a section on perceptions of risk with regard to ship casualty. Completed 
questionnaires were received from 2,372 respondents, giving a response rate of 
approximately 36%. Questionnaires were completed by a diverse range of individuals 
in terms of their position in the occupational hierarchy (i.e. rank), work department 
and nationality as follows: 
1. Rank: - (managers (n=104, 4.6%), senior officers (n=709, 31.1%), junior 
officers (n=704, 30.9%) and ratings (n=763, 33.5%)).  
 
2. Work department: - (deck department (n=1220, 51.4%), engineering (n=779, 
32.8%), catering (n=115, 4.8%) and those based ‘shore-side’ (n=104, 4.4%), i.e. 
managers / superintendents, etc), unspecified (other n=154, 6.5%).  
 
3. Nationality: - completed questionnaires were received from individuals from 
50 different countries. However the majority (84.5%) of respondents came from 
just five countries:  Philippines (n=909, 39.0%), United Kingdom (n=402, 
17.2%), China (n=391, 16.8%), India (n=180, 7.7%) and Netherlands (n=89, 
3.8%).  To enable tests of statistical significance, the analysis of nationality was 
limited to these five groups. 
 
Within the questionnaire we asked the following question: 
Just thinking in general terms, how likely do you think it is that someone 
working for your company will experience the following (Fire, Explosion, 
Collision with another ship, Sinking, Grounding, Contact with a fixed 
structure) during their sea-going career? 
 
Seafarers and company managers were asked to indicate their answer on a scale of 1-
5, where (1 = not at all likely) and (5 = extremely likely).  For the purpose of 
description, ‘1’ and ‘2’ on the scale were understood as indicating that respondents 
                                                 
1 At the time of writing the paper the data from the eighth administration had not yet been fully 
analysed. 
2 Based on figures derived from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay ‘World Fleet Statistics 2005’. 
3 For full details see Bailey et al. (2006) 
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saw the particular incident  as unlikely to occur. By contrast ‘3’ ‘4’ and ‘5’ on the 
scale were understood as indicating that the particular incident was perceived as likely 
to occur.  
 
The responses were analysed using the statistical package SPSS to determine whether 
different groups within the industry perceived matters differently. Factors examined 
included rank, department, nationality, age, and length and nature of experience of 
ship type.  
 
 
Findings  
 
The majority of seafarers and managers who completed the questionnaire generally 
perceived it to be ‘unlikely’ that someone working for their company would 
experience a ship level casualty.  However, they perceived the likelihood of 
experiencing the various types of incident differently, and this was reflected in their 
answers.  For example, 84.8% of respondents saw the risk of sinking as unlikely, 
while a smaller group 61.9% saw fire as such.  Responses to the other listed incidents 
fell between these two extremes (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1:  Percentage of individuals perceiving each type of incident as likely / 
unlikely 
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Looked at from the other direction, only 15.2% of respondents thought that it was 
likely that someone in their company would be on a ship that sank during their 
seagoing career, but  38.1% were of the opinion that someone in the ir company would 
be on a ship that had a fire. The likelihood of experiencing the following types of 
incident: contact with a fixed structure, collision, and grounding were similarly seen 
to be ‘likely’ by about a third of individuals who completed the questionnaire (Table 
1). 
 
Table 1:  Relative percentages of overall group perceiving likelihood of 
experiencing an incident as likely/ unlikely 
Type of Incident 
Percentage perceiving  
risk to be unlikely  
Percentage perceiving  
risk to be likely 
Fire 61.9 38.1 
Contact 63.5 36.5 
Collision 69.1 30.9 
Grounding 69.9 30.3 
Explosion 80.1 19.9 
Sinking 84.8 15.2 
 
How, then, should we understand the perceptions of those in the maritime industry in 
relation to ship level incidents?  Should we, for instance, be surprised that over a third 
of individuals considered the occurrence of a major incident in the  workplace as 
likely? Alternatively could we expect this figure to be higher? In addressing these 
questions, we shall investigate the available data in relation to the actual level of 
incidents recorded between the years 2000 and 2005. 
 
Before assessing the incident data, it can be seen from a brief inspection of Table 2 
below, that different Administrations code the ir data differently. For instance it can be 
seen that, of the listed registers, [24] and [10] combined the data for ‘fire’ and 
‘explosion’, whereas the other flags recorded them as separate categories. Indeed the 
way in which data is collected and coded is a significant issue and raises questions 
about the comparability of data from different flags. A full discussion of these issues 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but would need to address such central questions  as: 
the choice of categories reported, the need for a set of globally consistent reporting 
requirements and the criteria underpinning their application. Consideration would also 
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need to be given to issues of interpretation, e.g. what constitutes material damage, and 
how to ensure compliance with reporting requirements. For the sake of this 
discussion, however, we will simply take the data at face value.  
 
It can be seen that for the period 2000 to 2005 there was significant variation in the 
percentage of incidents recorded by the different flags (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Relative percentage of incidents per number of ships by flag for the 
years 2000 and 20054 
 Maritime Administrations  
Type of 
Incident Flag [2] Flag [4] 
Flag 
[10] 
Flag 
[15] 
Flag 
[22] 
Flag 
[24] Flag [3] 
Collision 4.22 0.58 13.86 0.98 0.54 2.28 26.86 
Contact 2.52 0.90 0.48 0.21 0.07 0.63 5.85 
Grounding 4.61 0.51 2.43 0.82 0.72 1.56 4.39 
Fire 0.06 0.90 2.43 0.31 0.13 … … 
Explosion 0.01 0.19 0.08 0.05 0.00 … … 
Fire/Explosion … … … … … 1.14 3.54 
Sinking 0.19 0.00 2.46 0.07 0.09 0.00 3.72 
 
 
In particular it can be seen that Administration [3] recorded between two and fifty 
times more collisions than the other registers. Similarly the data from flags [2] and [3] 
display notably higher levels of incidence for most types of ship casualty as compared 
with the other flags. For example, the incidence of grounding recorded by [2] is 
between three and twenty-six times higher than that recorded by the other registers. 
 
It is important to realise that such differences in the recorded levels of incidents may 
simply be a function of different levels of regulatory capacity (Winchester, 2003) or 
recording procedures rather than a real difference in the level of incidents. Equally, 
such variation could reflect genuine differences but be an artefact of the types of ships 
on these registers or the waters they are trading in, for example. However given that 
most research into incident reporting suggests that, in general, incidents tend to be 
                                                 
4 Data for register [2] is only for the period 2002-2004, while the data for register [4] covers the period 
2001-2005. Percentages have been calculated accordingly. 
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under-reported (Nichols, 1997; Walters, 2001), we can reasonably expect that these 
figures, if anything, under-represent the real number of incidents that have occurred. 
 
Leaving local variations aside, in order to get an overall picture of the level of ship 
casualties across the industry, it is necessary to calculate overall percentages of 
incidents for the period under consideration. To this end, we combined the total 
numbers of each type of incident for the given period, i.e. the years 2000-20055 (Table 
3) and divided by the total number of ships on the five registers over the same time 
period (Table 4).  
 
Table 3: Total number of incidents recorded by the seven registers between 2000 
and 2005 by incident type  
Type of Incident Combined number of incidents  
for the seven registers  
within the years 2000- 2005 
Collision 4,723 
Contact 1,000 
Grounding 1,834 
Fire 435 
Explosion 22 
Fire/Explosion 269 
Sinking 622 
Total 8,905 
 
Table 4: Total number of ships on the seven registers by year 
Year Total number of ships  for the seven registers  
2000 6,985 
2001 7,212 
2002 14,859 
2003 14,566 
2004 14,542 
2005 7,777 
Combined total  65,941 
 
                                                 
5 Data for one of the administrations was only for 2001-2005, while for another it covered the years 
2002-2004. These differences were allowed for in the calculations.  
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Thus by calculation we arrived at the following table of percentages per type of 
incident for the five year period (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Percentage of incidents over period 2000-2005 
Type of Incident 
Percentage of  incidents  
 over period 2000-5  
Rate per 1000  
ships  
Collision 7.16 71.6 
Grounding 2.78 27.8 
Contact 1.52 15.2 
Sinking 
0.94 
[LR 6 sinking’s = 0.075 ] 
9.4 
[ LR = 0.75] 
Fire7 0.82 8.2 
Explosion 0.04 0.4 
  
On the basis of the available data, during the period 2000 and 2005 the type of 
incident that a seafarer was most likely to experience (of those listed) was that of a 
ship collision, with the prospect that 7.16% of all ships over the five year period 
would be involved in such an incident 8. If we were to extrapolate this figure and apply 
it to the average size of the entire global fleet over this period9, the average rate of 
vessel collisions over the last five years would be approximately eighteen vessels per 
day involved in such an incident. Likewise, if we extrapolate instances of sinking, we 
calculate a figure of slightly more than two incidents per day.  Notably the figure for 
sinking is approximately 12.5 times higher than the numbers of total losses due to 
sinking recorded in Lloyd’s Register Casualty Statistics. This may be explained by the 
fact that the Lloyd’s Register figures only relate to vessels of 100gt or above, whereas 
we have captured vessels smaller than this. It is also likely to reflect the fact that the 
Lloyd’s Register Casualty Statistics only record total losses although we are unclear 
why this would rule out the recording of most sinkings as we would anticipate that 
they generally constitute total losses. Alternatively, it may be the case that the flags 
included in our sample have some of the highest recorded numbers of sinkings in the 
                                                 
6 Lloyd’s Register World Casualty Statistics for 2005 
7 The data for  fire/ explosion coded as a single category were excluded from the calculation 
8 We acknowledge that in practice a single vessel may be involved in several incidents. 
9 Based on figures from Lloyd’s Register World Fleet Statistics and vessels over 100gt = 536,459.  
We need, however, to be extremely cautious when extrapolating in this way, as our sample probably 
includes vessels less than 100gt; hence the difference between these figures and those based on Lloyd’s 
Register World Casualty Statistics and the IMUI REPORT 2006. 
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world fleet and as such, we would expect other registers (not represented by our data) 
to have considerably smaller numbers of recorded sinkings. Whilst this latter 
explanation seems unlikely, what we can’t say at this stage is whether our data offer a 
‘true reflection’ of the real situation. 
 
To better help us to understand these figures; we can compare them to the number of 
serious incidents10 involving Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) in Great Britain in 2005. 
In 2005 there were 441,000 HGVs with current licenses in Great Britain and 1,648 
serious accidents involving these vehicles (DfT 2005). By calculation 0.37% of the 
licensed HGVs were thus involved in a serious incident. In comparison the overall 
incident rate for shipping11 for 2005 was 13.7%. That is, there were 37 times more 
ship level incidents than there were serious incidents involving an HGV on British 
roads. There are obviously significant differences between these two modes of 
transport. However, there are sufficient similarities to make this difference in incident 
rates highly poignant, especially given that the fall-out from a shipping incident is 
liable to be significantly greater than that for a road transport vehicle. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that with the density of traffic on British roads and the high frequency 
of interaction between vehicles, there is a greater potential for a road traffic accident 
than an incident at sea. 
  
Against this background it can reasonably be argued that the occurrence of ship leve l 
incidents appears to be relatively high. Given that, it may seem surprising that more 
seafarers and managers did not perceive it to be likely that someone in their company 
would experience such an event. A closer look at the responses to the questionnaire, 
however, in terms of how those in different positions within the industry saw the 
likelihood of experiencing such an incident, reveals  significant variation in perception 
between different groups.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 A serious incident is defined as one in which at least one person is seriously injured, but no one is 
killed. 
11 Based on our seven datasets and taken over the period 2000-2005. 
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Differences in perception 
 
A comparison of responses to the questionnaire survey revealed that there were 
statistically significant differences between the ways in which managers perceived the 
likelihood of an incident as compared to those who worked onboard ship. It can be 
seen (Table 6) that a greater percentage of shore-based managers tended to see the 
occurrence of a ship level incident as ‘likely’ than did shipboard staff. It can also be 
seen that senior officers tended to be most closely aligned with managers. This may 
be due to the fact that they have the closest direct links with shore-side management  
and tend to be the ones most centrally involved in shipboard risk assessment.  Indeed 
it is not uncommon for shore-side managers to have previously worked at sea12, often 
in a senior shipboard position.  By contrast shipboard ratings were least inclined to 
perceive the occurrence of the listed types of incident as likely. Moreover they did not 
significantly differentiate between the different types of incident. Thus the further a 
group was from direct contact with shore-side management the greater the difference 
in perception appeared to be.  
 
Table 6:  Percentage by rank perceiving the occurrence of an incident as ‘likely’  
 Managers  Senior Junior Ratings  
Contact 54.4 47.3 30.6 29.1 
Grounding 47.6 36.0 26.1 25.2 
Collision 42.3 36.3 26.0 27.8 
Fire 41.3 43.0 38.2 31.6 
Explosion 23.4 20.1 17.1 21.4 
Sinking 17.6 13.2 11.3 19.5 
 
When considering the above table, what is perhaps most striking is that over half of 
managers thought it likely that someone working in their company would be on a ship 
that experienced contact with a fixed structure, and almost half thought that this 
would be the case for grounding. By contrast, less than a third of ratings perceived 
contact with a fixed structure as likely and only a quarter saw grounding as a likely 
occurrence. The exception to this trend was in relation to the perceived likelihood of 
sinking. Here more ratings (19.5%) thought sinking was likely than did managers 
(17.6%), or indeed ship’s officers. The different ranks seemed to be most closely in 
                                                 
12  74% of the managers in our sample had sea-going experience. 
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accord when they reflected on the likelihood of experiencing an explosion; 
approximately 20% of all ranks thought this was likely (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Percentage by rank perceiving each type of incident as likely 
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An explanation for this general difference in perception between managers and 
shipboard staff, could be that managers were better informed as to the actual level of 
incidents. This could be as a result of having access to actual statistics or a more 
global perspective deriving from greater awareness of the company fleet as a whole  
and a greater acquaintance with the wider industry in general.  By contrast, those who 
work onboard ship may have been more or less prone  to form perceptions based on an 
insular understanding derived from their actual experience of serving on ships and, 
specifically, the ship they were on at the time.  
 
Having identified the extent of actual incidents from the national datasets, we 
produced a rank-ordering based on percentage of incidents recorded (Table 7). The 
higher the recorded percentage of incidents, the higher is the position in the ordering. 
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Table 7: Rank ordering of incidents 
Rank  
Order 
Type of Incident 
Percentage of incidents  
 over period 2000-5  
1 Collision 7.16 
2 Grounding 2.78 
3 Contact 1.52 
4 Sinking 0.94 
5 Fire13 0.82 
6 Explosion 0.04 
 
On the basis that the greater the number of incidents (i.e. the higher in the rank-
ordering) the more likely it is that someone will experience such an incident, we 
compared these with the perceived likely occurrence of an incident (Table 8). From 
the comparison, we saw that managers’ perceptions again coincided most closely with 
the actual datasets. This could be taken to support the idea that they are better attuned 
to the actual situation with regard to the level of ship casualty. 
 
Table 8: Comparison of rank orderings based on incident datasets with rank 
orderings based on perceptions of different ranks, as a percentage, who 
perceived the occurrence of an incident as likely 
Rank-order 
based   Rank-orderings by Hierarchy 
on incident 
data sets   Managers  
 Senior  Junior  Ratings   
Collision 1 Contact -2 Contact -2 Fire -4 Fire -4 
Grounding 2 Grounding 0 Fire -3 Contact -1 Contact -1 
Contact 3 Collision -2 Collision -2 Grounding -1 Collision -2 
Sinking 4 Fire -1 Grounding -2 Collision -3 Grounding -2 
Fire 5 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 
Explosion 6 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 
Total 
distance  
from 
dataset 
  -8  -12  -12  -12 
 
 
                                                 
13 The data for  fire/ explosion coded as a single category were excluded from the calculation 
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From Table 8 it can be seen that, based on the actual number of reported incidents 
recorded, an individual is most likely to experience a collision of the incident types 
listed.  However, based on the perceptions of those who worked onboard, fire appears 
at the top of the rank-orderings; appearing in first place for junior officers and ratings 
and in second place for senior officers. By contrast, fire appeared fourth in the 
rankings based on managers’ perceptions and in only fifth place based on the actual 
datasets.  
 
It could be argued that the discrepancy between perceptions and the actual incident 
data, in relation to the occurrence of incidents of fire, is due to the fact that maritime 
administrations only record serious fires, but individuals’ perceptions are informed by 
all fires minor and serious. The thought would be that there are many fires onboard 
ship that are dealt with in their early stages (e.g. scavenge fires) and so never escalate 
to the extent of causing significant material damage.  Consequently such incidents do 
not get reported back to the maritime administration. Nonetheless this type of incident 
may well contribute to an individual’s perception of the likely occurrence of a fire. 
The same argument could be applied to incidents involving contact with a fixed 
structure. Many heavy landings against a quayside for example may not be reported 
back to the maritime administration. By contrast a collision between two ships, for 
instance, is presumably going to have more significant financial consequences, 
involving P&I clubs and classification societies, and as such is more likely to be 
reported.   
 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that the way in which a question is framed can 
influence responses (Bickert, 1992; Johnson et al., 1998; Schuman, 1992). In terms of 
our questionnaire survey, individuals were asked to rate the perceived likelihood of 
fire as one  of several types of incident. These included collision, sinking and 
grounding, which by their nature tend to be significant events. As such the aim was to 
provoke thoughts of serious ship fires rather than perhaps a minor chip pan fire. The 
claim would then be that while the statistics perhaps appear counterintuitive, this is 
precisely the point about the unreliability of perception.  The aim is to explain the 
heightened sensitivity or awareness of the particular risk.  
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As discussed previously, significant events like, for example, the sinking of the tanker 
‘Prestige’ with the attendant publicity may heighten awareness of certain forms of 
risk.  This may particularly be the case if individuals strongly relate to the situation, 
e.g. they work on a similar type of ship. As Lupton writes, it has been found that 
individuals “tend to overestimate risk related to circumstances where it can easily be 
imagined happening to oneself” (1999, p.20). Thus, for example, it was widely 
reported after 9/11 that many office workers in tall buildings were anxious about the 
risk of fire. 
 
It has further been argued that organisational factors such as company or group 
attitudes and behaviours, i.e. ways of doing things, shape individual ways of 
understanding. For instance, organisational factors like training and education, the 
extent to which workers are provided with information and allowed to participate in 
decisions or have direct control of the work process are liable to influence perceptions  
and risk awareness. Likewise, familiarity with a type of action or form of behaviour  
and the perceived benefit or potential harm associated with it, all influence the way in 
which risk is perceived. Thus the risk of fire may be perceived as likely by higher 
numbers of seafarers, than say collision, due to a complex mix of individual and 
social factors. 
 
Seafarers may, for instance, have a keen appreciation of the risk of shipboard fire due 
to the regulatory emphasis placed on the prevention and management of such 
incidents, with normal practice including the carrying out of routine fire-rounds, the 
use of hot work permits, the testing of alarms and regular shipboard fire drills. 
Equally, fire is liable to be experienced as something that can affect everyone onboard 
and yet the outbreak of fire may not be within anyone’s direct control. Furthermore 
given the small size of many crews and the large and often hazardous areas that may 
be affected by fire, including engine rooms, there may be a heightened sense of 
vulnerability due to the potential injuries or fatalities that could easily result and the 
difficulty in trying to cope with such a situation. Awareness of such factors can 
influence the perceived likelihood of an incident.  We could thus point to the 
effectiveness of training, onboard organisational arrangements, and the ability to 
easily imagine such a possibility as factors contributing to seafarers’ fear of the 
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potential effects of a fire, and hence a heightened sense of fire as a risk.14 Indeed there 
is a long tradition of seafarers perceiving fire as a likely risk, as illustrated by the 
following quote from the famous 16th century Commander Sir John Hawkins: “Serve 
God only, preserve your victuals, beware of fire, and keep good company.” (cited in 
Bridges 1927, p80). 
 
From the incident datasets, we have seen that collision is actually the incident most 
likely to be experienced15 and as such appeared in first place in the rank-order. By 
contrast, collision only appeared in third place in the rankings based on the 
perceptions of managers, senior officers and ratings – a difference of minus two 
places. Junior officers were even less inclined to view collision as ‘likely’, i.e. based 
on their perceptions collision was ranked fourth – a difference of minus three places 
from the ranking based on the incident data (Table 8). This could perhaps be due to 
their lack of experience. When we separated junior officers out, we found that 25.6% 
of junior deck officers and 25.1% of junior engineering officers saw the likelihood of 
experiencing a collision as likely. That is the two groups saw in the same way, which 
may further suggest that the issue is related to their experience rather than specific 
job.   
 
Given that junior deck officers (i.e. second and third mates) tend to make up the 
largest number of bridge watch keeping officers (i.e. individuals whose actions could 
lead to a collision) and they appear to be underestimating the occurrence of collisions, 
relative to other types of incident, this is clearly a matter of interest.  From a 
regulatory point of view, this may suggest the need for greater emphasis on collision 
avoidance and the appreciation of risk of collision during their training. Indeed, in a 
separate research project undertaken by the LRETRU into the use of VHF radio in 
collision avoidance situations, it was found that there was a high level of negotiation 
taking place, often resulting in action contrary to the collision regulations (Bailey, 
2005).   
 
                                                 
14 While the questionnaire was designed to encourage individual respondents to think of the likelihood 
of a serious incident of fire, we cannot rule out that their perceptions were nonetheless informed by an 
awareness of minor incidents involving fire. It would thus be wrong to ignore the fact that there are 
clearly methodological issues relating to the interpretation of questionnaire data that need to be taken 
account of when attempting to make such comparison. 
15 Based on recorded incidents. 
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At a more general level, the explanation for this disparity between perceptions and the 
data may be that the risk of experiencing a collision was perceived to be more directly 
under the control of a small group of individuals trained to avoid such incidents. Thus 
confidence or trust in colleagues may have ameliorated the perceived likelihood of 
such an incident happening. In this respect the hierarchical nature of shipboard life 
may have further influenced such perceptions by providing reassurance that the 
captain, a person of experience and authority, was ultimately in control.  
 
Such an account may, however, appear to beg the question of why the likelihood of 
contact with a fixed structure is perceived to be so high; appearing in first or second 
rank position for all groups. Normally when manoeuvring in close proximity to any 
fixed structure, be it a supply boat next to an oil or gas platform or a vessel alongside 
a jetty or quay, the master is usually conning the vessel or close at hand. Thus, given 
the previous argument, it should be expected that there would be high levels of 
confidence in the captains’ abilities and so a perception that there is little likelihood of 
an incident. The fact that perceptions of such incidents appear high in the rankings, 
suggests that there are other influential factors. 
 
It has been demonstrated in other contexts, particularly medical settings (Zerubavel, 
1985), that the existence of clear temporal markers identifying an event (i.e. a clear 
beginning and end point) is significant in influencing perceptions and behaviour, by 
possibly making it easier to imagine such an occurrence. When thinking about the  
occurrence of incidents of contact with a fixed structure, the re tends to be a natural 
temporal framing within which such events occur, e.g., going on to ‘stand-by’ and 
being secured alongside. As such these events are liable to be easier to envisage. 
Moreover such periods tend to impact upon all personnel. For instance, deck crew will 
be at mooring stations (or engaged in deck operations in the case of supply vessels), 
engineers are liable to be on stand-by and catering staff will need to know when to 
arrange meals. Additionally, not only are most personnel liable to be involved, but 
each group tends to face their own particular risks associated with the operation. For 
instance, at such times there tends to be a high demand upon the engines and so the 
potential for mechanical failure, while on deck there is the danger associated with 
working ropes and wire and in the galley the problems associated with failing to have  
meals ready at the right time.  Furthermore, all crew will be aware of the difficulty of 
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the operations involved, the contingent effect of weather, and the performance of 
engines and mooring operations upon the captains’ performance and consequent 
successful manoeuvre. Thus what we see is that the two risks of fire and contact with 
a fixed structure, which were perceived to be likely by the greatest number of 
respondents from each of the different shipboard groups, are those incidents in which 
potentially all would actively play a part (sinking will be discussed below) - either 
before or after the event. As such those onboard may find it easier to imagine such an 
event occurring and to more easily envisage the possible consequences, thereby 
contributing to a heightened awareness of the likely occurrence of an incident. 
 
Finally, when we looked at the relative rankings of sinking, we found that it appeared 
lower in the rankings for all groups than that based on the actual occurrence of such 
incidents. Although interestingly, the ranking based on the perceptions of those in the 
catering department corresponded most closely to that based on the actual datasets 
(Table 9). Indeed a significantly higher number (27.1%) of those in catering perceived 
sinking to be likely than did those who worked in other departments. By contrast, a 
significantly lower number of shore-side managers (7%) than shipboard staff 
perceived it to be likely.  
 
Table 9: Comparison of rank orderings based on incident data sets with rank 
orderings based on perceptions of different work departments, as a percentage, 
who perceived the occurrence of an incident as likely 
Rank-
order 
based on   Rank-orderings by Work Department 
incident 
data sets  Deck % Catering % Engineering % Ashore % 
Collision 1 Fire 36.9 Fire 35.8 Contact 37.9 Contact 54.4 
Grounding 2 Contact 34.3 Contact 32.4 Fire 37.4 Grounding 47.6 
Contact 3 Collision 28.5 Collision 29.9 Collision 31.8 Collision 42.3 
Sinking 4 Grounding 27.9 Grounding 27.4 Grounding 30.6 Fire 41.3 
Fire 5 Explosion 17.9 Sinking 27.1 Explosion 21.7 Explosion 15.7 
Explosion 6 Sinking 13.3 Explosion 26.9 Sinking 15.4 Sinking 7.6 
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We have suggested that a sense of control over a given situation may serve to 
diminish perceived risk. With respect to the occurrence of incidents of sinking, 
managers and seafarers appeared to share confidence in their vessels. Despite the fact 
that there may be factors beyond the control of those onboard, including unexpected 
adverse weather, fire or unforeseeable structural failures, etc. These may be mostly 
ameliorated by the skill and dedication of those in the shore-side office and onboard 
who are responsible for ensuring the vessel is seaworthy, properly maintained, loaded 
and navigated. Interestingly it is those in the catering department who in general have 
no direct role in ensuring the vessel does not sink who were most inclined to perceive 
the occurrence of sinking as likely. Moreover, unlike the occurrence of fire, where all 
onboard are liable to be actively involved in dealing with an outbreak, in the case of 
sinking the response tends to be more passive - a retreat to the sanctuary of lifeboat or 
other survival craft. Thus the eventuality of sinking is perhaps best seen as the end of 
action, a point at which no more can be done, a point from which there is no recovery. 
To contemplate its occurrence would be like going to work in an office building 
which one believed was likely to collapse during the course of the working day. 
Acceptance of such a situation would make going to work each day unbearable, if not 
untenable. As such we can perhaps understand why the perceived likelihood of such 
an occurrence is relatively low for all groups.  
 
The factors discussed, such as informed awareness, sense of control and fear of the 
consequences, which could be influencing perceptions tend to relate to the 
organisational setting and culture. It is further argued however, that individual 
conceptions of the world tend to be more or less deeply entrenched. In addition to the 
influence of organisational factors, it is claimed that individuals’ perceptions are 
influenced by their deeper personal core-values and beliefs. These it is claimed are 
shaped by broader societal values and institutions. As such, individuals  from different 
countries may well see things differently (Hofstede, 1991; Slovic, 1999; Karahanna et 
al., 2005).  
 
When the various factors of hierarchy, work department, experience, etc., were 
entered into a statistical model and compared, nationality was found to be the 
strongest predictor of how individuals perceived the likelihood of an incident 
occurring. Of the five main national groups in the study, Chinese respondents were 
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significantly more inclined to see the occurrence of a ship level incident as likely, than 
the other national groups (Figure 3). The notable exception to this trend was the 
perception of fire. Fewer Chinese respondents (45.6%) perceived fire as likely as 
compared to those from the Netherlands (59.6) and the UK (58.2%). By contrast, 
Filipinos were overall significantly less inclined to see the various types of incident as 
likely in comparison to the other national groups. 
 
Figure 3:  Percentages by nationality that saw each type of incident as likely 
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 When we produced rank orderings based on the different national perceptions, those 
from China again appeared differently to those from other nations (Table 10). 
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Table 10: Comparison of rank orderings based on incident data sets with rank 
orderings based on perceptions of different national groups , as a percentage, who 
perceived the occurrence of an incident as likely 
Rank-orderings by Nationality Rank-
order 
based on 
incident 
datasets 
 
China 
 
Netherlands  
 
Philippines 
 
India 
 
UK 
 
Collision 1 Contact -2 Fire -4 Fire -4 Fire -4 Fire -4 
Grounding 2 Collision -1 Collision -1 Contact -1 Grounding 0 Contact -1 
Contact 3 Grounding -1 Contact 0 Collision -2 Contact 0 Grounding -1 
Sinking 4 Fire -1 Grounding  -2 Grounding -2 Collision -3 Collision -3 
Fire 5 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 Explosion -1 
Explosion 6 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 Sinking -2 
Total 
distance 
from 
dataset 
  -8  -10  -12  -10  -12 
 
A comparison of rank-orderings revealed that the rankings based on the perceptions of 
Chinese respondents corresponded most closely to those based on the actual incident 
data. Interestingly while Chinese respondents perceived more in accord with the 
actual statistics in terms of the ranking of fire and collision, they appeared to be the 
furthest-out in relation to the ir perceptions of the likely occurrence of incidents of 
contact with a fixed structure.  
 
By contrast, the rankings based on the perceptions of those from the UK and the 
Philippines overall differed most from those based on the available data, particularly 
in relation to the risk of experiencing collision and fire. These two national groups 
appeared to over-estimate the likely occurrence of fire, as compared to other types of 
incident (as did those from the Netherlands and India ), but they also appeared to 
underestimate the incidence of collision.  
 
It could be suggested that an explanation for these national differences in perception 
actually reflect genuine differences in the risk faced. However given that our sample 
is drawn from a wide range of companies, it is open to question as to whether this 
would be the whole explanation.  Rather, it may be suggested that a full account is 
liable to make reference to a range of factors relating to group, organisational and 
national influences. While our research has identified that there clearly is an issue to 
be addressed, a full exploration of this topic is obviously beyond the scope of this 
paper and requires substantive further investigation.  
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To summarise, we have seen that the number of ship level incidents appeared to be 
relatively high. We have also seen that different groups of workers within the 
maritime sector perceived the likelihood of experiencing such an incident differently. 
In particular shore-based managers and Chinese respondents were most inclined to 
perceive the occurrence of a ship level incident as likely. Moreover these two groups 
appeared to align most closely with the actual incident data, in terms of the relative 
ordering of types of incident based on their likely occurrence. In general shipboard 
workers were more inclined to perceive the occurrence of fire, relative to other types 
of incident, as more likely than the data suggested and to perceive the risk of collision 
as less likely than indicated by the statistics. Junior officers especially, appeared to 
under-estimate the relative likelihood of collision.  
 
Perhaps most significantly, those in shore-side management tended to have different 
perspectives to those onboard ships. As it tends to be the managers who initiate safety 
interventions it is clearly important that they should be aware that those onboard may 
not see things the same way. Thus if  shore-side managers have the ‘most accurate’ 
perceptions of risk, as the they would appear to do, then the evidence suggests that 
they are currently failing to effectively communicate the information shaping their 
perceptions to seafarers in their companies. Perhaps via seminars directed at seniors, 
senior officers are put more in touch with the viewpoint of shore-side management, 
but our data suggest that this view fails to be communicated or to effectively ‘trickle’ 
down to junior officers and ratings. This could have a variety of potential 
consequences including the failure to take risk assessments, instructions or company 
procedures, etc., sufficiently seriously. 
 
Thus to emphasise, it is important that the industry move to establishing a coherent 
and robust set of statistics which can be utilised in the formulation of OHS strategy.  
Moreover, for the effective implementation of such strategies, it is also necessary to 
appreciate that different groups within an organisation may perceive things differently 
and to introduce safety initiatives in a manner sensitive to such difference. The aim is 
to develop appropriate risk communication strategies and practices to have all parties 
seeing the same way with regard to safety. 
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THOUGHTS ON SAFETY: THE VIEWS OF CHINESE 
SEAFARERS 
 
Helen Sampson and Bin Wu1 
 
 
Abstract 
Following the findings from the LRETRU/SIRC study of perceptions of risk, which 
identified nationality as a key influence on risk perception, research has been 
undertaken with Chinese seafarers to try to explore the factors which influence risk 
perception amongst a single national group. This paper reports on the preliminary 
findings of this study and discusses the main factors which are identified by Chinese 
seafarers as mitigating, or increasing, risk on board a vessel. These include: the 
practices and policies of employers; the impact of colleagues and their on board 
relationships; the effect of local labour market conditions; and the relevance of 
previous experience in determining risk perception. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent reports (Bailey, Ellis, Sampson 2006, and Bailey, Ellis, Sampson 
forthcoming) on seafarers’ perceptions of risk, nationality has been identified as a 
major influence on seafarers’ views. In relation to vessel level incidents Chinese 
seafarers have been found to be almost twice as likely as other nationalities to 
perceive there to be a risk of an accident (fire, explosion, collision, sinking, grounding 
or contact with a fixed structure) occurring in their company (Bailey, Ellis, Sampson 
2006). Whilst, in relation to personal injury, a complex picture of risk perception 
emerges. Chinese seafarers, it seems, are more likely than seafarers of other 
nationalities to identify a risk of injury pertaining to seafarers working for the ir own 
employers. However, and intriguingly, seafarers from China do not seem to perceive 
the risks associated with shipping in general as greater than other national groups 
(Bailey, Ellis, Sampson forthcoming).  
 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank David Walters for his helpful comments and advice in relation to the 
development of this paper. We would also like to thank all the seafarers who took part in the reported 
study and the two shipping companies who kindly agreed to allow Dr Wu to sail on their vessels. 
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Such interesting findings warrant further investigation. To this end, this paper 
represents a very preliminary report on some research conducted by Wu aboard 
wholly Chinese crewed vessels. The aim of the study, which is on-going, is to arrive 
at a better understanding of the ways in which Chinese seafarers understand risk and 
the matters and ideas which may influence their perceptions. Further research is due 
to take place and as such this paper reports on the preliminary findings from the first 
two vessels to be included in this study.  
 
 
Methods 
 
In 2006 and 2007 Wu undertook research voyages aboard one tanker and one bulk 
carrier. He spent a total of 73 days aboard these two ships and formally interviewed 
49 seafarers. Informal interviews and observations also took place, and detailed 
fieldnotes were maintained in the course of the data collection on board. This paper 
draws upon materials collected in the course of the research, including transcribed 
confidential interviews and field notes. 
 
 
Perceptions of the safety of shipping 
 
In relation to general perceptions of the safety of shipping, participant s were divided. 
Some expressed a view that seafaring was relatively safe and cited: modern 
technological developments and improvements (e.g. in navigation systems and marine 
machinery); international regulation ( e.g. SOLAS, ISM, ISPS); and more effective 
enforcement of regulation via port-state inspections; as reasons for safety 
improvements. Such seafarers often contrasted shipping favourably with shore-side 
industry and transportation in China, regarding the mainland as having a poor safety 
record. Other seafarers saw things rather differently, however, and highlighted the 
contemporary relevance of ‘human error’ in shipping accidents, referring also to the 
dangers of piracy which pose a significant threat to modern vessels particularly those 
trading in the Far East and in areas off the coast of some African states (e.g. Somalia). 
At the forefront of the minds of many of these seafarers was an awareness of the 
remoteness of deep-sea going vessels and the associated problems with rescuing or 
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helping seafarers in difficulty once they were underway. For these seafarers shipping 
was a high risk occupation and as one senior officer put it: ‘You can never be relaxed 
until you stand up ashore after the completion of your contract’. 
 
Thus it seemed that there was no universal view about the risks associated with 
shipping in general amongst the seafarers included in this study. Some were 
convinced that the modern shipping industry was generally a comparatively safe one 
in which to work, others regarded its inherent nature (remote from shore-side 
assistance and facilities) as risky and were conscious of some of the very specific 
risks attached to shipping (such as piracy). What subsequently emerged in the 
accounts of most of the seafarers, however, was the importance of companies in terms 
of management policies and practices in mitigating or exacerbating risk in the 
exercise of their practices and the implementation of their policies. 
 
 
The importance of ‘the company’ 
 
It emerged in the course of interviews with seafarers that their companies’ policies 
and practices strongly influenced perceptions of risk. It was widely understood that 
risk could be mitigated by seafarers and companies working together and acting in 
accordance with safety protocols. The following interview extract is illustrative of the 
ways in which seafarers believed that shipping could be rendered relatively safe 
where all parties acted properly and promptly: 
 
Interviewer: …Is this a relatively safe occupation or a high risk occupation? 
Interviewee: If the company has a good management system and working manuals 
and crew members implement the company manuals strictly, seafaring is not a 
risky occupation.  
Interviewer: What do you think about the impact of occasional or natural factors? 
Interviewee: I don’t think those factors are important compared with human 
factors. Sometimes, deficiencies of the ship’s hull or key equipment may be 
vital for the safety of ship and crew. Even so, it depends upon whether crew 
are able to identify the deficiencies at the earliest, and then whether the 
company can take necessary measures to deal with it once the company 
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received the report from the crew. Should both crew and company take serious 
steps on safety management, the seafarer’s occupation won’t be as dangerous 
as normally expected. So shipping safety requires both the earliest findings of 
crew and also prompt response of the ship company. (Senior officer) 
 
Reinforcing this view another interviewee emphasised that new vessels could be 
rendered unsafe by poor company practices whilst old vessels which were well run 
and managed could operate relatively safely. He explained that: 
 
Many small companies own new vessels but are poor in safety management. 
In that case, their ships are not safe at all. By contrast, some companies like 
my current servicing one have had comprehensive and strict safety 
management systems for a long time, in which the safety of even old ships can 
be secured. I believe that the safety of a ship is dependent upon management - 
both safety management by the company and by the crew. Without safety 
management, new equipment can easily be broken, leading to accidents…. 
Ten years ago, I would have placed an emphasis on ship conditions and I 
would have thought that a new ship would be safer than an old one. Today, I 
would give more weight to human factors and company safety management 
systems. (Senior officer) 
 
Another seafarer of much lower rank reinforced this view arguing: 
 
A 30 year old ship may not be necessarily poorer than a 10 year old ship in 
terms of the safety because the strict management is more important. (Rating) 
 
However not all seafarers were sanguine about the reliability and safety of their 
vessels and some suggested that there were some ships that were inherently unsafe 
creating danger that was beyond the ‘control’ of serving seafarers. One engineer for 
example reflected on a vessel he had previously served on. He described how he felt 
that: 
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Interviewee: It was our luck that no incident, like, related to the stopping of the 
main engine, happened during the period of poor navigation conditions. I was 
always worried and could not be relaxed throughout my service.  
Interviewer: Do you mean that without the reliability of marine machines and 
equipment, the safety of ship and crew cannot be secured? 
Interviewee: Certainly, this is particularly true for the main engine, which was my 
responsibility as 2nd engineer. In tha t period, I was a bit nervous.  
Interviewer:  What factors caused you to be so nervous? 
Interviewee: That was the deficiency of the ship design and building. The designer 
focused on the economic profit only. Cargo space, deck equipment and 
machinery are excellent, leaving the engine room too small to do maintenance 
work. Average temperature in the Engine Room was over 46 0 C. A key issue 
was the unreliability of the main engine. As all Chinese crew in this company 
knew her, it was difficult for crew agency to send us to this ship even US$100 
more for a 3rd engineer’s wage. Safety was a major consideration. (Senior 
engineer) 
 
Thus seafarers recognised that there were limits to the problems that could be 
overcome by on-board, or on-shore, human endeavour alone. Nevertheless the 
‘company’ approach was often key to their perception of safety.  
Research in other sectors such as railway operation has identified an association 
between distrust and poor safety performance (Clarke 1998) and in reviewing some of 
these findings Conchie and Donald (2006) conclude that: 
 
In explaining this relationship most safety professionals agree that negative 
attitudes are the cause and not the consequence of accidents (e.g. Lee and 
Harrison 2000). For example, workers who express negative attitudes toward 
safety are more likely to experience an accident than workers with positive 
attitudes. Research into risk draws similar conclusions . (Conchie and 
Donald 2006:1154. Our emphasis) 
 
Trust has often been discussed in relation to leadership and management (Clarke 
1998, Fleming and Lardner 2001, Cox et al 2006). Where trust breaks down, be it in 
relation to the implementation of a ‘just’ or ‘no blame’ culture or in relation to 
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management commitment to safety, negative consequences accrue in relation to safe 
working practices and the development of a safety culture. In Clarke’s research on 
British railways, for example, she demonstrated that rail workers failed to report 
minor incidents to management where they felt that ‘management take no notice’ 
(Clarke 1998:287). Such under-reporting undermines safety management and 
increases risk. Confidence in management is therefore key to the proper 
implementation of safety management systems. This was understood by the 
participants in this research who identified the company approach as a vital element in 
relation to the degree of risk they experienced at work. In relation to seafaring there is 
necessarily a distance between vessels and shore-side management. This distance is 
clearly a physical one but seems equally to be inter-relational. Shore-side 
management are seen by many seafarers to be the ‘company’ and the ‘management’ 
whereas shipboard senior officers seem to be more akin to ‘supervisors’ in land-based 
industries. Thus the ‘company’ can be equated with ‘management’ and trust in the 
company directly impacted upon the participating seafarers’ sense of safety on-board. 
They saw the company as playing an essential role in determining the implementation 
of safe working practice on board. Similarly, however, in this research, relationships 
with colleagues particularly, but not exclusively senior officers (supervisors), featured 
strongly in relation to perceptions of risk. 
 
 
The importance of colleagues on board in relation to perceptions of risk 
 
Participants identified fellow seafarers as having a critical role in mitigating risk. In 
this, senior members of the crew were seen as vital in preventing accidents via the 
promotion of trust, team spirit, and error free work. Trust was again identified as a 
key component of safety management. As one rating explained: 
 
Management is key. I mean that the personalities, leadership styles, and 
charisma of ship leaders (including the Captain and the Chief Engineer) will 
determine whether they can bring a crew together as a close and united team. 
If so, error chains can be identified and disrupted at an early stage. If not, say 
that a leader does not take care of personal matters amongst the crew and is 
very rude in delivering his commands to subordinates, they would distrust 
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and be disappointed in him. As a result, they wouldn’t report anything 
[requiring attention]. In this case, the ship will be unsafe even if it is a new 
one. (Rating). 
 
Senior officers were also considered to be a necessary, and an important, mediator of 
shore-side commercial pressure by seafarers. Some suggested that it was the role of 
senior officers to soak up such pressures and prevent them from impacting upon, and 
influencing, the remainder of the on board team. One explained that: 
 
All pressures should be the pressures of the captain and C/E because the crew 
do not have direct contact with external  information. It is important how the 
captain and C/E approach work pressure and how they communicate with 
outsiders? External pressure should not be directly transferred to the crew.  
 (Senior officer) 
 
Where senior on-board managers were regarded as weak, seafarers perceived that 
safety was compromised. One seafarer offered the following description of events 
aboard a ship he had served upon. In his account the Captain was deemed to have 
failed to resist shore-side commercial pressures which had ultimately caused him to 
insist on a mistaken course of action that could have had serious health and safety 
implications. In the seafarer’s account the Captain failed to resist the pressure applied 
by shore-side managers who required him to press for a faster voyage time than was 
sensible given the engine capacity of the ship. The Chief Engineer was deemed to 
have similarly failed to resist pressure exerted by the Captain causing him to operate 
the engines at a faster rph than was safe in the seafarer’s eyes. This impacted 
negatively on the seafarer’s perception of safety on board. He explained that: 
 
In the last ship, the maximum revolutionary rate of the main engine was 180 
rph due to the constraint of the engine conditions. In order to reduce the 
voyage duration, the captain asked the engine department to increase the 
revolutionary rate. The C/E passed the captain’s request to us. After a 
discussion amongst the engineers, we concluded that we cannot increase the 
speed beyond the limit of the ship condition. Having seen no response from us, 
the captain rang to an on-duty engineer directly and repeated his request. I told 
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the C/E that we had never taken such high speed which may have serious 
consequences. The C/E did not accept my advice and he came down to the 
engine room to implement the captain’s command. After one day run at the 
higher speed, unsurprisingly, two cylinders began to leak oil seriously. We had 
to stop the engine and spend two days making emergency repairs, making the 
voyage much longer than the original speed. It was our luck that the weather 
was not too bad at all during the period of the main engine stopping. 
Otherwise, we might have had a big problem.   
 
Thus leadership and management were seen to impact significantly on seafarers’ 
general sense of safety on board and their perception of the risk associated with their 
work. On-board seniors were emphasised in the accounts of most seafarers. Their role 
in leadership, promoting team work, and exercising authority in relation to team 
working rather than command and control tyrannies, was regarded as important to the 
safe operation of ships. Lee and Harrison (2000) argue that their research in the 
nuclear sector indicates that management style can have a strong impact upon safety- 
related attitudes. Their findings echo the perceptions of seafarers in this study who 
equated less authoritarian styles of management with less risk. Lee and Harrison 
suggest that: 
The categorization of management style is shown moving broadly from 
‘laissez faire’ through ‘authoritarian’ to ‘democratic’ in general accord with 
the literature on leadership and safety culture[…] This progression is 
associated with increasingly favourable attitudes towards safety on the part of 
‘followers’.    (Lee and Harrison 2000:88) 
 
However, for Chinese seafarers it seemed that another element, which impacted 
strongly upon the ability to promote effective teamwork, was essential to safety on 
board and their confidence in risk mitigation strategies and practices. This element is 
termed ‘guanxi’ in Chinese. 
 
Guanxi, is a term with complex meaning but for our purposes relates to a feeling of 
collective harmony, which underpins the understanding of many Chinese seafarers 
reflecting upon the importance of on board relationships and their perception of 
safety. ‘Good’ guanxi was deemed by many to be a vital component of effective team 
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work which was widely understood to improve safety on board. As one seafarer 
explained: 
 
Interviewer: Which factors influence the safety of a ship? 
Interviewee: Guanxi is certainly an important factor. 
Interviewer: How can guanxi influence safety?  
Interviewee: Suppose that I had just argued, shouted at, or fought with, a crew 
member, how could I concentrate on my work? As you know, some jobs in the 
engine room are very labour intensive and mentally demanding whilst others 
are not. If you are in a good mood, you won’t feel tired even if a job is really 
hard. Should you be in a bad mood, you will feel very tired even if the job is 
not difficult and you are very familiar with it….. Being in a bad mood is 
counter to the safety of yourself and others because you are unable to  
concentrate on your work.  
Interviewer: You have raised an important point that safety is closely related to 
the psychological state of crew members. 
Interviewee: Yes, bad moods cannot secure the safety of yourself and others 
because you cannot concentrate on work and make responses properly as 
usual. It is easy to lead to an accident because alongside working, you may be 
still concerned about what you heard, some bad words, or forged reports 
against you. In particular, you would find it very difficult to work with those 
with whom you had argued. (Rating) 
 
Where guanxi was good it positively impacted upon the risk perceptions of crew 
members. Where guanxi was poor it seemed that seafarers perceived their ship as less 
safe and their lives and health to be at greater risk. 
 
It seems that guanxi requires careful fostering and maintenance and that Chinese 
seafarers identify a number of responsibilities and ‘rights’ associated with guanxi. 
Guanxi is shared across a group who are deemed to share a collective responsibility 
for one and others’ welfare. Thus guanxi could be negatively affected by the failure of 
particular individuals to act in the collective interest or to protect the interests of one 
of their member associates. Guanxi clearly related to seafarers who for the duration of 
the voyage were regarded by many as sharing a collective responsibility on board. 
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This is an extension perhaps of the fairly usual sense of comradeship (a term 
originally emanating from the sixteenth century Spanish fleet see Perez-Mallaina, 
1998 and Bloor, 2005) experienced on board by seafarers who find themselves ‘all in 
the same boat’ (or specifically in the case of the sixteenth century Spaniards ‘all in the 
same bedchamber’) and therefore sharing common interests. However guanxi in 
China operates strongly ashore and the intersection of interests and respons ibilities 
involved could produce conflicts between the maintenance of shore-side and 
shipboard guanxi.   
 
On board guanxi could thus be affected by the distribution of the network of agencies 
supplying crew to vessels. Where crew agencies were dispersed, and thus on board 
crew were recruited from different parts of China, conflicts could emerge. Regional 
affiliations, prejudices and discrimination could disrupt on board harmony in ways 
which are very similar to those reported by Filipino crew who often express a 
preference for multinational vessels as a result of a desire to mitigate regionalism 
(Sampson 2003). For some Chinese crew the proposed solution was rather different 
however and they advocated that crews be made as homogenous as possible and be 
supplied by single agencies. The following account of the perceived problem and a 
proposed solution are illustrative: 
 
Interviewer: Does guanxi influence the performance of Chinese crew? 
Interviewee: Yes. Some region’s crew are particularly inclined to establish their 
own grouping. Small groupings are more likely to exist when crew are 
supplied by different crew agencies, like a “United Nations”. In my company, 
all officers are free seamen from different crew agencies while all ratings 
come from the same crew agency. This has made it very difficult for senior 
officers to manage and control the ratings. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Interviewee: Because the crew manager finds excuses to block their decisions or 
impede crew replacement. This will lead to either an accident or a near miss. 
Such consequences are actually inevitable.  
 (Rating)         
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On board strife, rifts, and power struggles were discussed a great deal by the seafarers 
in this study. It seemed that the capacity for personnel to access the support of the 
wider crew, to mobilise guanxi as it were, had the potential to fundamentally 
undermine the authority of even senior figures on board, illustrating how crucial on 
board relationships were to safe operations and to perceptions of safety. The following 
account offers an example of a captain being undermined by one of his officers which 
ultimately, in the view of the seafarer recollecting the story, resulted in an accident. 
The seafarer explains: 
 
Holding a captain’s certificate in his hand, the C/O tried to weaken the authority 
of the captain and replace the latter through developing his own guanxi on board. 
In order to maintain his position, the captain had to agree with him to promote an 
unqualified OS to AB in order to take duty on the bridge. In the Suez Canal, the 
unqualified AB was unable to follow the pilot’s command, and the ship grounded, 
resulting in a damaged hull. (Junior officer)     
 
It was not only poor guanxi that was regarded as having the potential to undermine 
safety on board however. It seemed that in some cases seafarers did not feel confident 
about the experience and ‘know-how’ of their peers. Researchers considering safety 
culture and the role of trust in the promotion of such cultures have commented that the 
operation of a “good’ safety culture can be characterised by a mutual trust that key 
stakeholders have in each other” and that furthermore workers feel secure when they 
know ‘that individuals have the necessary skills to carry out specific work tasks’ (Cox 
et al 2006:1124)  In the course of this research it emerged that such faith in the 
competence of fellow seafa rers was not always present. It was suggested by some 
participants that Chinese seafarers had, in some cases, acquired poor working 
practices and habits from their experience in the national fleet and that such 
deficiencies could be rectified if foreign companies provided good on-board guidance 
as to how to maintain or operate pieces of equipment and machinery. For example a 
senior officer suggested that: 
 
We would like to learn more from strict management and highly professional 
standards from foreign companies……We must admit that few [Chinese] 
crew/engineers/officers have good experience on maintenance work, and some 
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may have the wrong experience, resulting in frequent breakage of the equipment 
and machinery … So a good company SMS and operating manuals are important, 
partly because we can learn a lot from reading company documents and improve 
their knowledge, partly because the manuals indicate what are the correct ways to 
carry out maintenance work. A good manual not only reminds us what to do, but 
also tells us how to do it.  (Senior Officer) 
 
However there was also a feeling that seafarers might not wish to learn but that by 
utilising ‘guanxi’ ashore to secure work on board, and by moving from company to 
company to avoid the consequences of their incompetence, some very poor, or in the 
terms of one seafarer ‘rubbish’, seafarers survive in the modern Chinese seafarer 
labour market placing their fellow workers at risk. As one seafarer put it: 
 
There are many ‘rubbish’ seafarers amongst Chinese senior officers aboard 
foreign ships. They are poor in professional standards but strong in abusing guanxi 
for personal purposes. Without a credit system in the global labour market, 
unfortunately, they can move easily from one company to another. This has not 
only negative impacts on the professional development of junior officers and 
cadets, but also makes it difficult to establish a safety culture amongst Chinese 
seafarers due to the variety of professional approaches and standards. Such 
phenomenon should be attributed to the impacts from the traditional management 
system and culture within China’s state-owned shipping companies and crew 
agencies, which have yet transformed to a new system and culture. Such impacts 
can be summarised as the lack of professional concentration, poor professional 
standards, short term perspective, and favour to personal guanxi. (Senior officer) 
  
This lack of confidence in colleagues’ knowledge, competence, and experience, may 
well contribute to the heightened perceptions of risk identified amongst Chinese 
seafarers in relation to working in their current company (Bailey, Ellis, Sampson, 
forthcoming). A perception that other seafarers working for other companies may be 
better skilled and more knowledgeable could account, in part, for the perception 
amongst Chinese respondents identified in the same research (see Bailey Ellis 
Sampson forthcoming) that shipping in general was not as risky as respondents from 
other countries felt it to be. 
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The influence of the structure of the labour market 
 
A particular feature of the Chinese seafarer labour market appeared to compound this 
lack of confidence in the ability of colleagues. It seemed that seafarers had concerns 
about the influence of shore-side agency staff upon relationships on board wholly 
Chinese crewed vessels. Suggestions of nepotism were made by crew members who 
raised the safety implications of such practices and relations. One explained that 
senior officers, fearful for their jobs, could be made to feel that they were unable to 
exert influence over junior crew members in relation to safe working practices. He 
suggested that: 
 
 In the face of market competition, for instance, some captains and C/Es may be 
concerned about how to secure their jobs in this company. When they pay serious 
attention to the safety management, it may offend some crew who have a special 
background with the crew agency. This may make it difficult for those senior 
officers to perform their duties. In order to maintain harmonic work and personal 
relationships, they may give up their effort in safety education, training and strict 
management. (Senior officer) 
 
Some seafarers could cite direct experience of crew agency intervention of a nature 
which they felt compromised the safe operation of a vessel. One, for example, 
described how aboard one ship the crew effectively ended up operating with one 
person too few in the engine room because the crew agency insisted that an 
incompetent seafarer remain on board rather than be fired and replaced. He described 
how: 
 
A 3rd engineer could do nothing but clean the oil filter. It threatened the safety of 
ship if he continued to occupy his post. At that time, the crew agency rang the ship 
and suggested to the C/E to take any measure except send the crewman home. To 
avoid offending the agency, the C/E made a decision that the 3rd engineer was not 
allowed to enter the engine room but stay on the deck until his contract completed. 
(Officer) 
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Here again guanxi appears to come into play as nepotism, an element of guanxi, could 
fuel the promotion of seafarers who might be regarded by others as not yet fit for 
advancement. The following account was illustrative of the kinds of practices that 
were reported and the ways in which they impacted upon on board seafarer 
relationships, guanxi and perceptions of risk and safety: 
 
Interviewee: The impact of guanxi on Chinese seafarers cannot be underestimated 
whatever they board, Chinese or foreign-owned ships. For a rating, if you are 
good at communication with senior officers, it is certain that you have more 
chances to be promoted as AB, Bosun or Pumpman. On the other hand, some 
crew managers may ask the ship to promote their relatives although the latter 
may not be qualified or not strong enough for the new post.  
Interviewer: Does it influence safety? 
Interviewee: Yes, this is a case of a pumpman who was promoted just because he 
was a relative of the crew manager. He knew nothing about the deck work 
because he was an oiler. Soon after his promotion, he got a minute injury 
caused by the leakage of hot steam because he did not follow the operation 
procedure properly. Without learning the lesson from this accident, he had a 
bigger accident later. This was caused by his carelessness: he did not shut 
down the door in the forecastle tightly, resulting in a flood there later due to 
bad weather. To ensure navigation, a group of deck crew was sent to the 
forecastle for an emergency operation. Unfortunately, all crew members were 
hit down by a big wave, and one was seriously injured as he was thrown up  in 
the air and fell down the deck with a serious break of his pelvis.   
Interviewer: The case you mentioned indicated an improper intervention from the 
crew agency.  
Interviewee: Yes, the ship is very vulnerable once the intervention from the crew 
agency took place which influenced the crew’s guanxi. We fear such 
intervention.  
Interviewer: Is this still an issue for Chinese crew boarding foreign ships? 
Interviewee: Yes, it is a common issue. In the case I mentioned earlier, it was due 
to his special background that many crewmembers liked to show special 
respect to him, leading to a small grouping beyond the normal working 
relationship. This was a constraint from the strict safety management on board.  
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In this case favouritism, fostered by a concern with guanxi, appeared to have 
facilitated the promotion of the individual concerned and also to have influenced the 
on board behaviour of some other seafarers who appeared to cut him some slack in 
relation to his careless work practices ultimately resulting in a serious accident. There 
is a sense in the account of the issue dividing the crew and disrupting the harmony on 
board, something which most seafarers described as highly undesirable and as a 
problem in terms of safe operations on board. 
 
The competitive nature of the labour market also seemed to influence on board 
behaviour in others ways which could impact on safety. Seafarers recognised the need 
for others to share their knowledge and understanding with them in order to assist 
them in learning. A cadet for example explained that: 
 
Interviewee: The most effective way for onboard learning is that they instruct you 
to do some crucial operations completely. Just recently for instance, an 
engineer offered a comprehensive explanation of the procedure for preparing 
the main engine for navigation.  
Interviewer: How often do you have such opportunity? 
Interviewee: It is dependent upon your own attitudes and efforts. If you are 
arrogant and lazy, nobody likes to help you. If you work hard and take every 
job seriously, you will gain reward from experienced crew who would be 
willing to pass their experience and skills to you. You would benefit a lot, in 
particular, if they show and explain a complete process in equipment repair or 
maintenance, which gives you an overall picture and also key 
techniques/know-how instead of general information. (Cadet) 
 
However, a number of seafarers talked of the ‘protection’ of skills and knowledge by 
some colleagues unwilling to teach others for fear of future competition from them for 
their job. The phrase of ‘taking over their rice bowl’ was used by an engineer to 
evocatively describe the fears and attitudes of some seafarers conscious of the 
temporary status of their contracts and the competitive nature of the labour market: 
 
In the Engine Room, it is normal that people join together to fix machinery or 
equipment. This is an opportunity for us to learn from each other, and in 
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particular for those who are preparing themselves to take charge of the 
machinery and equipment once they are promoted. Whilst many people like to 
teach you without reservation, some are not open to do so because they fear 
that you may take over their “rice-bowl” [job]. …I have experienced working 
with such kind of persons.   
 (Engineer) 
 
The account of a Bosun echoed this when he responded to a question relating to 
sharing of knowledge:  
 
Interviewer: Do all experienced crew share a similar approach with you in terms 
of sharing knowledge and experience? 
Interviewee: I don’t think so. In fact, many people try to avoid doing it. It is a 
slogan: “once an apprentice has got all skills from his master, the master 
would end his business”. Taking into account the labour market competition, 
skill development and promotion of ABs may mean the decline of 
employment opportunities for the current Bosun. This is the reason why many 
Bosuns are reluctant to transfer all their knowledge and skills to their 
subordinates. (Bosun)  
 
There was also a suggestion that labour market conditions discouraged seafarers from 
seeking knowledge from others for fear of exposing their own ignorance. An older 
seafarer recognised this as a generational difference but it seems likely that the change 
in behaviour which he identified as relating to time also reflects changes in the nature 
of employment and a clear awareness amongst all seafarers of the precarious nature of 
their employment status. The seafarer reflected that: 
 
I gained such feeling from the first, my master, an experienced fitter who 
taught me a lot when I was cadet. It is rare for young seafarers today to talk 
about their mistakes. Rather, they would like to show that they are perfect 
even if they had actually made mistakes. This is certainly different from old 
ones.  (Engineer) 
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The influence of previous experience in the domestic fleet 
 
Many Chinese seafarers have entered the global labour market having been initially 
trained by, and within, state owned shipping enterprises (see Wu 2006; Wu et al, 
2006). Previous experiences are likely to impact upon perceptions of risk as seafarers 
contrast the practices of their current companies with the practices they have  
previously been familiar with. Such contrasts may impact favourably, or 
unfavourably, on seafarers’ risk perceptions. In the main seafarers in this exploratory 
study seemed to feel relatively ‘safe’ on board their current vessels as a consequence 
of the comparisons they made with what they considered to be the relatively unsafe 
ships aboard which they had previously served. In the main they appeared to regard 
the practices of their former employers as more risk prone than those which they 
experienced aboard their current vessels. The following example of an account given 
by a senior officer is illustrative: 
 
You may not know that “the segmentation of the three powers” was popularly 
practiced in the Chinese fleet in the past. That means that the Captain 
concentrates on the bridge, the Chief Officer on the deck and the Chief 
Engineer on the Engine Room. If all leaders focus on departmental interests 
without close cooperation, you might as well divide the ship into three pieces! 
In our company, it is different. (Senior officer) 
 
Whilst this finding is likely to reflect the nature of the two ships aboard which the 
researcher sailed (both of which were operated by what might be termed companies at 
the ‘top end’ of the labour market vis a vis safe working practices and safe vessel 
management) it is also illustrative of the ways in which perceptions of risk are relative 
and, as such, require contextualisation if they are to be properly explored and 
understood. The example serves to highlight the fact that to understand risk perception 
as simply culturally mediated (i.e. pertaining to specific ethnically rooted group 
values, traditions, beliefs) is inadequate in itself and the understanding of structural 
issues relating to labour markets, management practices, shore-side industry safety 
records, education and training, and so forth is essential to any successful attempt to 
explain national variations in risk perception. 
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Conclusions  
 
Consideration of the extended example of Chinese seafarers aboard fully Chinese-
crewed ships offers us an insight into the influences on seafarers’ perceptions of risks 
aboard. It is apparent in the discussions amongst seafarers, and between seafarers and 
the researcher, that a variety of issues impact upon safety perceptions at sea. These 
include what might be regarded as ‘general knowledge’ about shipping such as an 
awareness of technological advances, consideration of shipping specific risks such as 
piracy, and an understanding that ships are remote and isolated work places where 
help and assistance are not easily accessed when things go wrong. Crucially however 
it seems that what might be termed ‘local context’ is very important in shaping 
seafarers’ perceptions. ‘Local’ considerations are wide ranging and include the 
policies and practices of individual employers, the behaviour and attitudes of 
shipboard colleagues, and the impact of local labour market conditions.  
 
The form and content of localised relationships needs to be carefully considered in 
any effort to understand perceptions of risk whether a greater understanding is sought 
in relation to national differences or other variations such as those between seafarers 
of different rank or department. What this small scale preliminary study begins to 
reveal is the ways in which risks are understood, by seafarers, to be mitigated or 
exacerbated by organisations, or individuals; the importance of past experiences in 
gauging risks which are perceived in a relative manner; and the impact of structural 
conditions on safety behaviour and perceptions of danger.  
 
The research therefore indicates that the specific context of seafarers’ experiences, 
which can be conceived of within national frameworks, impacts significantly upon 
their perceptions of risk. Thus national differences in risk perception may be 
understood in relation to national economic conditions, national shore-based safety 
practices and regulations, national labour market conditions etc. What the research has 
yet to clearly indicate is any significant impact of national cultural understandings 
(i.e. national beliefs, values etc) on perceptions of risk and by extension on safety–
related behaviours. Guanxi is understood by Chinese seafarers to be specific to 
Chinese culture but it nevertheless resonates with aspects of other national cultures 
and cannot be seen to be wholly unique. The role of guanxi on-board merits further 
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exploration however. It is hoped that further research in this area will assist us in 
developing our understanding of the risk perceptions of seafarers more generally, of 
Chinese seafarers in particular, and of overall national differences in risk perception. 
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SEAFARERS’  PARTICIPATION IN  SAFETY  MANAGEMENT  ON  
BOARD  CARGO  SHIPS 
 
Syamantak Bhattacharya 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper considers the importance of seafarers’ participation in the management of self-
regulated Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) in the shipping industry. It points to the 
ways in which the concept of participation is understood differently within the industry and 
highlights the potential contribution that full employee participation makes to effective safety 
management at sea. Using qualitative research, including document analysis, interviews, and 
observations, both with shore based management and seafarers in the course of research 
voyages aboard cargo ships, the paper demonstrates what happens in practice when 
participation is attempted in the shipping industry. Seafarers’ employment patterns, fear of 
accountability, and shipboard hierarchy are identified as hindrances to participation. The 
paper concludes  that the effects of these hindrances are compounded by a deeper and 
underlying problem of a lack of appreciation of the principles of self- regulated OHS 
management system in the shipping industry.  
 
 
Locating seafarers in the ISM Code  
 
The introduction of the ISM Code represents one of the major changes to have occurred in 
the shipping industry in recent times. This piece of legislation was brought in between 1998 
and 2002 to provide a framework for the self-management of seafarers’ Occupational Health 
and Safety (OHS) and vessel pollution prevention. In the process it highlighted the 
importance of effective ship management and identified ship operators1 as independent and 
accountable entities. 
 
The ISM Code for the first time provides a framework for ship operators to “self- regulate” 
with regard to the protection of health and safety for their employees. Given the marginal 
involvement of regulatory authorities (i.e. flag states) the onus for providing an appropriate 
measure for the regulation of health and safety at sea was transferred, via the introduction of 
                                                 
1 Ship Operator: The ISM Code (3.1) requires that if the entity, who is responsible for the operation of the ship 
is other than the owner, the owner must report full name and details of such entity to the administration (Flag 
State) (IMO, 2002: 8). 
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the Code, almost ent irely, to ship operators. This necessitated ship operators’ active 
engagement with the development of Safety Management System (SMS) policies and 
procedures for their ships (Bailey, 2006). The ISM Code unequivocally demands direct and 
close involvement in SMS implementation and monitoring in its preamble where it states ‘the 
cornerstone of good management is commitment from the top’ (IMO, 2002: 5). 
 
Similar forms of self- regulated Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management systems 
are also widely found in shore-based industries. Along with the importance of the 
commitment from the  top management, shore-based research into such systems has, among 
other influences, identified the benefit of employee participation in contributing to the 
development of safe and healthy workplaces. Statistics as well as academic research 
demonstrate that in self-regulated OHS management systems a top-down approach alone has 
limitations. However, when combined with effective employee participation OHS 
management systems bring overall tangible benefits, such as less employee turnover, fewer 
incidents and an increased level of communication from employees (Dawson et al., 1988; 
Bohle and Quinlan, 2000; Gallagher et al., 2003). 
 
It is important to note however that the ISM Code nowhere contains an explicit provision 
concerning the requirement for seafarers’ participation. It does, however, state a number of 
important operational elements that imply seafarers’ participation in the development, 
maintenance and continuous improvement of the SMS. For instance, risk assessment, 
incident reporting and review of the SMS are all mentioned in the ISM Code (IMO, 2002: 
10).  
 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to explore how the shipping industry has risen to the 
challenges of the ISM Code and, in particular, if and how seafarers’ participation has become 
an integral part of the implementation of safety management. 
 
 
PhD Research design 
 
Earlier studies into the effectiveness of the ISM Code exposed serious limitations concerning 
the use of widely varying statistical data on accidents and incidents on board ships 
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global scale. The need for in-depth, qualitative research into the ISM related performance of 
ships and company offices was also a major recommendation of the IMO group of 
independent experts that conducted a quantitative survey into the benefits of the ISM Code in 
2005 (IMO, 2005; Anderson et al., 2003).   
 
The PhD research project, which underpins this paper, uses qualitative means to study some 
of the influences affecting the practice of the Code. It examines, among other things, the 
extent and quality of seafarers’ participation and management involvement, and the 
consequences of the withdrawal of regulatory bodies against the backdrop of the changing 
nature of the industry. It also explores the interplay between these different influences and 
how this complex interaction impacts on the practice of OHS. This paper however focuses 
specifically on seafarers’ participation and the impact of such participation on the practice of 
OHS in the shipping industry. 
 
Two companies were carefully selected for the empirical study based on their size, business 
focus and trading interest. The research was conducted in the companies’ shore-based 
technical management offices as well as on board their ships. The company SMS and 
associated written procedures, SMS files and other relevant documentation were studied, all 
ranks of seafarers and management staff interviewed, and routine activities on board ship 
closely observed. The research was designed to investigate a range of issues related to five 
specific procedures in the SMS: (1) Ship safety meetings, (2) Accident and incident 
reporting, (3), Risk assessments for onboard tasks, (4) SMS Reviews and (5) SMS Audits. 
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Figure 1:  Research locations and data collection sources 
 
 
 
The shore-based research took four days for each of the two companies, while a total of four 
ship voyages (two from each company) lasted for a period of one to two weeks each and 
included international routes (India-Persian Gulf and USA) as well as coastal trades (Western 
Europe). The data collection took place in the second half of 2006. 
 
Onboard ships seafarers from all ranks and departments were interviewed producing over 
100 hours of recorded interview data from around 75 interviewees. In addition, copious notes 
were kept from documentary analysis and onboard observations. The views and experiences 
of employees at all levels in the hierarchy onboard and those of the managers in the shore-
based office with different responsibilities were instrumental in gaining an in-depth picture 
of the practice of OHS.  
 
The four ships were tankers, a ship type that is widely regarded as the safer type of cargo 
ship (Lloyd’s List, 2005). Furthermore, the companies that offered access for the research 
held good safety and pollution prevention records judging from Port State Control (PSC)2 
                                                 
2 PSC data: Port State Control (PSC) is a government body which has statutory rights and responsibilities to 
carry out inspections of foreign flagged ships when such ships call at ports. PSC produces statistical data on 
operational deficiencies relating to ships’ safety, prevention and control of pollution, crew proficiencies and 
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data (Equasis, 2007; Paris MoU, 2004). Thus, any findings here which suggest that there may 
be scope for improvement may be even more pertinent for the wider industry. Aside from 
this stated bias there was nothing untypical about the individuals or company settings 
compared to the industry in general. While the study doesn’t intend to be representative of 
the industry as a whole, it presents in-depth discussion of a number of issues related to 
seafarers’ participation which gives it a wider relevance. 
 
 
What kind of participation? 
 
There may be a number of different ways of understanding the concept of participation in the 
context of OHS management. Different managers may interpret its significance differently.  
To understand what kind of participation contributes to the successful management of OHS, 
it is important to different iate the levels of seafarers’ participation that might exist in the 
industry. 
 
On one level such participation may be restricted to adherence to managements’ directives 
and procedures as laid down in the SMS. This form of participation may include seafarers 
donning adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or meticulously complying with 
SMS procedures by filling in forms and checklists prescribed by the management. It may 
also include seafarers successfully playing their parts by simply being the recipients of new 
OHS information and decisions that are already taken by the management. Such a symbolic 
involvement may be located in examples where seafarers’ participation is only limited to 
their presence in a safety meeting or their attendance in safety training programme. 
 
A different level of participation might involve seafarers being consulted and contributing to 
management decisions on the practice of OHS. Such consultation may include genuine 
discussion between seafarers and management with regard to risk assessment where seafarers 
can share their concerns with the managers (Walters and Frick, 2000). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
welfare and compliance to navigational rules. The industry, for regulatory compliance as well as commercial 
purposes, considers PSC-generated data, which is available in the public domain, as a valuable indicator for 
measuring the OHS performance of individual ships, and their owning, managing and/or operating company. 
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In the shipping industry this research demonstrated that seafarers’ participation remains a 
highly variable element in the management of OHS. Although there seems to be a universal 
approval of seafarers’ participation, there also seems to be a lack of true comprehension with 
regards to its potential and scope. Among managers alone there seems to be a wide variation 
in interpretation. While some managers remain oblivious to the potential for seafarers to play 
a role beyond their specific compliance with SMS, others see seafarers’ participation in the 
running of SMS as an important step towards the improvement of shipboard OHS. 
 
One shore-based manager, for example, remarked: 
 
The sea-staff don’t understand much, they are naive and as a result they should be 
told what to do – every step of it. I am happy with my crew as they are following our 
procedures and they are doing as per our requirements. In fact, our procedures are 
so good and so detailed that no one needs to butt in. And, of course, they send in their 
reports and pass the inspections. To run a ship safely you cannot ask for too much 
democracy... Democracy sometimes has the danger to lead to anarchy. 
 Quote: 1 (Ref: A-0-D) 
 
On the other hand, one of his colleagues having similar responsibility had a completely 
different understanding of the benefits of participation. He was not content with the fact that 
some seafarers behaved passively within the system. The second manager thus said: 
 
Some of the Masters and Senior Officers are very good, we learn a lot from them. I 
like to receive interesting suggestions and improvement notes. I hate when some of 
them write ‘no comments’ (in the Review) – it shows that we have failed somewhere... 
I would say that the downside of this company is the Ratings... the system fails there. 
If there is one weakest link in the whole system it’s the Ratings, we get minimal 
participation from them. All they say is ‘yes sir’ and ‘thank you sir’. 
 Quote: 2 (Ref: B-0-A) 
 
Research shows that this second interpretation of employee participation (or certain 
variations of this interpretation) has the greatest potential to promote OHS in all types of 
workplace. By following such values employees and management jointly become responsible 
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for a common goal of a safer and healthier workplace. Such teamwork necessitates that 
management not only determine policies and procedures and provide channels for 
communication, but also decentralise decision-making on OHS matters in such a manner that 
employees’ needs and concerns are incorporated in the running of the system (Walters, 2004; 
Harrisson and Legendre, 2003). 
 
The following section focuses on a range of concerns that seafarers have with regard to 
participation and in particular when attempting to operate at this higher level of participation.  
 
 
Obstacles to Seafarers’ Participation 
 
The research highlighted a number of barriers to seafarers’ participation in OHS management 
at sea. Three major concerns: Job Insecurity, Fear of Accountability and Shipboard 
Hierarchy are discussed below. 
 
Job Insecurity 
 
The most common theme identified when analysing seafarers’ interviews was of the fear of 
job loss. Seafarers were concerned about job secur ity as a result of the temporary and short-
term nature of their employment. Ratings 3 and Junior Officers4 were aware of the large pool 
of seafarers available from certain labour supplying countries and felt especially threatened 
that their jobs would be taken up by their compatriots who were waiting “in the wings” to be 
employed. Captains and other Senior Officers5, on the other hand, were concerned about 
changes in company employment programmes. Generally, this group of seafarers feared that, 
as a result of cost-cutting strategies, they would be replaced by seafarers from other nations 
drawing comparatively lower wages (Alderton et al., 2004). 
                                                 
3 Ratings: Seafarers who carry out more menial types of task and have limited independent responsibility. 
Generally they comprise the Bosun, all deck hands, such as Able Bodied Seaman (AB), Ordinary Seaman (OS), 
all Engine hands, such as the Fitter and Motorman, as well as Saloon staff, such as the Cook and the Messman. 
4 Junior Officers: Seafarers who have certain independent responsibilities, such as watch keeping. They 
generally are 2nd Officer, 3rd Officer, 3rd Engineer, 4th Engineer and Electrical Officer. 
5 Senior Officers: The group of seafarers who have the greatest responsibility in terms of the onboard 
management of the ships. They generally are the Captain, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer and 2nd Engineer. 
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Against the backdrop of job insecurity the implementation of a performance appraisal system 
became highly sensitive and undermined the willingness of ratings, in particular, to actively 
participate in the SMS. In both companies crew were appraised by seniors or the captain at 
regular intervals and reports were forwarded to crewing offices located in seafarers’ home 
countries. As these ratings were employed on short-term and temporary contracts, their 
future re-employment heavily relied on appraisal reports making them acutely aware of the 
importance of maintaining a ‘clean record’ in their reports. In the course of the research it 
became apparent that the ratings feared that senior officers might use the appraisal system as 
a tool to report not only work performance but also behaviour, which, in their understanding, 
depended on how respectful they were towards the captain or senior officers. This deterred 
ratings from participating freely in the SMS or from engaging in a meaningful discussion 
with the senior officers or captains, particularly if such discussions had the potential to be 
construed as arguments or dissent.  
 
For example one AB pointed out why he felt that engaging in a discussion with the captain 
might affect his re-employment chances. He said:  
 
I don’t talk during lifeboat drills, may be it becoming argument. 
Q. So why is it not right to argue? 
Some captain don’t like argument, may be not good for report, may be (he will put) 
bad remark in confidential appraisal...  
 
Q. So what happens if you get one bad appraisal? 
Very difficult to get new job... There are a lot of people waiting for AB job... Before 
changing company one manager (of new company) talking to other manager (of 
previous company) on the phone asking details ... ‘What about this man, how was he 
on your ship, did he make any trouble?’ So, very important for me to get good report. 
 Quote: 3 (Ref: A-2-D) 
 
Some senior officers, fearful of losing jobs to other nationalities, were similarly reticent. The 
declining number of compatriots onboard along with a steady influx of officers from 
comparatively new seafarer supply nations was a constant source of anxiety for them. This 
impacted upon senior officers’ willingness to make suggestions relating to shipboard 
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operations or to put forward any creative or confident proposals. Thus their interaction with 
management was noticeably muted. For example, one captain told me: 
 
Q. Can you ask for more hands? 
Can we ask the management? No we can’t. If I make hullabaloo may be tomorrow I 
will be replaced by two or three (cheap) masters, so I should rather keep quiet (he 
laughed). 
 Quote: 4 (Ref: B-2-A) 
 
Another Chief Engineer articulated the same worry slightly differently. On asking him about 
his fears to retain employment, he said: 
 
Yes, it’s a worry for all of us. We are constantly worried as we keep seeing more and 
more Chief Engineers (from another nation) taking over. They will call it 
redundancy, although we have been promised that they (the management) would not 
kick us out or replace us with (other nationalities), but who knows...  
 
Q. But aren’t you employed on a permanent basis? 
On paper we are permanent employees but every time we go home we become 
temporary again... They (the management) are the boss and we have to abide by their 
moves. But yes with regard to the first question, I guess I am always worried and thus 
psychologically it matters... I don’t feel the urge in making an Improvement Note6. 
It’s pointless you know – now the time has come for me to be safe and stay quietly 
and of course not draw any attention by having an accident or something. 
 Quote: 5 (Ref: B-1-E) 
 
Fear of Accountability 
 
Reporting near misses and different types of incident to the management can only be 
achieved through the active participation of seafarers and is considered a key element of 
OHS management. Procedures for these types of reporting are clearly identified in the ISM 
                                                 
6 Improvement Note: It is a mechanism used in the two companies for employees including the seafarers to 
comment on or suggest changes to the SMS as a means for continuous improvement to the SMS. 
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Code and feature in the SMS of the two companies. However, the research showed that, in 
practice, the seafarers were reluctant to use these systems because of the additional 
paperwork involved and importantly because they were concerned about the possible 
consequences of complying with such procedures. They feared that such reporting could 
damage their own and/or their colleagues’ reputations in the company. 
 
One of the two companies encouraged an anonymous incident reporting system, but the 
report form required so much detailed information that the identity of the seafarers involved 
could barely be obscured. Given the limited number of officers and ratings on board, such 
identification was even more straightforward. This prompted seafarers to report only serious 
incidents, such as personal injury, requiring considerable medical assistance, obvious  
mechanical or structural damage and incidents involving third-parties (e.g. cargo receivers 
and port personnel). Alongside these, there were a considerable number of reports of near-
miss cases that were conspicuously trivial. These included instances of an OS not wearing a 
hard hat on deck, a Chief Cook who twisted his ankle in the galley and a Fitter observed 
wearing an inappropriate pair of gloves during gas-cutting. Although these types of reporting 
are indeed important, it appeared that a substantial number of cases of intermediate 
seriousness were omitted as a result of reporting practice. After checking the records in the 
incident reporting file on one ship I wrote in my field notes: 
 
In the last five years this ship reported forty incidents... what interests me is the 
content of the reports. Almost 50% of the cases were mechanical failure (such as 
main engine breakdown and not due to individual failing) while 25% of the cases 
consisted of a serious personal injury (such as one that required hospitalisation), 
ship’s structural damage (on contacting the jetty) and all such events involving third 
parties (including oil pollutions in port while loading, which were reported to 
authorities)... Almost all of the remaining cases reported uncomplicated near-miss 
incidents (such as not wearing proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE))... There 
were only two cases that showed operational misjudgements or individual failings 
(close quarter in a Traffic Separation Scheme). 
 Quote: 6 (Ref: B-1-C) 
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Figure 2:  Nature of incident reports on one research ship over a 5 year period 
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Individual 
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From the interviews with seafarers who served on the same ship for a considerable period of 
time over the last five years, it was apparent that significant errors which did not result in a 
major incident, such as minor oil pollution due to spray through PV valve 7, ship dragging 
anchor as a result of using insufficient scope of chain, and experiencing minor irritation after 
handling chemicals without wearing appropriate gloves, did occur, but from the Incident 
Report File on the ship they appeared to be absent. It seemed that these ‘intermediate’ cases 
were regarded as having the potential to ‘get people into trouble’. There seemed to be a 
concern that reporting such incidents would allow for the identification of the people  
involved and that the reports of such incidents might be interpreted by management as a lack 
of professional ability. This impression was further substantiated during an interview with 
one captain who explained to me why he did not report an obvious case of a near miss 
incident to the management. He said: 
 
I did not report, I was furious with the engineers. But you see I did not report (to the 
management).  
                                                 
7 (PV) Pressure Vacuum valve: It is a safety device commonly found in tankers which allows excess pressure 
from the cargo tanks to be released and also air to be drawn in when excess vacuum develops inside the cargo 
tanks.  
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Q. Why? 
I think it’s mostly because by making such report I will end up talking about a 
colleague of mine... the 2nd (engineer) probably will get a bad name in the office or 
may even lose job 
 Quote: 7 (Ref: A-2-F) 
 
Seafarers’ fear of being identified through reporting was further aggravated by the possible 
consequences of the analysis of incident reports. From the research it was apparent that they 
remained in doubt regarding the apportioning of blame for each of the reported incidents. 
Despite a number of campaigns, such as encouraging anonymous reporting systems and 
advocating a no-blame culture, it seemed that in practice the apportioning of blame was not 
entirely eradicated. As a result, seafarers were sceptical about initiating any such reporting. 
They feared spoiling their own as well as their colleagues’ reputation within the company. 
They also did not want to risk getting into legal complications as they feared criminalisation. 
For example, one engineer explained why he would rather avoid reporting. He said: 
 
There is always a tendency to find out who is guilty and that is always there with this 
office. On this ship I had a problem, I had a near accident and near death but this 
was not my fault. But they (management) are asking for the guilty person, they ask for 
many explanations. If I have an accident they keep asking why this, why that, why like 
that. I find there is a tendency to find who is guilty through this accident reports. 
There is neither any comforting e-mail nor any room in the incident report for 
entering the circumstances of the work . In their report they are only blaming us and 
gunning for our heads for our faults in relation to their ‘lovely’ management 
procedures... given a chance I wouldn’t report the next time. 
 Quote: 8 (Ref: B-2-C) 
 
Shipboard Hierarchy 
 
During the shipboard research a sense of a formal and regimented atmosphere surfaced on a 
number of occasions and was tangible during interviews as well as observations. It was 
shaped by a rigid hierarchical structure where a command and control model of operation 
prevailed over a teamwork-based working environment. The level of crew eagerness to 
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participate in OHS matters was visibly inadequate, not because of any procedural lapses but 
because the atmosphere for eliciting meaningful communication was absent.  
 
Meetings and other occasions involving seafarers from across the shipboard hierarchy took a 
very formal route where management’s decisions as well as the captain’s and senior officer’s 
interpretations of such decisions were merely distributed to the remainder of the crew. The 
communication seemed unidirectional leaving very little room for any forum type of 
discussion. Although these meetings may also be construed as one level of participation, the  
outcome of such meetings did not contribute to any decision-making or provide any input 
into the running of the OHS management system. On one ship, for example, I recorded the 
following seating arrangement during a safety meeting in my diary: 
 
 
The seating arrangement during the meeting was as per the hierarchy on the ship 
(see the sketch). The Captain and the Senior Officers sat at one end with the Captain 
at the head of the table. Towards the middle of the table sat the Junior Officers and 
Senior Ratings, like the Cook and the Bosun leaving the most junior crew members, 
such as the OS  to sit at the far end. There were insufficient chairs in the room to 
accommodate all 12 of us, so the crew had to get their own chairs from the adjacent 
smoking room and the cargo control room. Other than the Captain, who had the last 
month’s safety meeting minutes and the 3rd Officer, who had a diary, no other crew 
members carried even any pen, pencil, paper or notebook. Refreshments were 
organised by the Cook before the meeting started and were provided only for the 
Captain and the Senior Officers.  
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Figure 3:  Safety meeting seating arrangement 
 
 
The safety committee meeting was a formal occasion, which was convened in the 
ship’s office. It was chaired by the Captain, who controlled the entire proceedings 
under the strict rules of ‘speak when spoken to’. At the start of the meeting the 
Captain asked the 3rd Officer to note down the minutes. The meeting lasted for15 
minutes, out of which the Captain spoke for over 13 minutes. While the Chief Officer 
and the Chief Engineer contributed for a minute or two, the others, particularly the 
Ratings, did not speak at all.  
 Quote: 9 (Ref: A-1-C) 
 
Examples of this hierarchical atmosphere were not just exhibited in meetings and drills but 
also in everyday activities. The control of the health and safety of the workplace appeared to 
be firmly in the hands of very few senior officers. Even in cases when ratings carried out 
actual hands-on tasks it appeared that they did not openly express any concerns about safety 
for fear of breaching the shipboard hierarchical order. Although this lack of openness did not 
necessarily mean that seafarers were any less safe, it did restrict the opportunity for a wider 
participation from ratings who could have usefully shared their concerns backed up with their 
knowledge and experience of risk posed in the workplace. This was exemplified in the 
following interview with an AB regarding entry into an enclosed space8:  
                                                 
8 Enclosed Space is a potentially oxygen-deficient compartment which is not entered regularly and the one which 
does not have a fixed means of suitable ventilation. On board ships it typically includes water ballast tanks, cargo 
tanks, void spaces, cofferdams etc.  
A.B. 
O.S. Oiler 3rd Off Ch/ Off Ch /Eng 
Capt 
Bosun Elect Off 2nd Eng Cook 
 
Apple juice 
Soft drinks 
Water bottles 
Four drinking glasses 
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Researcher  
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I can’t check meter (oxygen analyser)... if you follow the Chief Mate (Officer) you are 
OK. If chief mate say its OK then how can you argue... it is his responsibility to our 
safety. Mostly chief mate is the one who is doing it, but sometime he also send the 
cadet. If cadet is checking we can then going checking with him. 
 
Q. So can you check the oxygen reading if you are not sure, can you request the chief 
mate? 
No, because (on this ship) only the Chief is the one who is checking the meter. But if 
we smell gas we can go up (from the cargo tank) and then tell chief. I don’t know if I 
can check, sometime he (Chief Officer) may agree, depend on the man, but I will not 
ask this chief, may be he get annoyed with me.  
 Quote: 10 (Ref: A-2-E) 
 
However, the research also demonstrated that despite being in a hierarchical environment 
some individuals were able to make a significant difference in eliciting wider participation 
through their own efforts. Some senior officers were not prepared to accept ratings’ silence 
and skilfully devised innovative ways to encourage them to speak up. These officers 
appeared to be sensitive to the range of reasons underpinning the lack of communication, 
were innovative in their ways to motivate their juniors, and created an approachable 
atmosphere that brought them comparative success. Not surprisingly, they were also the 
officers who were most popular on the ships. One Chief Officer, for example, said: 
 
You need to know what works for them and what does not work for them. Sometimes 
it is better to play karaoke with them than trying safety meeting... well, that is only if 
you are that type. Otherwise you may set up 25 safety meetings and I wish you luck.  
 Quote: 11 (Ref: B-2-B) 
 
These Senior Officers developed their own ways of encouraging other officers and Ratings to 
share opinions and ideas. In another example, on another ship, I noted how the 2nd Engineer 
successfully intervened through an informal discussion. My field notes taken onboard read: 
 
During this morning’s coffee break at 10 o’clock I saw the 2nd Engineer coming to the 
crew smoke room to talk to the deck and the engine room crew before the work on the 
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hydraulic motor of the crane began. He made it a point to chat with them about the 
work schedule, safety precautions as well as the time scale of the work. He spent 20 
minutes with the crew drinking coffee and clarifying a number of issues raised by 
them. The Fitter, Bosun and the OS raised a lot of questions, including the sequence 
of dismantling and reconnecting the hydraulic pipes and wearing PPE. Interestingly, 
the ‘permit-to-work’ checklist for this job was (already) filled in and signed by the 
Chief Officer and the Captain at quarter-to-eight this morning. I felt that these 20 
minutes in the smoke room were much more valuable than the company’s ‘permit to 
work’ form filled in earlier in the day... In this occasion the formal checklist seemed 
to have served the official purpose whereas the initiative taken by the 2nd Engineer 
proved to be effective for the OHS of the seafarers. 
 Quote: 12 (Ref: A-1-C) 
 
Such informal procedures clearly ran in parallel with the more formalised and bureaucratic 
procedures embodied in the SMS. At the very least they complemented the SMS-based 
procedures but at times they also stood alone in contributing to the real work of day-to-day 
safety. In other words, these extra efforts from the senior officers yielded tangible and 
significant benefits to the management of the SMS which, at many times, were not achieved 
by literal application of the SMS based policies and procedures. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The research findings suggest that the extent and quality of seafarers’ participation in the 
safety management system on board was affected by three main factors. These were: Nature 
of Employment, Fear of Accountability, and issues related to Shipboard Hierarchy.  
 
With increasing globalisation across the shipping sector, and associated changes in the terms 
and conditions of labour, seafarers face changing employment patterns, such as the increased 
use of short- term, temporary, contracts. The research found that this type of employment 
contract promotes an unorganised and vulnerable labour force. The globalised nature of the 
industry also allows employers to choose and switch nationalities of seafarers with relative 
ease (Kahveci and Nichols, 2006). As a result, it generates fear in the minds of seafarers, and 
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in particular senior officers, about losing jobs to other nationals. Such labour market 
conditions cause seafarers to feel disempowered. Consequently, they hold back from actively 
volunteering their opinions, ideas and observations in relation to OHS issues for fear of 
losing their jobs. This feeling was very bluntly expressed by an OS:  
 
First we need job and then we think safety... but if no job then where is safety? 
 Quote: 13 (Ref: A-1-F) 
 
The research also shows that a vast majority of seafarers remain apprehensive about 
complying with SMS feedback mechanisms. Before reporting incidents to management they 
worry about the consequences in terms of their own accountability.  Furthermore, they are 
aware that any written communication and especially written incident reports invariably go 
on record, which is bound to make it easier for the administrative or legal authorities to 
“point a finger at them” (Jeffcoat et al., 2006). With the increase in seafarers’ criminalisation 
such fear runs very deep in their minds. As a result of all these pressures seafarers engage in 
selective reporting, leaving a substantial number of important incidents undiscussed when 
they might otherwise have made a positive contribut ion to the management of the company’s 
OHS.  
 
The research further demonstrates that a rigid onboard hierarchical setup merely limits 
seafarers’ input to the management of onboard OHS and facilitates seafarers’ adherence to 
OHS-related procedures and decisions that are taken by management. Such a setup fosters a 
lower level of participation and fails to promote the philosophy of involving seafarers in the 
decision-making process of OHS management. For a higher level participation to succeed, 
seafarers require a favourable and non-threatening atmosphere in which they may exchange 
ideas and experiences without fear of being reprimanded. However, the research also shows 
that the hierarchical setup varies from ship to ship and largely depends on senior officers who 
may resort to different and more informal means to enable the ratings to share their work 
experience and voice their concerns more freely. 
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Recommendations 
 
From the data presented in this paper serious concerns emerge with respect to both the extent 
and quality of seafarers’ participation in the management of their own OHS. Although it is 
true that seafarers themselves can deal with some of the issues that influence their 
participation, a substantial share of the responsibility lies in the hands of management. If 
ship-operators wish to utilise their SMS genuinely to improve safety, as opposed to simply 
operating a system as a bureaucratic exercise, then the extent and quality of seafarers’ 
participation needs to be pondered. The very concept of OHS management is associated with 
giving employees legitimate and systematic opportunit ies to address their own health and 
safety concerns  as well as taking the responsibility which underpins the philosophy of self-
regulation. Although it is imperative that management addresses each of the concerns raised 
in this paper, there is a deeper issue that we must attend to first.  
 
This deeper issue concerns the fact that seafarers’ participation in SMS continues to remain a 
contested concept. While some expect seafarers to be creative and forthcoming and to do 
more than just follow management- led procedures, others remain contented as long as 
seafarers follow the prescribed SMS onboard and adhere to new OHS information and 
decisions that are already taken by management. 
 
The evident need, therefore, is to bring about a common understanding of the term seafarers’ 
participation, within the industry, and ship-operators in particular, who hold the prime 
responsibility for the development, maintenance and continuous improvements of the SMS. 
It is proposed that operators involved in the running of SMS undergo training that addresses 
the underlying principles of self- regulated OHS management system of which seafarers’ 
participation is one of the key components. Particular concerns identified in this paper, i.e. 
employment patterns, alienation of the workforce, seafarers’ fear of accountability and 
shipboard hierarchical problems, may be easier to deal with once this deeper issue is 
addressed first. 
 
Further research is essential in order to understand this important subject within an industry 
which continues to be widely recognised as having one of the most dangerous workplaces.  
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